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A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

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CONTENTS

I. THE SETTLEMENT OF 1815	7
II. THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1830	18
III. THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848	30
IV. UNIFICATION	49
1. Italian Unity.	
2. German Unity.	
V. MIDDLE AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE	75
1. Poland after 1848.	
2. Austria after 1851.	
3. Nationalism in the Balkans.	
VI. NORTHERN NATIONS.	96
1. Norway.	
2. Ireland.	
VII. THE NEW STATES	119
1. Italy after 1860.	
2. Germany after 1871.	
VIII. INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES, 1870-1914	138
IX. NATIONALISM AND THE GREAT WAR	155
X. NATIONALISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR	168
A NOTE ON BOOKS.	195
INDEX	197

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

CHAPTER I

THE SETTLEMENT OF 1815

Main characteristics of nineteenth century European history. Nationalism and Liberalism; their importance and their inter-relations. The Vienna Settlement of 1815; its main basis. Generous treatment of France. European States in 1815.

IT is a commonplace, universally accepted and therefore frequently forgotten, that the main features of nineteenth-century history are Liberalism and Nationalism. These two great forces, both belonging to the realm of ideas rather than to that of the "hard facts" of history, were the products of the French Revolution. That vast movement, as a modern historian has said, is comparable in its effects to the Reformation and the rise of Christianity, because "like them it destroyed the landmarks of the world in which generations of men had passed their lives, because it was a movement towards a completer humanity, and because it too was a religion, with its doctrines, its apostles, and its martyrs." It is also comparable in that its effects were not those intended or expected by its early leaders. They proclaimed tirelessly the doctrine of the equality of man. This doctrine, essentially a political theory, produced three effective

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

principles : the sovereignty of the people, the importance of personal liberty, and Nationalism. This last was certainly foreign to the ideas of the early revolutionary leaders, who were thoroughly cosmopolitan in theory at least ; but it arose apparently inevitably out of the first. If the people were to be sovereign, then States must be formed from groups of people who wanted to be together in a State ; and such groups were found often to be nations. This was certainly a revolutionary principle at the end of the eighteenth century, which had seen the highest development of the Dynastic State. That State was the natural product of an aristocratic civilization, with its overwhelming emphasis on the family. The new emphasis on the people challenged the very basis of the older type of State, in which the opinions and desires of the masses had never been seriously considered.

So the history of the nineteenth century is the history of the development of these ideas, and the triumph of the Revolution over the old order which so bitterly opposed it. The early twentieth century, the product of this process, naturally saw that it was good ; it was the triumph of principles indubitably superior to those of the eighteenth century. The settlement at Vienna in 1815 might condemn Nationalism and individual liberty ; but these forces would prove too strong to be bound by such ties, and the nineteenth century is, in the main, the story of the undoing of 1815. This is the accepted view. Even to-day, when the importance of economic factors in history, so long practically ignored by historians, is over-emphasized, Liberalism and Nationalism take precedence over the Industrial Revolution in studies of the nineteenth century which are not primarily economic. This is possibly due in part to the habit of looking at

history from the political angle, and so making political factors of first importance ; but no modern historian is allowed to forget economic factors, and the refusal to replace the nineteenth-century version by one in which the Industrial Revolution takes the chief place must therefore be due to the persistent belief that these two factors are really the chief, and that even the vast industrial changes which transformed everyday life during the century are less important when the organization and development of Europe are under consideration.

Since both Liberalism and Nationalism were by-products of the French Revolution, it was perhaps natural that they should be regarded as twin or at least complementary forces working in their different ways towards "a completer humanity." At different times and in different places one or the other would be more prominent ; but they were working together, and the final issue would be the liberation of mankind from the chains that so long had bound it. Until quite recently there was seldom a note of doubt. History had reached, or was reaching, its final phase, and increasing development of the rights of the individual and of democracy within Nation-States was all that the future would have to chronicle. The battle for liberty had been won at last ; all the twentieth century would need to do would be to garner the harvest.

The spectacle of Europe at the present day is an ironic comment on these beliefs ; and all are now conscious that the problems of mankind were not settled once and for all in the nineteenth century. Increasingly, in this country, the ordinary man wonders what is wrong with Europe. He wonders why the nineteenth century has not gone on, and why democracy and freedom have

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

suddenly disappeared from so large a part of the Continent. Is this a temporary madness from which Europe will speedily recover to renew the "progress" of which she was so proud, or is the new Europe likely to be permanent? This insular view is thoroughly characteristic of the Englishman. He has not yet abandoned his views on liberty; and to him, therefore, Europe, intent on the complete subordination of the individual, is mad. The post-war world seems to have turned its back on the nineteenth century, and to be determined to destroy all its works. The ordinary man's views of the continuity of history are thus also upset. But post-war Europe is, in fact, the product of the nineteenth century, and the apparent contradiction in outlook and in aim is only apparent; the really effective forces of the nineteenth century are still in operation. What needs correction is the current view of that century. Seen in its correct proportions as a century of developing Nationalism, the nineteenth century leads naturally to the twentieth century. The Englishman tends to get things wrong because he looks at European history from an English standpoint, and assumes that what is true of England is true, though probably with some delay and to a less degree, of Europe in general. Accepting the view that Liberalism and Nationalism are the potent factors of the nineteenth century, he tends to assume that the greater of these is Liberalism; that, in fact, Nationalism is merely an aspect of Liberalism, an aspect fortunately unnecessary in his own happy country in the nineteenth century, rendered necessary in some parts of Europe because, at bottom, they were backward.

So far neither Liberalism nor Nationalism has been accurately defined; and rightly, because neither is

capable of scientific definition. The ideas which move men politically do so in virtue of their force and their appeal, and not because they are clear or accurate. Ideas are likely to be influential almost because they are vague ; such ideas gain support from various quarters. Different people are attracted by different aspects of the theory which happen to appeal to their special interests. Since Nationalism and Liberalism have been real forces during recent European history, it may be taken for granted that they will not easily be confined into a definition. The warning perhaps is necessary that " Liberalism " throughout is used in its European sense, and not with its English party connotation. It stands, therefore, for a belief in the importance of individual freedom, and, politically, for representative democracy. In the nineteenth century it stood especially for the right of the common people to a share in their government, and against the autocratic methods customary in the greater part of Europe. In this sense a political theorist of the present day despairingly says of Liberalism that it " is not easy to describe, much less to define, for it is hardly less a habit of mind than a body of doctrine." Nationalism has obviously been difficult to define. Those who attempt the task generally end by stating, in one form or another, that Nationalism is an idea, and that a group of people become a nation because they believe they are a nation. It is, in fact, comparatively easy to recognize a nation. Self-conscious nations are in the main a modern phenomenon, and in the nineteenth century were confined to Europe, with the exceptions of the Japanese and the Jews. Even in Europe nations had not generally become Nation-States at the beginning of the century, but they had done so in the west and north.

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

Thus the English, French, and Spaniards in the west had been conscious nations for considerable periods, and in the north the Scandinavian countries had developed national consciousness. The Vienna Settlement left Norway under the control of Sweden, but the Norwegians were as much a nation as were the Swedes or the Danes. In central and eastern Europe Nation-States had not yet been developed, and Nationalism was a comparatively new force. The reasons for this varying development lie mainly in the past histories of the different areas, and not in any particular virtue or lack of it in the various peoples. But the fact that central and eastern Europe had generally so far failed to develop Nation-States was to have very great effects on European history during the nineteenth century.

Both Liberalism and Nationalism, therefore, are essentially ideas—ideas about the way in which man should organize his corporate life. To an Englishman, nationality is taken for granted. This has been true for so long that it has ceased to be a live political issue ; and this was as true in the nineteenth century as it is to-day. When he thinks of it all, the Englishman tends to take it as a necessary basis for Liberalism and freedom. It is an elementary step taken by us long ago which some unfortunates in Europe took only in the nineteenth century. This attitude accounts for his discomfort about Ireland. Irish Nationalism has been a thorn in his side largely because, though he was unwilling on practical grounds to concede the Irish demands, he felt that they were a nation struggling to be free ; and he had a bad conscience about opposing such a struggle. It was out of harmony with his general policy and outlook and with his declared ideals. Unfortunately, instead of facing

THE SETTLEMENT OF 1815

this issue the Englishman preferred to try to ignore it; he carried on with his opposition to the Irish, trying to forget that they were a nation struggling for freedom. One of the great objections to the "terrible old man" was that Gladstone brought this issue to the forefront, making the average Englishman dreadfully uncomfortable, and therefore viciously unreasonable. There was irony in this as a good deal of his discomfort was often unnecessary, being due to his own confusion as to the relationship between Nationalism and Liberalism. That relationship is, at bottom, necessarily antagonistic. Liberalism is fundamentally individualistic; it stresses the need for individual liberty so that personality may be developed. Nationalism stresses the claims of the group and subordinates individual rights entirely to these claims. This survey of the nineteenth century is an attempt to see these two great forces in their real relationship, and to make intelligible not only that century but the subsequent history of Europe. For that reason it has been entitled "A Century of Nationalism."

The nineteenth century, for historical purposes, begins in 1815 and ends in 1918; it therefore stretches from the Congress of Vienna to the Treaties of Versailles. The former effort at peace-making has been severely criticized, especially by those generations which had not experienced a general European war, and had therefore not had to attempt the effort of pacification themselves. The main burden of the usual criticism is that the settlement completely ignored the great forces released by the French Revolution, and thereby made its own destruction certain. More lenient because of our own failure at Versailles, the present generation emphasizes the virtue of Vienna and its success in preventing a major conflict

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

in Europe for half a century. Unquestionably the diplomats headed by Metternich had no love for either Liberalism or Nationalism ; their business was to destroy the Revolution, and these were its unwelcome products. But they were, on the whole, good Europeans ; they did attempt to make a settlement which would leave as few rankling sores as possible, on their basis that the only concern of the masses with government was to obey. To create bulwarks against France they added the Austrian Netherlands to Holland, and strengthened Piedmont by the addition of Genoa. The feelings of the Belgians and of the Genoese were alike ignored ; and Nationalism in Germany remained particularist, Prussia gaining not only territory, especially in the Rhine area, but moral force as a National State. Austria enlarged her territory by the addition of numerous non-German areas ; and Italian Nationalism, like Polish, was entirely flouted. Liberalism, it was felt, was a danger that each State must guard itself against (it was generally called Jacobinism or Revolution) ; though Metternich hoped by precept and example to spread the Austrian system, guaranteed illiberal, widely throughout Europe—a hope largely fulfilled. The “western Powers,” France and Britain, were incurably infected ; but the disease might be prevented from spreading.

In the stress of the war against Napoleon the allies had made use of the idea of Nationalism ; they recognized the real distinction between this force and Liberalism, and tried to arouse national feeling against Napoleon in Italy and Poland, and even in Germany. The war over, they ignored their own promises and suggestions and made their settlement on other principles. The lesson of national resistance in Spain and Russia had

been only partially learned. It is clear, especially from the attitude of Metternich's Austria, that Liberalism was feared, but not regarded as inevitable or unavoidable, and that Nationalism was not considered a serious factor. No government which believed that Nationalism was a force of the future would have saddled itself with the various fragments of which the Austrian Empire was composed. It was this error which created the ramshackle empire which was to disintegrate in 1918, and led, in 1938, to the absorption of German Austria in a Germany largely created and dominated by Prussia. The error is intelligible when one considers the cosmopolitanism of a great man like Goethe.

The most commendable feature of Vienna was its lack of vindictiveness. For this Castlereagh and Wellington deserve tremendous credit. They were cool and sensible enough to insist on a settlement which should not irretrievably humiliate and embitter France, and thus made possible Talleyrand's otherwise incredible success in making his beaten country immediately a factor in European diplomacy. That they should have maintained this attitude in 1815, after the Hundred Days, as well as in 1814, is really surprising. Their realistic insistence that to associate indelibly the restored Bourbons with the crippling of France would make their position untenable was elementary political sense; but such elementary sense is not so easily observable in the treatment of the Weimar Republic in 1919. It was this side of the Vienna settlement that accounted for its considerable measure of success. And this cool and sensible attitude was possible largely because the statesmen, even of Britain, ignored the passionate demands of the "Nationalists" and the masses. Thus the Prussian

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

demand for Alsace-Lorraine was refused, though on purely national grounds a good case might be made for it. Such a weakening of France, it was felt, would make the position of Louis XVIII. impossible. Aristocratic management of foreign affairs comes rather well out of this testing period. The bitter, more vocal, and more politically effective passions of 1918 were evidently beyond the control of the statesmen then.

Though the Congress invented a principle of "legitimism," the restoration of the governments displaced by the Revolution or by Napoleon, as the basis for its remaking of the map of Europe, it paid only lip-service to this invention of Talleyrand; the real basis of its work was the compromising of conflicting interests; and in this task the interests of beaten France were wisely included. The continued fragmentation of German lands, the partition of Poland, and the treatment of the Italian States prove conclusively that the Congress did not take Nationalism seriously. Liberalism they took very seriously and tried, with considerable success, to ensure its suppression.

The history of the nineteenth century may be viewed as the story of the undoing of the work of the Congress of Vienna. This is clearly only a partial view, but it has the merit of making an intelligible story, and one which has a large measure of the truth. No brief sketch of so long and important a period can attempt completeness, but it is hoped that this account of the undoing of Vienna by the force of Nationalism will give a guiding thread which will make it easier to follow the complicated pattern of European affairs during an active and confused period. The main features of Europe after the Congress of Vienna had completed its

labours, and avoided the open quarrels which seemed likely to interrupt its efforts, were the National States of England, France, Spain, and Portugal in the west ; nearly forty States of varying size in Germany ; seven States, together with Austrian provinces, in Italy ; an Austrian Empire centred round Austria and Hungary, which included various Slav areas as well as the Italian provinces ; the continued partition of Poland among Russia, Prussia, and Austria ; a Sweden which included Norway, transferred from Denmark ; a very large Russia in the east ; and a Turkish Empire in the Balkans which was already tottering. The most powerful States, apart from Britain, were France, Austria, and Russia. The danger of French hegemony was still regarded as real ; it was assumed that no other single Power would be able to face France successfully.

CHAPTER II

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1830

Troubles after 1815. Mutiny in Spain ; revolts in Portugal and Naples. The Greek insurrection. Attitude of the Powers. Eventual intervention. Revolution in France, 1830. Resultant movements in Belgium, Poland, and Italy. Greece and Belgium as "National" States.

It was Liberalism which first gave trouble to the governments of Europe ; the Spanish constitution of 1812 haunts the period immediately after 1815. Spanish constitutionalism—a somewhat strange and fantastic plant—seems fated to distract the harmony of Europe. The Constitution of 1812, a paper affair of Liberal parentage produced during the struggle against Napoleon, and therefore never really tried out in practice, was promptly suppressed by the restored Ferdinand, a Bourbon of the most recalcitrant and stupid variety. It became a banner for the Liberals not only of Spain but of southern Europe generally, and threatened in 1820 to become a banner of war. But somehow Liberalism failed to seize the popular imagination, as the abortive efforts in that year proved. This was prophetic of subsequent events ; Liberal revolutions, though they might look dangerous, generally proved easy to suppress. Fundamentally, this was because they failed to arouse sufficient popular enthusiasm. They were usually con-

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1830

finer too much to the middle classes, who may be necessary to lead a revolution, but are by themselves unable to make one. The masses might shout for Liberalism, but they would not fight for it.

The Spanish revolt of 1820 was primarily a mutiny. The army gathered at Cadiz for the purpose of subduing the rebellious Spanish colonies in America realized that it was being sent to almost certain death. Plots against the government had long been rife among the officers, and they now revolted, proclaiming their adherence to the Constitution of 1812. The movement was but ill managed; but it was sufficient to frighten Ferdinand into accepting the Constitution. He soon showed that he desired to restore the clerical and absolutist rule to which he was accustomed; and eventually, in 1823, he gained his ends with the assistance of a French army. The Duc d'Angoulême's invasion of Spain to restore Absolutism completed and proved the respectability of the new France in the eyes of the Concert of the Powers which was trying to control European affairs. Angoulême met no real resistance, except when he tried to restrain Ferdinand from wreaking vengeance on his Liberal opponents. The Spanish people showed very little enthusiasm for constitutionalism, and submitted to the reaction almost without protest. Canning took the opportunity to make known England's feelings by recognizing the independence of the Spanish colonies in America.

The Spanish outbreak precipitated a revolt at Naples. This kingdom, which included the southern portion of Italy and the island of Sicily, had lost a good deal of its feudalism under the rule of Joseph Bonaparte and Murat; and on his restoration Ferdinand, another Bourbon, had

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

followed the example rather of Louis XVIII. in France than of his own namesake in Spain. The existing system was little altered, except that the Church regained its lost authority; but it was merely a modified Absolutism which the French had set up, and Ferdinand's rather natural support of those who had been with him in Sicily, which England had always been able to preserve from conquest by the French, gave cause for discontent to those who had been on the mainland and had therefore accepted the French. The secret society called the Carbonari became practically a conspiratorial party against the government. Encouraged by the news from Spain, in the middle of 1820 they declared for the Constitution, and Ferdinand, finding that even the army was mainly on the side of the rebels, took a solemn oath to the Constitution. He then wrote hurriedly to the Emperor of Austria asking for help against his rebellious subjects. Metternich would readily have sent an army forthwith as the troubles in Italy were bound to affect Austria directly, but he had first to submit the question for discussion at a couple of conferences of the Concert of the Powers. Eventually he was able to send an army from Lombardy in February 1821. There was no actual battle; the rebels as an armed force simply disintegrated; and the restored Ferdinand made his new despotism more after the Spanish model.

Portugal, too, saw a "Liberal" attempt in 1820; though here the main desire was for a return of the King and Court, which had fled to Brazil in 1807 on the first French attack. Even in 1815 the King refused to return, and the English Marshal Beresford remained the practical ruler of Portugal. The revolts at Oporto and Lisbon in 1820, though they demanded a constitution, were

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1830

primarily concerned with securing Portuguese government for Portugal. In this they succeeded, as the Court returned from Brazil, leaving the King's eldest son as Emperor there. The question of a constitution languished until 1826, when, on the death of John VI., Pedro, the Emperor of Brazil, granted a constitution to Portugal before finally renouncing the crown. His brother Miguel became the Absolutist pretender to the throne nominally managed by a Regency for Pedro's daughter. Only the sending of a British force by Canning saved the country from reaction of the type triumphant in Spain. Thus of all these movements the only successful one was that part of the Portuguese movement which was purely Nationalist, and insisted on having a national government in the country. All the Liberal efforts only produced eventually a worse despotism ; and no popular movement could be aroused against this.

The Greek struggle for freedom from the Turks was essentially a Nationalist movement. Primarily because of the difference in religion, the Turks had never made any effort to absorb the various national groups they had overrun in the Balkans, except in so far as they had accepted as Turks all who became Moslems. Even in this distant and backward part of Europe the repercussions of the French Revolution were felt, and the various subject peoples began to stir. The first to make an open bid for independence were the Greeks. Though their Byzantine Empire had fallen before the Turks, and their country had disappeared in the Sultan's dominions, the Greeks remained the most important of the subject races. This was primarily because the Christian Church of all the Balkan peoples was the Greek Orthodox. Since the Church was used by the Turks as a means of

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

managing their dominions, the Greek priests and bishops formed a part of the government machinery, and the patriarch at Constantinople was a great official as well as head of the Church to which Russia belonged. In addition, a good deal of the civil service which ran the Turkish Empire was Greek. The Greek national revival began, as has often happened, by a linguistic revival. Koraes did a magnificent work for his country when he stabilized and refined the language and laid the foundations of modern Greek. Economic wellbeing had also come. In the war between Russia and Turkey in 1768, Russia had persuaded the Greeks to take up arms. They suffered severely, and were practically deserted by Russia; but by the Treaty of Kainardji, in 1774, Russia became Protector of the Christians in the Balkans; and by a stretching of the terms of another clause she allowed Greek merchant ships to hoist the Russian flag and enjoy valuable commercial privileges. As all ships had to be armed against the Mediterranean pirates, the Greeks in effect became possessed of a navy before they had a country. The value of this, should any attempt for independence be made, was obvious.

The disturbances caused by the French Revolution made the Greeks more nationally conscious, and the failure of the Congress of Vienna to do anything for them produced a secret society which aimed at the revival of the Byzantine Empire. The fact that the Greek islands in particular were practically free, and enjoyed a prosperity which might well have been envied by any other Europeans, made not for content with the nominal Turkish rule, but for a desire for a National State. In 1821 the various plots produced action. An insurrection was begun under Ypsilanti, a Greek general in the Russian

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1830

army in Moldavia, a part of the modern Roumania nearest to the Russian frontier. He hoped for help from the Tsar, but Alexander, now wholly converted to Metternich's views, would not support a "revolutionary" movement. The synchronization with the revolts in Spain and Italy was unfortunate for this effort, as for some time the eastern European Powers persisted in regarding the Greek movement as a "Jacobin" one, to be condemned because it aimed at the overthrow of an existing government. But the failure of Ypsilanti and his movement, which aimed at replacing Turkish by Greek domination of the Balkans, caused the Greeks to concentrate on an effort to free their own real home, the islands and the Morea. The revolt now became wholly a national affair, fought with the thoroughgoing hatred usual in such struggles. Massacre and counter-massacre harried the area, the previously happy islands suffering particularly. The various Powers, each primarily concerned to uphold its own interests and prevent the undue expansion of any other State, were chiefly afraid that Russia might take the opportunity to dismember the Turkish Empire. So, though there was a strong sentimental attachment to the Greek cause, not only in Russia, where it was mainly inspired by their ecclesiastical unity, but in France and England, where it was largely the product of "classical" education, there was no official intervention on the Greek side. Volunteers might fight and die for Greece, and, like Byron, proclaim their opinions of the statesmen who permitted the massacres to continue; but the jealousies of the Powers froze them into immobility. They had certainly the excuse that in bloodthirstiness and savagery the Greeks were at least the equals of their foes, though the

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

devastation of Chios and the massacre of its inhabitants in 1822 made this once happy island a symbol of Turkish barbarity.

Since neither side proved able really to defeat the other, the war appeared likely to drag on interminably ; then Sultan Mahmud called in the help of Mehemet Ali of Egypt, nominally his vassal. Mehemet possessed an efficient fleet and army, and his intervention seemed likely to result in the defeat and possible extermination of the Greeks. This was too much for the Powers, and Russia, now ruled by Nicholas I., France under Charles X., and England, finally agreed on joint intervention. At Navarino in 1827 a joint squadron destroyed the Egyptian fleet ; and the declaration of war on Turkey by Russia in 1828 resulted in 1829 in the Treaty of Adrianople, and eventually led in 1829 to the creation of a small Greek kingdom, which after some difficulties found a sovereign in Prince Otto of Bavaria. The success of the Greeks was therefore by no means the result of their own unaided efforts ; but the persistence of the small kingdom, and its eventual growth, were unquestionably due to their national solidarity, which united even the quarrelsome Greeks against their national foes. The first real triumph of Nationalism in the nineteenth century had been won, though with difficulty.

The Greek War of Independence had not directly affected the Vienna Settlement ; the first successful attacks on those arrangements came in 1830. Not only did the French expel the reactionary Charles X. in the July Revolution, replacing him by the bourgeois Orleanist monarch Louis Philippe ; but the Belgians, stirred by the excitement in Paris, revolted against the Dutch. This was essentially a Nationalist movement, though the

discontents of the Belgians were sharpened by religious, political, and economic grievances. It is possible that had the affair been left to the Belgians and Dutch to settle for themselves, this movement would also have been unsuccessful at the moment. But Belgian affairs have always been of international importance, and England as well as France was interested. Talleyrand, now nearly eighty, did a further great service to France by securing the assent of Wellington and William IV. to the recognition of the new Belgian State; incidentally, he invented the principle of non-intervention to lend moral justification to this condonation of rebellion. The support of France and England, especially as the French eventually sent armed forces, really settled the question, since the other European Powers were too busy with their own problems effectively to help the Dutch; though it was not until 1839 that the Dutch king William finally agreed to the dismemberment of his dominions. The permanent success of the policy of the western Powers in this instance was caused by their support of a national movement. They did not support it for that reason, but it was the Nationalist backing which made the new Belgian State under Leopold of Saxe-Coburg a permanent feature of the nineteenth century and not a passing arrangement.

Very effective indirect help was given unintentionally to the Belgians by the Poles. Polish national feeling was at this time almost entirely confined to the landowning class, and was primarily directed against Russia, not only because she held the greater portion of the old kingdom, but also because Alexander had partially recognized the separate identity of his Polish province, giving it an organization of its own. The Russifying tendencies of

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

his successor Nicholas helped to strengthen the Polish desire for independence ; and the disturbance in France, from which country the Poles always hoped for sympathy and help, started a movement which soon became a war against Russia. As both Prussia and Austria held Polish territory, they naturally watched this rebellion much more closely than the Belgian troubles. Though the Poles were eventually, in 1831, thoroughly beaten by Russia, they prevented all three eastern Powers from exerting any real influence on the Belgian question. The failure of the Poles, faced as they were by a great Power like Russia, with Prussia and Austria in the background, was perhaps inevitable ; but it was made more certain by their lack of unity, and by the fact that Polish Nationalism was largely confined to the landlord class, who kept down their peasants in a serfdom quite as thorough as Russia itself could desire. In such circumstances Nationalism could not be a really popular movement inspiring the masses. The disappearance of Poland, which had once been a considerable Empire, from the map towards the end of the eighteenth century was largely the fault of the Poles themselves. Primarily a ruling class, and thoroughly feudal in outlook, they carried localism to excess, and effectively prevented any real central government from being established. The elective nature of their kingship, and the absurd *liberum veto*, by which any baron could veto any proposal, rendered the central government helpless. The temptation offered by such a State to its neighbours proved irresistible ; and the peasants, who were not always of Polish blood, had no special reason to object to a change which really affected them but slightly. In the old Polish State they were serfs, with no voice in the govern-

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1830

ment ; the new masters could not offer less. It was not until the Polish upper classes, learning very slowly from adversity, began to stress the national aspect of their movement, and to try to make common cause with the Polish peasants, that there was any prospect of success. They learned so slowly that their chance had then gone. Only the Great War revived the Polish question as a live issue.

In 1830 Austria was even more concerned with disturbances in Italy than with the Polish insurrection, her Galician territory, her share of the Polish spoil having a Ruthenian population with Polish landlords. There was thus little danger of a national movement to disturb the Austrian rule. In Italy, after the Neapolitan failure in 1821, revolutionary activity had been concentrated mainly on the badly managed Papal States. These curious territorial possessions of the Church formed a block in central Italy, and illustrated all the worst vices of clericalism. Insurrection broke out in February 1831 ; it was inspired partly by national feeling, but probably more by Liberalism and a desire to mitigate the misgovernment which was peculiarly flagrant in the Papal States. The Pope was quite unable to suppress the rebels. He promptly appealed to Austria for aid. Metternich, rightly judging that Louis Philippe would not risk a conflict, suppressed the Roman rebels in March ; and a further rising in 1832 was again dealt with immediately by Austrian intervention. All that France could do was to insist on the withdrawal of the Austrian troops after their work was done. The Italian States were left to the mismanagement of their autocrats. No really national movement had been aroused, and the Liberal movement again proved to have little real backing among the people.

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

In Germany only minor Liberal attempts were caused by the excitements of 1830, and they produced no important alteration of the existing order. Liberalism and Nationalism were still very generally confused; the Liberal movement in France incited both Liberal and National movements in various parts of Europe; and both were regarded as "revolutionary," without much distinction being made between them. That the one success outside France was a National movement was to some extent an accident: Belgium gained her independence, as has been seen, chiefly as a by-product of European international rivalries. Even the Polish movement began as a "Liberal" demand for the restoration of Alexander's constitution. The existing order in Europe had survived 1830 practically unaltered. It proved too strong to be seriously upset by its assailants. But the events in the Balkans and the Low Countries were significant pointers. Neither had much influence on the governments of Europe. Greece, and the Balkans generally, were hardly thought of as being European at all; they formed part of the "Near East," and were a problem chiefly because they were not really included in Europe. So no very serious notice was likely to be taken of events there; that is, no lesson was likely to be thought applicable to European affairs in general. As for the Belgian business, this was regarded as the result of sharp practice by France and England, which unfortunately could not be prevented because of the Polish and Italian troubles. The common feature of Nationalism was hardly realized. Perhaps it was natural for those who knew the background of the Polish movement best to discount its National aspect. Nationalism was certainly not the real basis of the insurrection

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1830

of 1830 ; the Polish nobility was fighting for its lost domination. So, after the first shock, the governments settled down again, chiefly concerned, as all peaceful governments tend to be, to maintain the existing arrangements. " Revolution " had been defeated, and all was well again.

CHAPTER III

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848

Mehemet Ali and Turkey. The danger of war in 1840. Troubles in Italy before 1848. The "Year of Revolutions." Nationalist movements in Italy and the Austrian Empire. Reasons for the eventual failure of these movements. The clash of Liberalism and Nationalism in Austria. The revolutions in Germany. The failure of Liberalism to produce unity. The results of 1848.

BETWEEN 1830 and 1848 there were no movements of first-rate importance in Europe. The system of Metternich, having survived the shocks of 1830, seemed to have become permanent. "Revolutionary" movements, whether National or Liberal, were driven underground, there to fester unhealthily, unable to influence current events. Such attempts as Mazzini's invasion into Italy from Switzerland in 1834 only illustrated the strength of the existing governments. These governments, generally Absolutist, remained determinedly opposed to any change. Metternich's ideal of a system practically frozen seemed to be realizable. The Miguelist and Carlist wars in Portugal and Spain were certainly based on the antagonism between Liberals and Absolutists ; but local conditions were of primary importance, and as the long Carlist war dragged on, whatever principles had originally divided the warring groups were almost forgotten in the ferocities of a civil war waged as relentlessly as the then available means of destruction

made possible. The support given by England and France to the Liberal side was half-hearted; they were unwilling to risk a European war on the Spanish issue, and the modern technique of wholesale "unofficial" intervention had not then been developed, nor would it have served to blind the other group of Powers had it been tried. So the local struggles in the Iberian peninsula remained local; this became in fact their dominant feature. So far as any principle was at stake, it came to be the desire of the various provinces for a good deal of local self-government.

Europe was brought nearer a general war by affairs in the eastern Mediterranean in which Nationalism played no part. Mehemet Ali, the ruler of Egypt and nominally a vassal of Turkey, who had been called in by Mahmud against the Greeks, was far more vigorous and more powerful than the Sultan. With his capable son Ibrahim he had ambitions to found a powerful and independent kingdom, based on Egypt, but including a good deal of the Turkish dominions in Palestine and Syria. He gained the support of France, but the other European Powers, for varying reasons, preferred to preserve the Turkish Empire from dismemberment in this way. Thus Mehemet Ali's success when open war broke out against Turkey, and his support by France against the other Powers, seemed likely to produce a major conflict in 1840. But Louis Philippe had no desire to revive the coalition against France, and the dismissal of Thiers ensured that she would not provoke a war. So Turkey was saved by the Powers, Mehemet Ali having to be content with much less than he had initially demanded. The excitement produced a very important effect in Germany, where the prospect of an invasion by France

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

caused an unexpected outburst of patriotic fervour. Opposition to Prussia in western Germany was forgotten, and two patriotic songs, one the famous "Die Wacht am Rhein," accurately expressed the feelings aroused. The opposition to Prussia in Germany was mainly Liberal in origin, since Prussia was notoriously a politically backward State ; but it was submerged when national feeling was aroused by the possibility of a threat from France. This was prophetic of the relations between the two forces for the remainder of the century.

The storm that was to burst in Europe in 1848 was presaged chiefly in Italy. In that "geographical expression" of Metternich's phrase, Liberalism and Nationalism were working together, largely because Austria herself had made it clear in 1830 that there could be no relaxation of Absolutism anywhere in Italy so long as she remained the dominant Power. In no part of Italy would any attempt to Liberalize the existing system be permitted ; Austrian troops would unfailingly support the Absolutist régimes. Those Italians who had Liberal ideals and sympathies were therefore compelled to become Nationalists in addition. This makes intelligible the amazing enthusiasm for Pius IX. in 1846 ; the new Pope was acclaimed not only because he was believed to be more Liberal than his predecessor, but more because he seemed prepared to make a stand against Austria. The effect of Mazzini's persistent efforts to arouse Italian national feeling was seen in the excited support of Pius IX. as a leader against the dominant foreign Power. Gioberti's idea of a federal Italy under the leadership of the Pope seemed for a brief moment to be practical politics. Fortunately for Italy as a nation, it was only for a moment. The Papacy was by its nature no leader

for a national movement ; and the Italians were gradually to become conscious that it was a national struggle for unity in which they were engaged. The story of that struggle is one of the most colourful and dramatic of the century ; the Italian Risorgimento has become the standard example of a successful national movement. In fact, it was not that. Few historical movements are unmixed with other elements, since man is not a simple creature. The struggle to create a national movement in Italy was prolonged, and by no means entirely successful.

The greatest figure of the Risorgimento was Mazzini. He allied to his Nationalism an unbending Republicanism, which was to prevent his having any direct political success ; and he spent nearly his whole life in exile. But he preached Italian unity passionately and unceasingly, and from the first insisted that it must mean the expulsion of Austria. His whole energies were given to the cause, in which he saw moral grandeur far more than mere politics ; and his plottings and his writings slowly influenced his countrymen. His work was preparatory, but it was thoroughly done. Without him the dramatic successes of the movement would have been impossible. His generalizings and his moral ardour made him specially effective in England, where he was universally regarded as an apostle of liberty. Since the Italian question was bound to produce international complications, his international reputation was of real value to the movement. Of the other great figures of the Risorgimento, Garibaldi was primarily able to rouse real popular enthusiasm. He brought that essential personal magnetism which attracts the masses, and which made him the greatest leader of "irregular" forces of his day. He was the perfect leader for an apparently

forlorn hope. Cavour was a Piedmontese statesman concerned with practical possibilities and with a union which would make Piedmont the leader of the new Italy. He was a skilful statesman, able to use the national feeling which Mazzini had made vocal, and the enthusiasm which Garibaldi was able to add. The combination of these three might have been sufficient to produce a Nation-State ; unfortunately, it was impossible for them to combine. Mazzini, a republican, could never see a Piedmontese statesman as the architect of the Italy of his dreams ; and Garibaldi found the statesman's sense of the possible much too narrow for his enthusiasms. Thus even before practical steps had been taken there was serious disagreement among the leaders. There were also other serious difficulties hampering the growth of the movement for any real union of Italy : the very great differences between the north and south of the country in social organization and economic activities and general outlook ; the natural desire of the discontented in each separate State to improve their immediate condition by "Liberalizing" that State ; the existence of the States of the Church with their religious and international complications ; and mere fear of the power of Austria. The course of Italian unity was not likely to run smooth. But the excitements of 1846 showed that the movement was developing, and that open struggle was certain in the near future.

1848 was the critical year of the nineteenth century. It was not only a year of revolutions, in which government after government was attacked ; a year which saw the fall of Metternich and of his system ; but a year in which the two great revolutionary ideas unconsciously but clearly defined their mutual relationship. The events

of 1848 were important in themselves ; they also predicted accurately the main tendencies of the remainder of the century. To the revolutionaries throughout Europe, Liberalism was the vital force, with Nationalism a useful handmaid. It is now clear that Nationalism was really the dominant force, the underlying idea which gave vigour to the various efforts to change the existing order in Europe. The tocsin might be sounded by a Liberal revolution in France, but it was a series of National movements that were aroused by that signal. To the Englishman of the time all were movements for liberation, and therefore essentially Liberal and democratic ; Europe was at last really setting out on the road on which England had led the way, and the march towards a democratic world had begun in earnest. This delusion, natural at the time, is now unreasonable ; but current English views of European affairs are often unconsciously still based on it.

When at the very beginning of 1848 revolt broke out in Palermo it was assumed that Austria would step in as usual, especially since troubles also occurred in Lombardy itself, directly under Austrian rule. To the astonishment of every one Austria had to deal with serious internal revolt. Both the Italian movements, it will be noted, had begun before the French Revolution against Louis Philippe broke out late in February. Austria, the dominant European Power after 1815, dominant more perhaps through Metternich's diplomatic skill than through the Empire's military strength, had every reason to oppose both Liberalism and Nationalism. The Empire consisted of an extraordinary mixture of peoples at very different cultural and economic levels, held together by the administration and the army, though

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

geographically and economically the area had real possibilities of unified development. If economic factors were really basic to political development, Austria might well have developed into a powerful and united State ; but economic factors by themselves are an inadequate foundation, as the history of Austria was to prove. Any development of national feeling spelt dismemberment ; it was only the carelessness and half-heartedness of the régime that allowed the movements for the revival of national languages to proceed unhindered. Language revival is almost a clinical symptom of an early stage of Nationalism and should have been a warning to the government. Probably Metternich never took Nationalism very seriously ; he was more afraid of Liberalism, against which the main energies of his government were directed. Anything savouring of democracy was to him the direct product of the Revolution, against which his whole career had been directed, and to combat which was the mainspring of both his internal and his external policy. Unfortunately, he had nothing positive to add to this entirely negative outlook. Between 1815 and 1848 he did as nearly nothing as was possible. So barren a conservatism could arouse no enthusiasm ; Metternich, essentially eighteenth century and aristocratic, made the fatal mistake of leaving all the enthusiasms to his opponents.

The most real and effective of the non-German groups in the Austrian Empire was the Magyar. Austria had developed from an Archduchy to an Empire largely by dynastic arrangements, and not by conquest. The Habsburgs had been very fortunate in their marriages. They had married into the neighbouring ruling houses ; and almost invariably these houses died out, and they

succeeded as the nearest heirs to valuable territories. Thus the kingdom of Hungary had not been conquered, but acquired. This special means of territorial expansion had meant that Austria had grown peacefully and inexpensively; but it also meant that the various kingdoms and principalities felt themselves to be equals, and not subordinate to German-speaking Austria. In the eighteenth century the spread of "benevolent despotism" to Austria had meant primarily the attempt to unify the organization and government of the various dominions by Joseph II.; this had been resisted. Thus something of the organization of the old Hungarian kingdom remained; and Austria's obstinate efforts to secure the disappearance of these elements by disuse made it possible for the Magyars to fight as "Conservatives" struggling to preserve a legitimate existing order which Metternich was trying to change. That there was nothing really Liberal about the movement was shown by the steady resistance of the lesser landlords to any diminution of their privileges, especially the freedom of their estates, even if newly acquired, from taxation. But the fervid eloquence of Kossuth gave a specious appearance of Liberalism to the movement, even when it was trying to impose the Magyar language throughout the eastern half of the Austrian Empire, to a majority of whose inhabitants it was foreign. The Magyar movement, therefore, though claiming to be a national movement, and generally accepted as such, was, in fact, an attempt at class domination. The Magyar nobles wanted the right to lord it over the entire eastern portion of the Empire. The stand of Széchenyi and Deák to maintain existing rights in Hungary gave them a solid foundation against a government like the Austrian;

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

it also kept the movement within "constitutional" bounds and delayed the appeal to force. It was left to the Polish landlords in Galicia to begin armed insurrection in 1846. This movement was planned by Polish exiles, mainly from Russia, in Paris; Galicia rather than Warsaw was chosen after their experiences in 1831. But the insurrection was even more flagrantly a class movement than the Magyar one; and the Ruthenian peasants helped materially to crush the Polish landlords. Since they did so with the usual barbarity of the peasant when aroused, their assistance was somewhat embarrassing to the government. But what really popular national feeling there was in this instance was on the side of the Austrians. This was not the case as the revolt spread.

That spread was due to the excitement caused everywhere by the news from Paris. The fall of the Orleanist dynasty came on a Europe on which Liberal and National movements were straining against suppression; it gave the little extra impetus needed to make these movements open insurrections, and all Europe was soon ablaze. In Hungary the inflammatory Kossuth declared that "the future of Hungary can never be secure while in the other provinces there exists a system of government in direct antagonism to every constitutional principle. Our task it is to found a happier future on the brotherhood of all the Austrian races, and to substitute for the union enforced by bayonets and police the enduring bond of a free constitution." This, if sincere, was a demand which went far beyond Deák's programme of Hungarian existing rights. It helped to fan movements in Bohemia, in Croatia, and in Vienna itself, as well as to encourage the Italians. Unfortunately, it was not sincere; Kossuth, like the other Magyars, desired not freedom but the right

to dominate. This fundamental inconsistency prevented any real collaboration between the various movements, and was eventually to result in their defeat. At the moment, however, it was the Austrian government which seemed in danger. When even faithful Vienna became turbulent, that government gave way. The Viennese movement was purely Liberal, and was satisfied with the disappearance of Metternich which it caused. Since the death of the Emperor Francis in 1846, Metternich had become the sole symbol of the existing order, as the new Emperor Ferdinand was imbecile ; his fall was therefore hailed with delight as the end of a system of which even the easy-going Viennese had grown tired. But now Metternich had gone, the Austrian Liberals had no desire to see the break up of the Empire ; and that was what the various other movements seemed likely to mean. When the government was reorganized under Schwarzenberg, and the young Francis Joseph was made Emperor in place of his imbecile uncle, the Liberals accepted the new order, reactionary though it was, and at least tacitly supported it against the various disruptive movements.

Of these the Italian was the most clearly hostile to the Empire, and the Magyar the most successful. Helped by the temporary disappearance of the central government and by the general prevalence of revolt, the Hungarians established what was practically an independent State. Kossuth, anxious to make the movement a truly national one, so far as the Magyars were concerned, persuaded the Diet at Pesth to free the serfs, without compensation to the nobles. The distracted Austrian government accepted what it seemed unable to avoid, and the only link remaining between Hungary and Austria

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

was the personal bond of the Emperor, at that moment Ferdinand. Almost at the same time the Czechs at Prague extracted a promise of local autonomy for Bohemia, the Croats were setting up a National government at Agram, and the insurrection in Lombardy seemed likely to drive the Austrians completely out of Italy, especially since Charles Albert of Piedmont had declared war, and was in possession of Milan. Assailed at once by so many foes, the Austrian Empire seemed certain to disappear. But there was no real unity among its foes, and the intermixture of Liberalism and Nationalism soon caused difficulties. Above all, the army proved faithful. Nationalism had not been made so important as to overcome other loyalties, and the rank and file of the army, untouched by national feeling, were ready to support any government which should have the courage openly to oppose rebellion. Radetsky, commanding the troops in Lombardy, was able to check the Piedmontese, while in June Windischgratz crushed the Czechs in Prague, and the possibility of an autonomous Bohemia disappeared. The real weaknesses of the various "revolutionary" movements now became clear. In Italy the Pope as early as April disavowed any intention of taking part in a national Italian movement against Austria, while in Naples the movement, primarily a Liberal one against the despicable Ferdinand, was crushed by May. Thus only Piedmont gave any real aid to revolting Lombardy. Radetsky, passing to the offensive, defeated Charles Albert at Custoza ; and only the fear of the possible intervention of France and Britain prevented his invading Piedmont itself. Venice, under the republican Manin, for a time continued the fight ; but the success of Radetsky ensured the continued possession of the Austrian provinces.

Encouraged by these successes, the Austrian government turned to deal with the remaining troubles. Against Hungary they had already been able to use the Slav movement. Jellacic, the Croat leader, was infuriated by the Magyar attempt to secure control over his country; to exchange Austrian for Magyar domination would be a poor result for a national movement. Conscious that Croatia alone would not face the Magyars, he sought the support of the central government. His appeal to the Croatian regiments in Italy to remain faithful was probably the real turning point. Had these regiments deserted Radetsky, he might well have been defeated by Charles Albert. Thus, ironically, it was a national movement which gave the hard-pressed government material assistance. From every point of view, therefore, that government supported the Croats against the Magyars. This might be playing with fire, especially since the Croats were busy rousing the other Slav groups in Hungary against the danger of Magyar dominance; but the Austrians needed whatever allies they could get, and hoped to apply the old and tried method of "divide and rule" once they had crushed the Magyars. So in September, undoubtedly with the connivance of the Viennese government, Jellacic began a march on Buda-Pesth. In the hope of reviving the Liberal movement against the government, the Magyars sent a deputation to the Assembly at Vienna, to plead for united action against the reactionary government; but the Czechs, the leading Slav group in the Assembly, promptly abandoned their Liberalism, and supported Jellacic as leader of a national movement. This roused the Liberals in Vienna to their own danger, and they joined forces with the Magyars against the government.

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

Windischgratz from Prague promptly marched on Vienna. Unfortunately for themselves the Magyars, still divided between Conservatives like Deák and extremists like Kossuth, were too slow in definitely allying themselves with the Viennese Liberals. Their attempt to relieve the city came too late, and Windischgratz entered as a conqueror on 31st October. The first really effective government since the beginning of the troubles was set up under Schwarzenberg, whose first action was to depose Ferdinand on account both of his imbecility and of his many and varied promises made at the various stages of the revolts. As his brother declined the shaking throne, his eighteen year old nephew Francis Joseph was proclaimed Emperor. As was to be expected, the Magyars refused to recognize the new Emperor.

The struggle now resolved itself into one between the new Austrian government, supported by the Croatians and the Roumanians in Transylvania, and the Magyars. As Schwarzenberg made it clear that he was fighting to suppress entirely any independent authority within the Empire, and to create a centralized State run from Vienna, the Magyar struggle became one for national existence. Inspired by this, the Magyars rallied fiercely and defeated the Austrians. In this hour of success they declared Hungary an independent State, which would clearly be a republic with Kossuth at the head. This move was fatal to their prospects of final success ; it alarmed some even among the Magyars of more conservative tendencies ; it perpetuated the antagonism of the Slavs ; above all, it gave Russia a colourable opportunity for intervention against a "revolutionary" movement. Unable to crush the revolt herself, Austria readily accepted the assistance

proffered by the Tsar, and large Russian forces proved the decisive factor in the campaign of 1849, which ended in the complete defeat of the "rebels." Schwarzenberg took full advantage of his opportunity. The Empire became a single governmental unit run by Germans from Vienna, with the Magyars a subject people like any of the Slav groups they so despised. It was not the old system which was restored ; but one which for ten years was to crush all individuality, whether of persons or of groups, was set up by the thoroughgoing reactionary Schwarzenberg.

Germany, too, saw an abortive revolution in 1848. In the various States of that conglomeration, movements which were various mixtures of Liberalism and Nationalism occurred. They were, in the first instance, surprisingly successful, and it seemed that a new era had dawned. This was especially true in the west, where the influence of "French ideas" of Liberalism was naturally strongest. Thus in Baden not only was the question of a united Parliament for Germany officially discussed, but the censorship was abolished ; it also disappeared in Württemberg ; Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau took action about a national Parliament ; in Bavaria, where the scandal of Lola Montez, the Spanish dancer who had captivated the King, had already almost produced a revolution, a "popular" constitution was promised amid great rejoicings ; in Saxony concessions were promised ; and Weimar, always Liberal in feeling, recovered the liberty of the Press which had been unwillingly surrendered under pressure from Metternich in 1819. In the other States similar events occurred ; everywhere there was a sudden move to end or at least mitigate Absolutism, and a demand for a national

Assembly. Even in Prussia there was a tumultuous enthusiasm for Liberalism and national unity. The March Revolution in Berlin, where barricades appeared, was a disorderly affair, and Frederick William IV.'s horror at the deaths among his beloved Berliners made him appear as champion of the national cause. But the movement was mainly Liberal, and a good many of the democrats quickly became doubtful of a unity which could clearly be gained only under the leadership of Prussia, a state to which Liberalism was foreign. Frederick William, almost superstitiously loyal to the Habsburgs, would not take advantage of Austria's difficulties to assume the leadership of Germany, and finally refused to pick up a crown out of the mud of revolution. Thus the possibility of a movement which would stir national feeling disappeared. The attempt at uniting and Liberalizing Germany therefore failed. It is easy to poke fun at the Liberals at Frankfort, laboriously laying the foundations for a Liberal constitution for a State which did not exist ; but it is difficult to see what effective action they could have taken. To Liberalize separately all the various States in Germany was an almost hopeless task ; to work for a united Germany meant inevitably in practice a State controlled by Prussia or Austria or both, in which Liberalism would be impossible. When Frederick William decided against Liberalism as revolutionary, he settled the fate of the movement, since a union of the smaller States, excluding both Prussia and Austria, was not practical politics. The revolutions of 1848 in Germany, therefore, fizzled out ingloriously. The most disastrous effect was to give to the majority of Germans the feeling that Liberals were ineffective folk, unable to make any decisive move. Already there

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848

was the beginning of a national movement ; 1848 made it almost certain that the movement would in future be merely Nationalist, with no admixture of Liberal doctrines. First make your State, became the German feeling ; Liberalizing that State could be left to a later date.

The failure in Galicia in 1846, and the obvious preparedness of both Russia and Prussia, prevented any Polish movement of importance in 1848. So one of the most vociferous "national" movements played no part in the revolutions of that year. In France, whose revolution precipitated the general disturbances, the movement was a Liberal one. There was no need in France for any national movement as the State was already a Nation-State ; what the French wanted was more liberty. What the revolution, largely as a result of the attempt to introduce Socialism, eventually produced was the second Empire under Louis Napoleon ; an ironic comment on the "success" of 1848. Even in France, where the situation was not complicated by Nationalism, Liberalism proved to be ill-served by revolution. It is one of the abiding and major difficulties of the development of freedom that it is so difficult to deal with vigorous reactionaries. To submit is clearly fatal ; to rebel commonly fails to produce anything except a military despotism instead of the existing one. The trouble is not that Liberals are too doctrinaire and not sufficiently realist or practical adequately to deal with the situation, but that the masses find the Liberal doctrine anæmic, and are always ready to accept a dictatorship which is colourful and emphatic. Periods of revolution, therefore, in which the masses are utilized, generally end not in increased liberty but in dictatorships, often of a flamboyant and militarist type.

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

The "Year of Revolutions" really settled more than appeared on the surface. In the main the various revolutions failed in their immediate objects; the existing governments generally survived; and they generally treated Liberalism as the enemy, and continued to attempt to suppress it. The effect on the masses was to make them dimly realize that what they wanted most was national States. The issue of democratic States or national States was not clear; the two movements were still intermingled and confused; but slowly people were beginning to realize that the freedom they wanted most urgently was freedom from immediate foreign control; they wanted a State for their own national group. This emphasis on the national group is really antagonistic to Liberalism, with its insistence on individual rights. The essential antagonism between Liberalism and Nationalism had not yet been made clear, but it was mistily beginning to appear. Even at this stage it was clear that Nationalism, appealing to group loyalty and group solidarity, had a far greater popular appeal than Liberalism, with its insistence, as Mazzini so definitely proclaimed, on both the duties and the rights of the individual. Loyalty to the group is a feeling comparatively easy to arouse; once aroused, it is capable of almost infinite development. Above all, it is very largely emotional, and so can be experienced by practically all men of whatever social or intellectual status. That Nationalism is an emotion makes it a force with a universal appeal; and as an emotion it has the power to grow more and more intense and overmastering. The appeal of Liberalism was largely intellectual. It always tended, for that reason, to be a middle-class doctrine with but little real support from the masses. Even in

England this tendency is visible. In Europe generally it is far more marked. So in 1848, when passions of the fiercest sort were aroused, Liberalism soon became obscured. The real victory in the struggles lay not with the governments, though theirs was the immediate triumph; it was Nationalism which gained most in the long run from the struggles and excitements of 1848. Marx hoped that these revolutions were a prelude to the Socialist Revolution for which he worked so tirelessly. But though he utilized fully the emotional possibilities of his creed, he proved unable to stem the tide of Nationalism. From his own point of view it was a mistake for Marx to emphasize the international aspect of Socialism; he opposed the current of the age, and the success of his doctrines suffered in consequence. Even in France, where the bitterness of the existing fortunate classes in defending their property was demonstrated in the furious fighting when Cavaignac crushed the working classes in Paris in June, the huge vote in December for Louis Napoleon showed how comparatively small a hold Socialism had yet got among the masses. In Italy the final defeat of Charles Albert at Novara in March 1849, and his abdication in favour of his son Victor Emmanuel, completed the triumph of Radetsky; but these events ensured that in the future the leadership of the Italian movement would unquestionably be taken as of right by Piedmont.

The result of the "Year of Revolutions," therefore, was not to Liberalize Europe. France, where the movement was undoubtedly Liberal in origin, fell in effect under a dictatorship which the Liberals proved unable to overturn. In Germany the Liberalism of the movement was a chief cause of its eventual failure; the

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

double aims of Liberalism and Unity made a task too great for accomplishment, and the inglorious end to the great outburst had a depressing effect on German political activity, even though in some States the cleansing by the "March Winds" produced effects which lasted after the movement as a whole had collapsed. There was little ruthlessness in the suppression, though some of the "forty-niners" on the Californian goldfields had gone to seek freedom as well as gold. But the apparent hopelessness of the tasks facing them seemed to take the heart out of the German Liberals who remained at home. They became less likely than ever to lead a really popular movement, for which task utter conviction and a burning enthusiasm are essential qualities. Even Nationalism suffered a setback; for only a minority of Germans were willing to pay the price of Union if that price was Prussianism. The prospect of a Germany dominated by Prussia, politically backward, chilled the ardour of many who sincerely desired to see the German people united in a Nation-State. They were also worried by the apparently insoluble problem of the relation between the Austrian Empire and any German national State. Schwarzenberg's attempt to bring the whole Austrian Empire into the German Confederation was sufficient to convince every one that the idea was intolerable; apparently German Austria must be left out of the Nation-State now that she had recovered her dominions; but few German Nationalists desired thus to exclude an important group of their own folk. It seemed possible that German Nationalism might remain a mere sentiment, extolled in song and poem but not influencing the practical politics of the day.

CHAPTER IV

UNIFICATION

1. Italian Unity

Piedmont and the movement for Italian unity The work of Cavour Attitude of Louis Napoleon The War, 1859 France makes peace The enlargement of Piedmont and the attack on Naples Garibaldi and the Thousand The new State

It was not until 1851 that something like peace again settled on the Europe so disturbed in 1848. In the main the revolutionary movements had failed and the autocratic governments were reinstated. Actually something had been gained by the Liberals: there was more individual freedom in the new Europe than in the old. But 1848 had vitally shaken the older order by stirring against it in many places the feeling of Nationalism. That passion won no permanent victories in 1848, but the ground was prepared for future struggles. The two great movements which were to dominate European affairs in the succeeding twenty years were the national movements in Italy and Germany. They were to have very different histories; superficially, two movements could hardly appear more dissimilar; yet underlying their differences lay the basic similarity that they succeeded largely because they gave national unity to peoples who really desired this above all else.

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

In Italy the great difficulty remained Austria. Holding Lombardy apparently more firmly than ever after her defeat of Piedmont in 1848-49, she dominated Italy, and clearly no national State could be formed until she had been driven out. But only a united Italy would have any chance of driving her out; the existing small Italian States were obviously incapable of facing Austria in the field. The position therefore seemed hopeless. When, in spite of Mazzini's efforts, it was almost impossible to get even the Sicilians and the Neapolitans to combine against their Bourbon despot, the chance of getting the seven Italian States effectively to unite against Austria seemed small. The events of 1848, while they had made Piedmont the obvious leader in any anti-Austrian movement, had also made even more complicated the position in central Italy. Fearing after Novara, and the restoration of the Grand Duke in Tuscany which quickly followed it, that Austria would entirely dominate Italy, Louis Napoleon determined on the restoration of Papal power. Restoring the Pope by French arms would, he hoped, enable him to check any dangerous Austrian ambitions for extension in Italy; it would also gain him the support of the clericals in France, and Louis Napoleon was anxious to secure whatever support he could. A small force was therefore dispatched to Civita Vecchia, in the hope that the Roman rebels would regard the French as allies against a possible Austrian attack. But Mazzini was in Rome, and made it clear that the restoration of the Papal States by either Power was equally unwelcome to him. The French, after an initial check which affected the elections in France, besieged Rome; though Garibaldi maintained the defence with vigour, the French took the city,

UNIFICATION

Garibaldi with some of his men trying to get north to Venice. Eventually, after almost theatrical adventures, Garibaldi managed to escape to Piedmont, whence he emigrated to South America. The Papal States were thus restored in all the glory of their clerical misgovernment; worse still, France was now committed to enmity against any movement for Italian unity, since she maintained a force to support the Papal authority.

Fortunately, in 1852 Victor Emmanuel called in to rule Piedmont a first-rate statesman in Cavour, and supported him unflinchingly. Cavour had helped to found the *Risorgimento*, a journal devoted to Italian Nationalism; but in 1848 he concentrated entirely on war against Austria, and opposed extremists who talked of a republic. Victor Emmanuel, who had no love for enthusiasts, realized the steadiness of purpose and the skill of Cavour. Committed by his refusal of bribes in the disasters of 1849 to enmity to Austria, he saw in Cavour a statesman who could tackle the diplomatic struggle which must precede any armed clash. Cavour first strained every nerve to increase the armed forces of Piedmont, doing his best to develop the country economically largely for this end; he offered asylum in Piedmont to refugees from Austrian tyranny in Lombardy or Papal tyranny in Rome; but he was convinced that outside help would be necessary if Piedmont were to be able to fight Austria. Effective help could be hoped for only from France. Britain might be sympathetic, but she was not likely to plunge into a war with Austria to help Piedmont or Italy; nor, for that matter, was France. International affairs were governed by practical and selfish considerations. But France might be bribed by the offer of territory;

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

and notoriously she was inclined to expect military success from a Bonaparte, which would predispose Louis Napoleon towards a war in which he might hope for rapid success. Cavour's first move was to join the western Powers in the Crimean War, that curious crusade to help Turkey. At the Conference of Paris in 1856, which ended that war, he was consequently able to appear as an equal, and to take the opportunity for a somewhat irrelevant but very vigorous attack on Austria as the source of misgovernment in central and southern Italy. That flourish gained for Piedmont the support of Mazzini and Garibaldi, and with them of the Nationalist movement throughout Italy.

This might be useful ; but Cavour was primarily concerned with Louis Napoleon. That enigmatic dictator had vague ideas about helping Italy ; he had been associated with the Carbonari in his early days. He had more definite desires to popularize his own régime by winning victories and territory for France, which the Crimean adventure had not produced. Upsetting 1815, an ambition natural to a Bonaparte, could probably most safely be attempted by an attack on Austria to "free" Italy. Britain would certainly look on such an attempt with favour, and neither Russia nor Prussia was likely to feel intimately concerned. The victor of 1815 would be humiliated and weakened, and Savoy might well be gained for France without arousing a European coalition against her. So the meeting at Plombières in 1858 settled that French help would be given to Piedmont in its struggle against Austria. Austria must be made at least technically the aggressor ; possibly Nice as well as Savoy might go to France ; and Italy was to become three kingdoms, united in a confederation under the

UNIFICATION

Pope. The expected war was duly arranged in 1859, and Magenta and Solferino secured Lombardy for Piedmont. Then, to the horror of Cavour, Louis Napoleon made a hurried peace. From his own standpoint he was undoubtedly right ; but a peace which left Venetia to Austria, and created an Italian federation including Austria and under the presidency of the Pope, was a terrible blow to Cavour. For six months he retired from office, leaving to Victor Emmanuel a most difficult job.

The Austrian defeats had caused the collapse of the central Italian States. Tuscany, Modena, and Parma had been abandoned by their princes, and were demanding union with Piedmont ; so too in the Papal States the popular voice was for Piedmont. Victor Emmanuel had of necessity to join in the Treaty of Zurich which ratified the arrangements made between Louis Napoleon and Francis Joseph at Villafranca, though he refused to join any federation in which an Austrian province was included. He had now somehow to secure the rest of Italy without plunging Piedmont into a further war. He showed unexpected skill and ingenuity. Garibaldi, who with Mazzini was preparing an attack on Rome, was persuaded to postpone an enterprise which would certainly have strained relations with France unbearably. When the proposal for a European Congress to settle the tangled Italian question was finally abandoned, Cavour returned to assist his King. Unwillingly he had to bargain with Louis Napoleon, who naturally had not so far been able to demand the price of his help, since he had left his work incomplete. In return for an agreement that Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Romagna should be united to Piedmont, he surrendered Nice as well as Savoy to France ; though all these arrangements were disguised

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

by plebiscites, the price remained the more awkward as Garibaldi had been born in Nice, and furiously attacked Cavour when the matter came before the Parliament at Turin. But the gains were worth the cost. The new Italian kingdom was strong enough to face the fulminations of the Pope against the sacrilegious despoiler of the Church, and to have reasonable hopes of being able to gain southern Italy before very long. It was certain, too, to take the first occasion on which Austria was embarrassed to attack Venetia.

The actual fight for Naples was undertaken by Garibaldi and the Thousand. Of all the national movements of the century, this struck the popular imagination most. The groups of Nationalist exiles of various nations who lived and plotted in Liberal western European countries had long been headed and guided by Mazzini, who was always ready to support any national movement, though primarily concerned with his beloved Italy. Something in the nature of a theoretical basis for the various national movements was built out of his writings, and Nationalism became more self-conscious than it had previously been. This development of his "Young Italy" movement into a "Young Europe" one, in which it was associated on equal terms with "Young Poland," "Young Germany," and "Young Hungary," helped to maintain the opinion that national movements were essentially "Liberal" in outlook and at the same time make the Italian movement peculiarly important. The Italian exiles were received into Society; and popular feeling in England, for example, was strongly pro-Italian. Then the almost theatrical descent on Sicily included every sentimental appeal. It was a colourful fight against odds, though the initial Neapolitan advan-

UNIFICATION

tage in numbers, since Cavour dared not openly support him, was more than compensated for by the enthusiasm of Garibaldi's Nationalists and his own inspiration and ability. The Bourbon kingdom of Naples fell comparatively easily, rotted by misgovernment and attacked by enthusiasts for a united Italy. In fact, the main difficulty became that of restraining Garibaldi and his victorious forces from attacking Rome, still guarded by the French. After the struggle for Sicily, Garibaldi's attack on the mainland was in the nature of a triumphal march, which proceeded so quickly that Cavour had no time to establish in Naples a government which would vote for Piedmont. Garibaldi got there first and was proclaimed Dictator, as in Sicily. That he would next march on Rome was openly announced. To avoid the danger of a conflict with France, Cavour attacked the remaining Papal States, Umbria and the Marches, in September 1860, easily overcoming them; in three weeks Ancona, the last fortress, had fallen. Cavour had carefully avoided Rome itself, giving France the opportunity to avoid open war. Then the two forces, Piedmontese and Garibaldian, turned against the remaining Neapolitan army, which had repulsed some of Garibaldi's men. Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi met, with very uncertain feelings; and when the Bourbon army had been finally defeated Garibaldi, refused the lieutenantancy of southern Italy for a year for which he asked, retired in discontent to private life.

By the beginning of 1861 the new Italian kingdom thus included the whole of Italy except Rome and Venetia. The success of Piedmont had been unexpectedly great, and a new State had appeared in Europe. The two remaining problems were difficult, and Cavour's

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

death in June removed the man best able to face them ; but the new kingdom was likely to survive. The failure immediately to secure Venetia and Rome rankled with the Garibaldian enthusiasts, though their chances of success in a war with Austria for Venetia would have been remote. But their disappointment, coupled with the fact that the first stages of the movement had, in fact, depended on French help, made the Italian movement by no means perfect as an example of Nationalism. The history of Italy was to underline this weakness. The union was to prove more formal and less real than had been hoped. Cavour's belief in Liberalism as the means of making the unity real was to be disappointed. His death probably made the Liberalism which was tried in Italy less satisfactory ; though he was so confirmed an admirer of the English parliamentary system that he would certainly have supported parliamentism as the solvent of the remaining problems. The attempt to transplant this system to a soil wholly unprepared for it was not an unqualified success, though it was by no means a complete failure. But the Italian version of the parliamentary system was one which lent itself to delays and corruption rather too readily ; it produced an effect of unreality in political life. For this unreality the mass of voters were at bottom to blame. They showed little interest in political issues, but plenty in personal ones and in local rivalries. Naturally, they found fault increasingly with the politicians, to whose backs they transferred the results of their own lack of political sense and responsibility. One of the fundamental difficulties was that the enthusiasm for Nationalism did its work in creating the new State ; it was then not transferable to the less exciting job of running it. Passion

UNIFICATION

and enthusiasm are invaluable allies for an army ; they need the addition of balance and restraint to be useful in the humdrum everyday work of politics ; and to the ordinary man such additions spell cancellation. Unaccustomed to democratic methods and without political experience, the ordinary Italian found the new kingdom disappointing. The difficulty about the capital emphasized the importance of Piedmont in the work of liberation, and Italians from other districts found this difficult to stomach. The removal of the capital from Turin to Florence in 1864 was clearly not a final solution. It was somewhat humiliating to Italian pride that just as she had needed French help for her establishment, the Italian kingdom needed Prussian help to secure her final province and her capital. There was little real enthusiasm possible for so comparatively weak a State.

2. German Unity

The position after 1848. Dominance of Austria. Prussia and the Zollverein. Bismarck and union under Prussia. His military preparations and their effects. The Danish War, 1863. War against Austria, 1866. The North German Confederation. The Franco-Prussian War and the creation of the German Empire. The doctrine of Force in Politics.

The struggle of the Italians for national unity meant primarily the forcible ejection of Austria ; the German national movement was faced by very different problems, though again Austria loomed large in the picture. After 1848 the majority of Germans despaired of Liberalism as a means towards unity. The problem was certainly difficult. The Germans were divided into many States

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

of varying sizes and importance, and their joint organization, such as it was, entailed international complications. Prussia had set up a Union of her own in 1848, but when Austria recovered her strength she refused to recognize this Union, and in 1850 Schwarzenberg insisted that the old Confederation was still in existence and summoned the Diet to Frankfort. The four minor kingdoms—Bavaria, Saxony, Wurttemberg, and Hanover—jealous of Prussia, sent envoys, as did a few of the smaller States which had joined the Prussian Union. Satisfied that Frederick William would not fight, Schwarzenberg insisted on the dissolution of the Union ; and by making the difficulties in Hesse-Cassel the immediate issue, and ostentatiously preparing for war, he terrified Frederick William into calling in the Tsar as mediator. Nicholas naturally decided in favour of the State he had recently helped to save, and Prussia had to choose between war and humiliation. At Olmütz Prussia gave way entirely, and the Federal Diet, dominated by Austria, resumed control of German affairs. Schwarzenberg might even have succeeded in his design of including the whole Austrian Empire in the Confederation, but that England and France protested against a change which would seriously have upset the balance of power in Europe. Though technically it was only German Austria which was in the Confederation, inevitably Austria spoke with the weight of her whole Empire. She was indisputably the leading Power, with Prussia a poor second, and the leading Power was concerned more with non-German than with German interests.

German Nationalism had thus failed to accomplish anything. The Parliament at Frankfort had concentrated

UNIFICATION

in practical affairs chiefly on Schleswig-Holstein, where the tangled relations of the two districts to Denmark and the Confederation had proved a source of trouble. The population of Holstein was almost entirely German, and that of Schleswig only partly Danish. Holstein was a member of the Confederation, in which in consequence the King of Denmark was represented, just as, until 1837, the British King was for Hanover. The Danish King wished to incorporate the duchies in his kingdom, and the question chanced to become acute in January 1848. Holstein was soon in revolt, and naturally appealed to the Confederation for help, and Prussia and the Confederation in consequence went to war against Denmark. The Danes were soon driven out of the duchies, but Russia and Britain objected to any invasion of Denmark itself, and the Prussians withdrew to Schleswig. In 1850 Prussia, anxious to dissociate herself from a movement connected with the revolutionary Assembly at Frankfort, made peace with Denmark in the name of the Confederation. The Holsteiners continued to fight, and after Olmütz Austria compelled Prussia to join her in forcing the duchies to submit. The chief practical Nationalist effort was thus terminated by the two German States themselves. The duchies were practically united with Denmark, though the old connection with the Confederation was nominally preserved. The final symbol of the Nationalist effort, the fleet which the Frankfort Assembly had built, was hurriedly sold by Prussia in 1852.

German Nationalism seemed able to overcome local jealousies and particularist loyalty—Germans were Prussians or Bavarians or Hanoverians and so on first—only under the pressure of foreign danger. It had first

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

been made effective by the French conquest under Napoleon, though even that, after 1806, had roused Prussian Nationalism far more effectively than German. It flared up wherever, as in 1840, there seemed any likelihood of an attack by France, or as in Schleswig-Holstein, when Germans faced Danes. But as soon as the immediate danger was over, German Nationalism as a real force disappeared, and the rivalries of the various States became all-important. After 1850, with Austria again the premier State, those desirous of German unity must in effect work for the exclusion of Austria ; and German unity could therefore only be partial. Naturally, the existing governments in the smaller States would oppose any unitary movement, as it entailed their extinction. Only Prussia was likely to work for it ; for a union which excluded Austria was certain to be dominated by Prussia. Since 1819 she had been slowly preparing the way by her Zollverein, a customs union of obvious practical advantage which gradually included all the north German States under her guidance. This customs union greatly developed trade and laid the foundation for the Industrial Revolution in Germany, though by the mid-century this had hardly begun. In 1846 the total steam-power recorded in Prussia was under 22,000 horse-power, and railways were practically unknown. The political results of the Zollverein were speedier than its economic effects. Prussia was recognized as the leading north German State. Thus after 1848 the movement for German unity became a movement guided by Prussia, and directed primarily against Austria. Neither side really desired this. William I., who became King of Prussia in 1861, after acting as Regent since 1858, when Frederick William IV. became definitely

UNIFICATION

insane, regarded Austria as a brother and senior State ; and the Prussian preparation to join in the Italian war on Austria's side in 1859 was one of the main reasons for Louis Napoleon's hasty conclusion of that war. Austria had no desire to fight Prussia for the leadership of the Confederation ; after the death of Schwarzenberg, the architect of Olmütz, in 1852, his policy "first to humiliate Prussia, then to destroy it" was abandoned by Austria, which would now have been content to share the leadership amicably with Prussia.

Such an arrangement would permanently have prevented any sort of German unity, and incidentally have kept Prussia a second-rate Power. When William I. called in Bismarck as his minister against the troublesome Liberals in the Prussian Parliament in 1862 he gave conscious direction both to the anti-parliamentary forces in Prussia and to the movement for unity under Prussia. It was during the struggle with the Prussian Parliament that Bismarck made his famous profession of faith : "Not by speeches and majority votes are the great questions of the day to be decided—that was the mistake of 1848—but by blood and iron." Prussia was being guided by a statesman who believed in force, and had nothing but contempt for democracy in any form. He meant to work for German unity under Prussia, primarily for the benefit of Prussia ; and he had no scruples about the means to that end. His early pro-Austrian feelings had long disappeared, and he realized that only the expulsion of Austria from Germany would make possible the Prussian power he desired. As he was no enthusiast for Nationalism, the necessity for the exclusion of German Austria from his German State did not trouble him. Unfortunately for themselves, the grounds on which

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

the Prussian Liberals opposed Bismarck were the enlargement and development of the army. This was an essential preliminary to the plans Bismarck had in view ; but as those plans could hardly be advertised in Parliament, and would have aroused horror among more than the Liberals had they been, he was unable to satisfy them as to his justification. Their opposition, strenuously maintained, was entirely to discredit them with the great majority of Germans when that army won resounding victories. In Prussia the distinction between Liberalism and Nationalism became patent. The Liberals might sincerely desire German unity, but they bitterly opposed the statesman who produced it or what passed for it. In consequence Nationalist feeling in Germany tended to become anti-Liberal, and it got a permanent reverence for forcible methods. As if to emphasize the point, Austria promulgated a comparatively Liberal Constitution in 1861, and the Liberals in Germany therefore supported her against Prussia. On every ground, therefore, they were to become thoroughly discredited with the mass of Germans.

Bismarck's first move in foreign affairs, too, was vigorously opposed by Liberal opinion in Germany. When the Poles revolted against Russia in 1863 Bismarck promptly supported the Tsar, making certain that no help came from Posen to the rebels, holding the frontier strongly, and diplomatically standing by Russia when France, Austria, and Britain tried to intervene on behalf of the Poles. German Liberals were naturally opposed to the crushing of Poland by autocratic Russia ; and they also feared that Bismarck's policy ran the risk of a war against the three Powers, with only Russia, hampered by the rebellion, to support Prussia. Actually, as

UNIFICATION

he had calculated, Bismarck had obviated any danger of a Franco-Russian alliance, and had substituted for it an understanding between Prussia and Russia, the value of which he fully realized. He had gained a friend who would be most useful as his policy developed. The crushing of the Poles, whether regarded as anti-Liberal or anti-Nationalist, was no source of distress to him. Prussia also had Polish areas.

Since the Liberals had a majority in the Prussian Parliament, they were able to make themselves a real nuisance to Bismarck. Though the Prussian constitution was not democratic, it did give certain powers to Parliament, and the Liberal opposition to Bismarck could therefore be effective. He had been called to office by William I. when the dispute over the army estimates had produced a deadlock. The dissolution of Parliament had merely strengthened the Liberals, who clearly had the support of the majority of the people. Bismarck, failing to persuade Parliament to agree to the estimates, prorogued the Assembly and muzzled the indignant Press by edict. He then proceeded to govern in effect without Parliament, and the reorganization of the army was hurried on. Superficially, Bismarck seemed to be preparing the way for a revolution in Prussia. There could be no question of the unpopularity of his government; practically every move he made even in foreign affairs was condemned by public opinion. It seemed only a question of time before discontent would be forced to become rebellion. But the very definiteness of Bismarck's challenge cleared up the situation. Forced to choose between their Liberalism and loyalty to William and the Prussian kingship, the Liberals grumbled but would not revolt. Their Liberalism was not suffi-

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

cient to overcome their traditional loyalty to the Hohenzollerns. It was on this that Bismarck really depended, even more than on the support of the king, of which he was certain since William's chief interests were military.

Having secured Prussia against the danger of a Franco-Russian alliance, Bismarck could now prepare for the struggle with Austria. In his plans for this he was hampered by King William's dislike of the idea of a war between German Powers, and to a less extent by the general popular feeling against such a strife. He had also to be certain that no other Power, in particular France, would intervene to help Austria. He was fortunate in being able first to utilize the troublesome question of Schleswig-Holstein. Encouraged by the unexpected upshot of the troubles of 1848, the Danes attempted the absorption of the duchies. Inevitably, the German element protested, and soon national feeling was as excited as it had been in 1848. When in 1863 Schleswig was definitely incorporated in Denmark, the Diet, which had been threatening action, declared war on Denmark, and entrusted the execution of the actual job to Saxony and Hanover. In December Holstein was occupied by these Federal troops, the Danes retiring into Schleswig. Bismarck, intent only on Prussian interests, had already agreed secretly with Austria that the whole question should be settled by joint action by the two Powers, ignoring the Diet. He now horrified the Prussian Parliament and national feeling throughout Germany by recognizing the legal authority in the duchies of the new Danish King, Christian IX. This was strictly in accordance with the Treaty of London of 1852, as Bismarck was happy to point out. Then Prussia and Austria, ignoring the protests of the Diet, demanded

UNIFICATION

that Christian should annul the unification of Schleswig with Denmark, and on his refusal their troops attacked Schleswig early in 1864. The Danes could offer no effective resistance to the two Powers, especially as Holstein was already held by the Federation. It was clear that Schleswig would be overrun; only the intervention of the Powers could save the Danes. A conference was held in London in April, but broke down because the Danes, securing support from Britain and Russia, believed that they would be actively supported in the war. But as even Britain and France were not now on good terms, the Danes got only verbal support, and were forced to surrender the whole of the duchies to Austria and Prussia, who proceeded to expel the Saxon and Hanoverian representatives of the Federation and take over the entire control.

Thus even in fulfilling one of the desires of German Nationalists, that Holstein should remain German, Bismarck managed to oppose them, and to carry out the expulsion of Denmark entirely as a Prussian and Austrian affair. In his eyes, politics were the concern of government, and not of irresponsible and ignorant people. He had taken the lead throughout, and had managed to manoeuvre Austria into joint action chiefly by emphasizing the danger of allowing democratic and revolutionary ideas to gain strength by satisfying German desires in this question. Almost immediately Austria realized that her position was a false one, and tried to extricate herself. Bismarck was not yet ready for an open quarrel. King William must be convinced of the necessity to fight Austria; the neutrality of France must be assured; and the active assistance of Italy must be arranged. So at Gastein, in August 1865, Bismarck

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

“papered over the cracks,” and Holstein was to be administered by Austria, Schleswig by Prussia. Such an arrangement was admirable for one who wished to have a bone of contention handy ; when he was ready, Bismarck could be certain of finding an excuse for a quarrel in the management of the duchies.

His first anxiety now was the attitude of France. Any serious disturbance of the balance of power in Europe was bound to be of interest to France, and opposition to any change was likely. Fortunately for Bismarck, Louis Napoleon, in common with most European statesmen, was grossly mistaken in his estimate of the relative strength of the two German Powers. Any addition to Austria would seriously have alarmed him ; but some aggrandizement of Prussia would be positively useful, serving as a balance against Austria. So at Biarritz in September 1865 Bismarck received personally from the French Emperor assurances that Austria would get no help from France. Louis Napoleon calculated on an evenly balanced conflict between Austria and Prussia with the help of Italy, in which, at a later stage, he might act as mediator and secure for his services some advantage for France on the Rhine. Bismarck did not disturb these pleasant dreams, and proceeded to secure the alliance of Italy. The continued possession of Venetia by Austria made this task even easier. Italy was prepared to join in any war against Austria. Overtures had been made even in the spring of 1865, and in April 1866 Bismarck secured his alliance provided the war came within three months. The Holsteiners and the Liberals in Germany had already done the main job—the conversion of King William to an anti-Austrian attitude. Schleswig had been treated to a dose of Prussian repres-

UNIFICATION

sion, while Holstein had been allowed considerable freedom under the Austrians. They had utilized that freedom to criticize the position in Schleswig, and on Bismarck complaining, Austria announced that she would refer the whole question to the Diet. This was an open breach of the secret agreement and of Gastein, and finally convinced the Prussian King of Austria's unfriendliness. By June, Austria had been forced into war, nominally on the question of Holstein, on which she secured the support of almost all the members of the Diet.

German public opinion almost unanimously condemned Prussia. Liberals and Nationalists alike saw in Bismarck's policy only a selfish desire for the aggrandizement of Prussia ; and this readiness to fight a brother German Power for such an object shook opinion even in Prussia itself. Only some minor north German States, who would have been helpless against Prussia, sided with her in the war. The four minor kingdoms and the other small States stood by Austria. Liberal antagonism to Prussianism was strong and vocal. Bismarck had staked everything on success in this war. Defeat would have meant the collapse of Prussia. He was confident of the army, confident that its equipment and training were superior to Austria's, and confident that despite the general weight of public opinion that army would fight whole-heartedly. He knew his Prussians ; discipline was extraordinarily powerful with them, and loyalty to Prussia would outweigh all other feelings. The help given to Austria by the German States was more than counter-balanced by Italian intervention. Though the Italians were once again defeated at Custozza, they had kept busy a considerable portion

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

of the Austrian army, while only minor Prussian detachments were needed to deal with the Federal troops in Germany. The theatre of the main struggle was Bohemia ; at Königgrätz the new Prussian army decisively defeated the Austrians. The " Six Weeks' War " startled Europe ; the efficiency of the Prussian war machine was terrifying. Despite the success at Custozza and the naval victory over the Italians at Lissa, Francis Joseph was glad to ask Louis Napoleon to mediate. The treaty was concluded at Prague in August. Bismarck, already planning his next stroke, had no wish permanently to antagonize Austria. Venetia went to Italy, her promised reward ; but Bismarck allowed the boundary so to be drawn that all the mountain passes were held by Austria, though the inhabitants were Italians. Prussia herself took no Austrian territory. She was content with driving Austria out of Germany, where a North German Confederation, including Saxony, was to be set up. The States south of the Main retained their independence. Prussia annexed outright Hanover, Nassau, and Hesse-Cassel ; she also took the duchies, the original excuse for the war. The south German States had been overrun after Königgrätz. They appealed to the French Emperor to mediate for them too ; and Bismarck was able to show them that Napoleon was asking, to compensate France for the increased strength of Prussia, not only the permanent division of Germany by the Main, but some German territory. Of the evils threatening them, the States unanimously chose the lesser, made peace direct with Prussia, and secretly entered into alliance with her. The selfish policy of the French Emperor was Bismarck's most able assistant.

The union of Germany under Prussia for which

UNIFICATION

Bismarck was working was not yet complete. The four States south of the Main had been kept out largely at the insistence of Louis Napoleon ; and Bismarck believed that they would best be obtained by the defeat of France. A Franco-Prussian war would bring them in voluntarily, and success in that war would make the enlarged Prussia the dominant Power in Europe. How great a change from the humiliation of Olmütz ! Already Bismarck had overcome his unpopularity in Prussia. Dazzled by the successes of the army, the Prussian Liberals were surprised as well as delighted when Bismarck stood before them, fresh from the glories of Königgrätz, and confessed that his government had been unconstitutional. He asked for an Act of Indemnity, for the condoning of his crime. Parliament gladly agreed. Bismarck had used his success well ; he had captured the Liberals. The Act of Indemnity was not a confession that Bismarck had been unconstitutional ; it was a confession that the Liberals had been wrong in opposing him. His doctrine of force had been accepted ; he had now the mass of the Prussian people behind him, because they had changed and not he. The rule of force had been proved right ; the lesson was only too thoroughly learned by the Germans.

So when in 1870 Louis Napoleon blundered into the war Bismarck desired, the North German Confederation was whole-heartedly Prussian, and the four southern States promptly joined in. Austria remained neutral, as did Italy. Neither particularly desired Prussian success, but neither was prepared to face the Prussians unless France seemed likely to win. Against the well-organized and well-led Prussians the French had no real chance of success. In less than two months Louis Napoleon had

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

surrendered at Sedan, and the second Empire disappeared. On the 18th January 1871, in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, William I. was proclaimed German Emperor ; the Treaty of Frankfort with France was signed in May. The south German States had already united with the Prussian Confederation, though Bavaria insisted on retaining a good measure of self-government. France had to surrender Alsace-Lorraine to the new German Empire. The unification of Germany had at last been accomplished.

What the Liberals had failed to do, Bismarck had done by a series of successful wars. The war against France, with the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine, completed the conversion of such Germans as had been unwilling to recognize the virtue of Bismarck's earlier wars. The very incompleteness of his work—for the new German Empire was essentially a federal State, and not a unified Nation-State—was satisfactory to most Germans, who still remained particularist at heart. The long-continued opposition of the Hanoverian representatives in the Reichstag, which persisted even into the present century, was a characteristic symptom of the apparently irrepressible vitality of particularism. The unity which Bismarck gave Germany was incomplete. Austria was excluded, permanently in his view ; and in the German Empire the old "State" loyalty had by no means vanished. Since Prussia had swallowed the other States, this is not surprising. The basic weakness of the new Germany as a Nation-State was that the Prussians had never had any necessity really to extend their loyalty. Bismarck remained in all essentials a Prussian to the end ; so did the other Prussians. Naturally, the various other localisms were kept alive.

UNIFICATION

What Bismarck had created in 1871 was a German Empire ; it was not a Nation-State. Probably the Bismarckian was the only method that could have secured any sort of German unity by 1871 ; by its very nature that method ensured that the unity would be far from complete. The desire of the German Nationalists was only partially satisfied by the German Empire. They were not ready to pay the price required for full satisfaction ; particularism was very dear to them. But since men are not logical, their unwillingness to pay the price of full national unity only made them vaguely uncomfortable, while they insisted on the reality and strength of their national feeling. That very insistence was a proof of dissatisfaction. The difficulties were increased by the existence of German peoples outside the Empire, not only in Austria, but in Switzerland and Denmark. Because German Nationalism was sentimentally vague, it was difficult to concentrate it on the Empire ; it tended to slop over, to include the " outside " German-speaking folk. Inside, it was very slow in overcoming particularism. That job certainly had not been done by 1914. On the other side, the Germans had come to accept Bismarck's view that force is what really matters in politics. This essentially barbaric view finds easy acceptance because it is itself easy. There is no intellectual difficulty in accepting the view that though might may not be right, might can get its way. The simple Bismarckian creed had proved itself in a few brief years ; and the Germans accepted it whole-heartedly. At first, it is true, they thought of it as applicable to foreign affairs. The new National Liberal Party, which was born after the Act of Indemnity, retained nominally its Liberal programme for internal affairs, but supported

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

the government in foreign relations. Such an artificial distinction could not be permanent. If force is the really vital factor in external affairs, it will sooner or later be recognized as equally effective in internal matters.

The important common feature of the two great successful movements for national unity, therefore, is the very partial measure of that success. The new States were very definitely more State than nation. In both Italy and Germany there remained the feeling that what had really happened was the triumph of Piedmont and Prussia ; and support for the new States was by no means whole-hearted throughout their areas. All that Cavour and Bismarck could do was to create the necessary framework ; the national spirit would have to breathe life into it. In neither instance did this occur as readily as was expected. The task of securing sufficient homogeneity to blur the old localist loyalties proved difficult. Because Nationalism is essentially a sentiment it is vague and irrational. It is tremendously potent in creating enthusiasm, but is unable to harness that enthusiasm to the real jobs of practical politics. The expectation that once the State had been created, the major part of the work would have been done, and the national spirit would somehow run the machine, proved quite unfounded. Nationalism is clearly not a political creed in the ordinary sense at all ; but this was not realized in the nineteenth century, which expected the newly formed Nation-States somehow to canalize the enthusiasm which had helped to create them so as to run them efficiently. The tendency to regard Nationalism as an aspect of Liberalism was the basis of this misunderstanding. A people struggling against foreign oppression was a natural object of Liberal sympathy ;

UNIFICATION

by transference, the movement was regarded as Liberal. So to Englishmen both Garibaldi and Kossuth were "Liberal" figures, men fighting nobly for freedom. As such their visits to Newcastle-on-Tyne are still commemorated by a tablet on which they are associated with Lloyd Garrison. All three were clearly regarded as "Liberal" heroes, though both the Nationalists were essentially dictatorial in their political views.

This is not surprising. Any strongly held sentiment tends towards dictatorial views in politics. A real and fervid enthusiasm for some particular idea makes its holders anxious to obtain power so as to carry out the idea. Once in power, it would clearly be criminal to abandon that position before the task was completed. Further, as a Nationalist Party was necessarily at the beginning an opposition one, which would almost certainly have to use force, there was a tendency for the elevation of a leader or small group to catch the popular imagination and lead the necessary rebellion. In practice, therefore, Nationalist parties were almost committed to dictatorial organization; when, as often happened, they were driven to conspiratorial methods the emergence of a dictator was almost certain. So Nationalism, though not in itself a political creed, was bound to lean towards dictatorship. It was essentially an enemy, not an ally, of Liberalism. But the antagonism goes deeper. Liberalism, by its emphasis on the individual, inevitably is international in outlook. All groupings of individuals are at bottom practical; they have no moral or semi-religious sanction for Liberalism. It is only for practical purposes that a Nation-State is superior to any other sort of State; there is no essential superiority. The only grouping that has real moral sanction is humanity. So

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

Liberalism, though nineteenth-century Liberals generally cheered on national movements, is fundamentally opposed to Nationalism. To a Nationalist the group is everything. The nation is for him the natural and final group, to which the individual is completely subordinate. "Sad blackguards we should be," said Cavour, "if we did for ourselves what we are doing for Italy." It is this sinking of the individual in the group that gives its peculiar fervour to Nationalism and makes it effectively a religion. Such a doctrine is likely to be very powerful ; but it is essentially illiberal. Unfortunately, this was not realized even as late as 1914, though by that date the swing away from individualism towards some "group" doctrine was noticeable even in this country. The triumph of the Liberal Party in 1906 would probably have been its last even had no war intervened in 1914 ; men were moving in Britain towards some doctrine which emphasized the group, the feature common to both Toryism and Socialism.

CHAPTER V

MIDDLE AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

1. Poland after 1848

The rising of 1863. Russian policy in Poland. Polish "Nationalism." The new Poland of 1919.

THE earlier efforts and failures of the Poles have already been briefly recounted. After their defeat by the Russians in 1831, a steady and persistent attempt was made to get rid of Polish Nationalism altogether. Russia, holding the largest area of the old Polish kingdom, was naturally the leading actor. Nicholas I. attempted to absorb the Polish provinces in Russia, making them merely part of his Empire. This Russification was bitterly resented by the Poles, both on national grounds and because they regarded the Slav Empire as essentially inferior. So they clung to their language and traditions the more enthusiastically, and despite all the Russian efforts succeeded in preserving their differentiation. In Posen, the Polish province which had become part of Prussia, the attempt to Germanize the population was equally resisted. Even Prussian thoroughness found the task too great. Planting colonies of Germans in the area did not, as had been hoped, Germanize the other inhabitants; instead, the colonists tended to become

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

Polish in sympathy. Only in Galicia, the Austrian province, was there comparative peace ; and that, as has been seen, was largely because the rural population was not Polish in blood or language, the Ruthenians being Slavs, akin to the Ukrainians.

The Russifying policy of Nicholas I. was mitigated by his successor Alexander II. as part of a general movement to modify Absolutism. The fact that Russian Poland had given no trouble in 1848, when attempts at revolt had been made in Posen and Galicia, perhaps led to the belief that the danger of armed rebellion was over ; and the obvious dissatisfaction of the province suggested the advisability of a change of method. Alexander was not prepared to revive the large measure of separatism which had existed before 1830, but he was ready to grant some degree of administrative autonomy and to give government appointments to Poles. This attempt at conciliation merely made Polish discontent vocal. They still aimed at national independence, and even hankered after their lost domination, and so regarded the concessions as unimportant sops. Angered by this response the Tsar returned to repression, and the result was a revolt in January 1863. Once again the Poles failed to gain real support from the peasants. Their movement was still not really national, and their immediate attempt to revive the old Polish dominion over Lithuania ensured the enthusiastic support of the Russians to their own government. As has been seen, Bismarck prevented any help reaching the insurgents, and also checked the attempt of France, Austria, and Britain to intervene diplomatically on the side of the Poles. So again they were thoroughly beaten. Realizing the peculiar nature of the Polish "National" movement

MIDDLE AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

—that it was almost entirely an affair of the landlord class, with some help from the towns—the Tsar did not merely restore Nicholas's system, though once again Poland was incorporated in the Russian Empire ; he attempted to secure the permanent support of the peasants by an abolition of serfdom which was much more generous to them than that carried out in Russia generally in 1861. The peasants became owners, received a much larger share of the land than in other provinces, and preserved their rights of common over the woods and pastures. These rights were always a fruitful source of dispute between peasants and landlords, and were retained by Russia for that reason. Whether all this would keep them faithful to the Russian connection when their language and separate culture were repressed remained an unsolved problem for the rest of the century. Learning at last, the Polish landlords did try to make common cause with the peasants on the question of language and customs ; but though the Polish language survived despite Russian efforts, real national feeling was developed only slowly. It is very striking that the attempted revolution at St. Petersburg in 1905 did not lead to any rising in Poland. That seemed to show that the dream of Polish independence was at last fading.

The history of the Polish movement in the nineteenth century thus demonstrates the vital necessity for a really popular basis for a national movement. Unless the movement affects the masses, it has no real chance of success in its own right. A movement like the Polish one, which was essentially a class movement attempting to utilize national feeling for its own selfish purpose, had no real prospect of success. Certainly its failure did not prove that a national movement could, on occasion, be

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

successfully stifled. Polish Nationalism existed yet and none of the despoilers of the old kingdom really succeeded in absorbing their prey. It needed the cataclysm of the Great War to restore Poland to the map of Europe ; but it seems probable, from the experience of the nineteenth century, that the new Polish State will be a permanent feature of that map and not a mere passing phantom. It is in the main a Nation-State, and the great force of Nationalism will therefore help to ensure its continuance.

2. Austria after 1851

The Magyar struggle after 1850. Their desire for domination, not freedom. Effect of the Austro-Prussian War, 1866. The Dual Monarchy, 1867 : Germans and Magyars share control. The suppression of the Slavs.

Though the Magyars had been crushed in 1849, it was clear that the attempt to run the Austrian Empire from a single centre, and to obliterate all national distinctions, would be steadily resisted. Schwarzenberg had no doubts about his policy either internally or against Prussia in the German Confederation, but he died in 1852, and his successors, less heavy-handed and hard-hearted, found the task increasingly difficult. To Germanize the whole Empire seemed an impossible task ; to control it from Vienna very difficult. They tried alliance with the Papacy, hoping to make Roman Catholicism the cement for their State ; but clericalism had merely its usual effect of making the administration more Conservative than ever, without increasing either its efficiency or its popularity. In the war against France

MIDDLE AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

and Italy in 1859 Austria had to recognize defeat speedily, not primarily because of Magenta and Solferino, but because her internal stability was threatened. Thousands of Hungarian refugees had fought for the Italians, and a continuation of the war would probably have meant outbreaks of revolt within the Empire that would have disrupted it. Francis Joseph therefore felt compelled to try to come to terms with at least his leading opponents, the Magyars. His small concessions gave them the opportunity to make themselves heard ; and once again it was practical independence which they demanded. The Diploma of 1860 promised the restoration of the old Hungarian constitution which Schwarzenberg had swept away, and also proposed to grant certain limited rights of local self-government to other national groups. This did not please the Magyars. They wanted not a revival of the old arrangement, but one which would make them supreme in the eastern half of the Empire. They particularly opposed the setting up of any Central Council to control the common interests of the Empire ; as Schmerling and the Emperor refused to budge, a deadlock seemed likely. In 1861 the assembly at Pesth of a Hungarian Diet gave the Magyars the chance of open opposition. They refused to elect representatives to the Council which had been summoned in Vienna. Harking back to 1848 and the abdication of Ferdinand, which no Hungarian Diet had accepted, they refused to agree to the long delayed coronation of Francis Joseph unless Croatia and Transylvania were restored to Hungary. The dissolution of the Diet and the restoration of military rule were Schmerling's answers. The Reichsrat, duly assembled at Vienna, but without representatives from Hungary, proceeded to act as the Parliament for the

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

whole Empire. In 1863 Transylvania sent representatives, glad at escaping Magyar control. If the Emperor could thus win the various smaller nationalities he would eventually be able to deal with the recalcitrant Magyars.

But once again the external troubles of the Austrian State proved the decisive factor. The defeat of Königgrätz compelled Francis Joseph to alter his policy. He had already, in 1865, under the impending threat from Prussia, tried to bargain with the Magyars. After Königgrätz the question became one of Federalism or Dualism. Beust, lately of Saxony, was made chief minister by Francis Joseph ; and he, desirous of maintaining German control in the eastern half of the Empire, favoured Dualism. This was entirely satisfactory to the Magyars, who had no desire for Federalism, with its recognition of Czechs, Croats, Transylvanians, and others. The Magyars had won, and the final arrangements for setting up the Dual Monarchy were soon completed by Deák and Beust. In effect, the Empire was split into two sections, the one to be managed by Vienna, the other by Buda-Pesth. Certain common ministries for the whole Empire were created, but of these only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not duplicated. Delighted with their success, the Magyars acclaimed Francis Joseph as King of Hungary in June 1867. Only Kossuth, bitterly anti-Habsburg, refused to be satisfied, and remained in exile. The Dualism thus created lasted until the final collapse of the Empire in 1918.

This was certainly a triumph for Nationalism. The Magyars had persistently struggled against the danger of German domination—and they had won. But their victory included the right to control the whole eastern

MIDDLE AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

part of the Empire. They proved themselves harder taskmasters than the Germans in Vienna. Triumphant at last in their own national struggle, they had no sympathy whatever for the national pretensions of any of their Slav subject groups. The very policy of centralization which they had condemned in Vienna became their steady policy ; and the Magyarization of the whole of their part of the Empire was the aim persistently followed. The idea that a nation, once it had gained its own freedom, would necessarily be Liberal in outlook and policy was decisively refuted. It may seem illogical that a nation which had struggled so hard for its own national existence and rights should deny these to the peoples over which it had regained control, but logic is seldom dominant in politics. In any case, national movements are, by their nature, selfish, and concerned entirely with their own claims ; they are narrow in outlook, and envisage nothing beyond their own triumph. And the Magyar movement from the first had openly aimed at domination in the old kingdom of Hungary. The prevalent vague notion that the setting up of Nation-States would automatically end the wars and struggles which troubled Europe received no support from the triumph of the Magyars. They gained equality with the Germans of Vienna as a ruling group, and were completely satisfied with this position. " You manage your barbarians and we will manage ours " adequately sums up their attitude. Their experience of a national movement made them the more careful to check the early stages of such movements among their Slav peoples. The poacher turned keeper was an expert at suppressing poaching. Thus the creation of the Dual Monarchy in 1867, though it was one of the major triumphs of Nationalism in the nine-

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

teenth century, did not ensure the future of Austria-Hungary. The Dual Monarchy was still vulnerable to the spirit of Nationalism ; and the denial of all rights to the Slavs, especially in the Hungarian half of the Empire, was a continuing source of weakness. In fact, the most striking feature of the Dual Monarchy came to be the marked difference between the Austrian and Hungarian halves. In the Austrian portion the German-speaking group soon abandoned the effort to absorb or obliterate the "subject" nationalities, and an increasing tendency towards Federalism marked especially the period after 1900. It was the Czechs who took the leading part in this transformation ; but all the "subject" nationalities benefited, and an interesting experiment in federal government was being built up. Its value was largely offset by the persistent Magyar efforts in the other half of the monarchy to obliterate all the other national groups, and to make themselves a ruling race. The Austro-Hungarian banknote illustrated the position ; one side bore inscriptions in every language of Austria, the other, in Magyar only. That the "ramshackle Empire" collapsed under the strain of the Great War was therefore due chiefly to the policy of the Hungarian half, which made irreconcilable the desires of Roumanians, Serbs, and other Slav groups for national existence with a continuance of the prevailing system. Ironically, therefore, it was a vociferous Nationalist group who ensured that Nationalism should prove fatal at last to the Habsburg Empire.

3. Nationalism in the Balkans

The new Balkan States. Roumania, 1862. The effect on the Slav peoples. Troubles in 1875. The intervention of Russia. San Stefano, 1878. The attitude of Britain and Austria. The Treaty of Berlin, 1878. The resultant position in the Balkans. Nationalism as a disturbing factor. The Cretan troubles of 1896 and the Greco-Turk War of 1897. Greek defeat, but Turkey not allowed to gain anything. Crete finally united to Greece, 1910. The problem of Macedonia: rival claims. The "Young Turk" movement, 1908. Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. The Balkan War of 1912. Collapse of Turkey. The Second Balkan War, 1913. The creation of Albania.

An account has been given of the creation of the Greek national kingdom in 1829. The weakness of Turkey, which had made it possible, continued throughout the century. Turkey completely failed to modernize herself, and remained an old-fashioned theocracy, governed by Asiatic methods of despotism, and completely divorced from the life of Europe. Her continued existence was an apparent miracle dependent in reality on the jealousies and rivalries of the European Powers. The trouble would not have been to expel the Turks, but to get any agreement as to who should succeed them. When France and Britain, with Piedmont, fought the Crimean War, they were fighting against Russia rather than for Turkey. Even more directly and intimately concerned in the question was Austria. The obvious solution of the Balkan question during the nineteenth century was partition between Russia and Austria. Had they been able to agree on partition, the objections of the other interested Powers would not have counted for very much. Unfortunately for themselves, they could

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

never agree, chiefly because the possession of Constantinople and the Straits was worth more than all the rest. Partition in such circumstances was impossible, and each continued to hope that a happy chance would make the real prize theirs. The possible difficulties with the peoples of the Balkans did not, at first, seriously affect the Powers. They did not think of these unfortunate subjects of the Turks as nations ; even if they had done, they were, as has been shown, unaware of the possible strength, persistence, and danger of Nationalism. So the " Sick Man " of Europe remained, and the reversion of his dominions continued to perturb and antagonize the Powers.

Since the Turks remained, and continued to govern by a mixture of incompetence, carelessness, and massacre, the various Slav groups in the Balkans gradually developed national movements to gain freedom for themselves. With the example of the Greeks to inspire them, they prepared to struggle for independence, hoping for assistance from one or other of the Powers. The Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (the modern Roumania) were officially under Russian protection since their restoration to Turkey by Russia in 1812 ; Serbia had obtained some local autonomy under its own Princes in 1817 ; and Montenegro had always preserved a precarious independence, largely because its mountains were not worth the effort which conquest would entail. By the Treaty of Paris in 1856, after the Crimean War, Russia ceded a portion of Bessarabia, thus putting the mouth of the Danube into the Principalities, whose measure of local autonomy was now guaranteed by the Powers generally. Taking full advantage of the disagreements among these Powers, the

MIDDLE AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

Roumanians were able to make themselves practically independent in 1862 ; and on their choosing a sovereign from the Hohenzollerns in 1866 only a fixed tribute to Constantinople was left. The Roumanians, a latinized people, had followed the Greeks in becoming a Nation-State.

These successes naturally inspired the Slav groups to try for complete independence, and in the early sixties there was a series of risings which the Turks found some difficulty in suppressing. Then in 1875 Herzegovina rose in revolt, and a religious war between Christians and Mohammedans broke out in neighbouring Bosnia. Serbia and Montenegro both helped the rebels unofficially, and soon Austria took an interest in the affair. She was inevitably concerned in troubles so near her own borders, which might easily affect her own Slav areas now under Magyar domination, and none too loyal or happy. Efforts by the Powers, Britain alone refusing to join, to settle the questions without open war only led to the extension of the war and its accompanying massacres to Bulgaria. Disraeli still refused to support the rebels, his real reason being clearly jealousy of Russia, whom he suspected of fomenting Balkan troubles for her own ends ; and he opposed any joint intervention against Turkey. In consequence, the Serbs got badly beaten in 1876 ; only the enforcement of an armistice by Russia saved Belgrade. All efforts to get Turkey to agree to give up provinces without fighting failed, and in 1877 Russia, and later Roumania, declared war. Disraeli, though clearly hostile to Russia and nervous of her possible ambitions in the Balkans, was not prepared to face another Crimea, and Turkey had to fight alone. As usual, she put up an unexpectedly successful resistance,

but by 1878 the Russians were in Adrianople ; they had also been successful in the Asiatic field of the war, and Turkey appealed to the Powers to mediate. None except Britain was at all willing to assist her, and she was therefore compelled by Russia, in March, to sign the Treaty of San Stefano, by which the independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Roumania was fully recognized, the first two gaining considerable territory ; a big Bulgaria was to be created as an autonomous Principality stretching from sea to sea, and owing little but tribute ; and Bosnia and Herzegovina were to have a considerable measure of self-government. Russia was to take Bessarabia, handing over the comparatively worthless Dobrudja to Roumania in exchange ; and Russia also gained territory in Asia.

Clearly this settlement was dictated entirely by Russian interests ; the treatment of her ally Roumania was particularly galling. There was a general fear that San Stefano meant the complete domination of the Balkans by Russia. The newly created Bulgarian State would be under the thumb of its creator, and through it Russia would command the Balkans, and soon be able finally to expel the Turks. Disraeli, thoroughly alarmed, was prepared for another war to assist Turkey, and Austria was now inclined to support any anti-Russian move. The situation was critical ; but Bismarck, who acted as neutral chairman at the Congress of Berlin in June 1878, managed to secure a settlement which obviated a further war, and Disraeli returned to London bringing " peace with honour." The new arrangements reduced Bulgaria to a State north of the Balkans, and even that was divided into two, the southern portion being christened " Eastern Roumelia " ; Bosnia and Herze-

MIDDLE AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

govina were to be administered by Austria (which meant Hungary); the gains of both Serbia and Montenegro were reduced; and Greece, which had been preparing to join in the war, got promises regarding Thessaly which were only partially fulfilled. The Bessarabian exchange was allowed to stand despite Roumania's protests. For her services Britain received Cyprus from Turkey. The whole episode demonstrated, if that were necessary, that the Powers were concerned in the Balkans only with what they took to be their own interests, and were entirely indifferent to the feelings or wishes of the inhabitants. If Nationalism gained anything it would be by accident, or because some Power thought that to support a particular national group might serve its own purposes. The Powers, too, were curiously slow to learn from experience. Roumania, which they tried to keep divided, and therefore weak, had united despite them; and it had shown no special subservience to Russia. Yet they feared that the big Bulgaria of San Stefano would be permanently pro-Russian, and again divided it into two as well as reducing its size. That division proved very temporary; by 1885 Eastern Roumelia had disappeared into Bulgaria, which thus became one of the more important Balkan States; and the only active opposition to the union came from Serbia, which suffered defeat in a brief campaign.

By 1880, therefore, national states had appeared in Greece, Roumania, Serbia, and Bulgaria, while little Montenegro persisted and had grown. Albania and Macedonia remained under Turkish rule, and Bosnia and Herzegovina had exchanged Turkish for Austro-Hungarian authority. The old position, which encouraged the hopes of Russia and Austria, had been vitally changed.

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

Disraeli's fear of Russian influence in the Balkans was misplaced. The various Nation-States had their own ambitions, and were by no means prepared to be merely Russian outposts. All were poor, and therefore prepared to accept bribes from any one ; but none intended in return to surrender any of its dreams. So, in addition to the rivalries of the Great Powers about the Balkans, there were now the rivalries and ambitions of these national States. Unfortunately, several had been dominant Balkan Powers in the past ; and each hoped to revive its own historic glories. Each nation freed from the Turks was as prepared as the Magyars to subjugate other peoples if they obtained or could make the opportunity. The difficulties were increased by the erratic dispersal of national groups in many parts ; it is impossible to draw frontiers in the Balkans which will create pure Nation-States. By reducing Bulgaria inside its own national limits, Disraeli helped to make the new State more united ; the "big Bulgaria" of San Stefano would have faced from the first the undying enmity of Serbs and Greeks alike. Otherwise his efforts at Berlin were unfortunate. Certainly if it was hoped that the settlement of 1878 was final, there was nothing but disappointment in store. Nationalism here was likely to continue to be inflammatory, even after the Turk had been expelled, if expelled he ever were. The prospect of the gain of territory when the Turk disappeared from Europe served to antagonize the various States ; each was anxious to gain as much spoil as possible, and in consequence they could not unite even to attempt the necessary preliminary of beating Turkey. This rivalry about future putative gains helped to make them accentuate their national differences, and to insist on their

MIDDLE AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

national claims in the areas still under the Turks. Nationalism therefore remained a disruptive force in the Balkans. The successes of both Roumania and Bulgaria in securing unity in defiance of the Powers made all hope that their own efforts might in the future be fortunate. At the same time they were naturally prepared to accept assistance of every sort from any Power which was willing to support them. As all the major Powers for different reasons conceived themselves to be "interested" in the Balkans, the confusion may better be imagined than described. The Balkans remained a permanent danger-zone, Nationalism having thus far merely added considerably to the combustible material.

That European statesmen recognized the existence and importance of Nationalism was proved by their acceptance of definite rebuffs from both Roumania and Bulgaria. The Powers did not wish either of these States to be large enough to be really independent in policy ; but when the separated areas insisted on joining, it was generally realized that national feeling was behind this insistence, and that Nationalism would yield only to the action of superior force. This task they were unwilling to attempt. They therefore accepted in each case what had occurred, though that meant climbing down without disguise. Nationalism was evidently realized as a force that counted. It could be overcome, but only by force ; and even then there was the almost certain prospect of future troubles. Slowly, too, the realization grew that neither Russia nor Austria would find it easy to dominate the Balkans now that these national States existed. They were certainly more quarrelsome than powerful, and remained very little civilized or modernized ; but they showed as little

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

political gratitude as more advanced States, and were not prepared to be the mere clients of their liberators. In fact, as Nationalism in the Balkans became more self-conscious, the possession by Austria of Slav provinces made the Slav States consider the possibility of their own expansion at the expense of Austria as well as of Turkey. If Nationalism meant anything, these provinces should surely be joined to Slav States rather than continue to be dominated by the Magyars from Buda-Pesth. The idea of the backward, weak, and disunited Balkan States gaining anything from the Austrian Empire seemed absurd ; but the history of the Balkans has been full of apparent impossibilities, and there is no doubt that these dreams were seriously entertained by the States concerned.

The next open outbreak of trouble affected the Greeks. Crete had been left under the suzerainty of Turkey in 1878 ; the Greeks who formed the majority of the inhabitants of the island wanted union with Greece. The customary difficulties and friction led eventually to the customary rebellion in 1896. The proclamation by the insurgents of union with Greece almost inevitably compelled that country to support them ; and though the naval forces of the Powers bombarded the rebels, Turkish rule in Crete was ended. Believing, despite the bombardment of the island, that she would have support from some of the Powers, Greece forced a war on Turkey in 1897, hoping to gain territory on the mainland as well as Crete. She got badly beaten, since Austria and Russia warned the Christian Balkan States not to join in. When the Greeks had been defeated, the Powers insisted on an armistice, and the treaty which ended the war gave Turkey nothing but an indemnity ;

MIDDLE AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

she evacuated Thessaly, which had been overrun. Crete, the original cause of the dispute, remained a problem until it was finally united with Greece by Venizelos in 1910, after union had been ineffectively proclaimed in the excitements of 1908.

In Macedonia, the nominally Turkish province which was desired alike by Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgars, the period from 1878 to 1914 was one which demonstrated only too clearly the intransigence and violence of national ambitions. Macedonia contained groups of all three peoples, and of others in addition. Each of the States hoped to absorb the whole area, or at least the greater part of it, and soon Roumania joined in the game, claiming the Vlachs as long-lost brothers. The din of rival national claims, supported with very little regard for objective truth, resounded through the Chancelleries of Europe, and Macedonia, despite the stiffening of Turkish rule by international supervisory bodies, became the permanent home of feud and murder. No real settlement even appeared possible ; and the contentions and murders in this area kept the hatreds of the various Balkan nations for one another at boiling-point. As a means of pacification it was clear that Nationalism was a failure, and the development of national States here had made the preservation of peace almost impossible. The danger was that the war might become a general European one, since the greater Powers still retained their interest in the Balkans. The planning of the Bagdad railway by Germany, and her intervention in the Balkans, was the outstanding feature of this period. Germany's intervention over the head of her Austrian ally was conclusive proof that the Balkans as a route, if not for themselves, were regarded as of real value. When the

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

"Young Turks" gained power in 1908, and granted constitutional liberties to the various provinces of the Turkish dominions, a new and unexpected factor was introduced. As constitutional liberties were by no means normal in the various Balkan States, which generally tended towards a hardly disguised dictatorship, the offer of such liberties to the Turkish provinces seemed dangerous. A revived Turkey of this type would be very threatening to the various quarrelling national States. Actually the constitutionalism of the "Young Turks" was unimportant. What really mattered was that they were the precursors of a Turkish Nationalism which was to grow with surprising rapidity. The Turk, who in so long had learned so little from Europe, was to learn this lesson with dramatic rapidity. Nationalism, entirely alien to the Turkish State, was to transform it. In 1908, however, Austria took the opportunity of the changes in Turkey formally to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. Against this breach of the Treaty of Berlin Britain protested, but did nothing further. Bulgaria at the same time, by arrangement with Austria, declared her complete independence, and thus became even formally the equal of the other States.

The effect of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was far greater than had been anticipated. Generally the view was that expressed by Italy that it was only the disappearance of a diplomatic fiction, and the recognition of the actual state of affairs. But to the Serbs it meant the end of their hopes of expansion in that direction; and how real those hopes had been was proved by their attempt to secure from Austria a strip of Bosnia which would unite Serbia and Montenegro. Both these States were Serb, and each hoped to be the head of a Great

MIDDLE AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

Serbia which would control the Balkans ; their rivalry over this prevented them from opposing even the Bulgarians with real vigour. Austria's natural refusal to cede territory showed them the probable future in which there would be no Great Serbia to quarrel about. So Serbia became the prime mover in the Balkan Alliance. Having lost their hope of northward expansion, and fearing the further advance of Austria, the Balkan States actually sank their interminable differences in an alliance against Turkey. The process was hastened by the Italian attack on Turkey in Libya, which caused a war in 1911. It was not very vigorously pursued, but it suggested that a further Power might try to gain Balkan territory, a prospect naturally unpleasing to the existing Balkan States, who regarded the remaining Turkish provinces as their rightful heritage. Though the first " Young Turk " government had quietly collapsed, there was already the possibility that a Turkish revival was brewing. Such a revival would completely alter the situation, and the States were therefore anxious to make certain of Macedonia and Albania before Turkey became too strong for them to attack. They did not abandon their conflicting and exalted national claims, but temporarily they postponed them to unite to drive out the Turks. More easily, they agreed to ignore the Powers which normally regarded them as very junior allies ; and Serbia ceased to depend on Russia and Bulgaria on Austria. Though there was nothing very secret about all this, the declaration of war by Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro on Turkey in the autumn of 1912 seemed to take the Powers by surprise. They evidently expected the allies to quarrel among themselves to an extent which would make any joint action impossible.

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

Turkey, always surprising, now collapsed with dramatic thoroughness; and early in 1913 Adrianople as well as Salonika had been captured. Turkey was forced to surrender practically the whole of her European possessions to the allies. Their very success proved their undoing. They could not agree on the division of such unexpectedly ample booty, and their dissensions were eagerly fomented by Russia, Austria, and other Powers, who had no desire to see the Balkan question settled in this way. The upshot was the Second Balkan War, in which Bulgaria attacked Serbia, which was supported by Greece and Roumania. Delighted, the Turks took their chance and recaptured Adrianople. Bulgaria was defeated, and the final result was that Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Roumania were all considerably increased at Turkey's expense, while Bulgaria got practically nothing; in addition, an independent Albania was set up. This last was the result of the insistence of the Powers, who strongly asserted the separate national unity of the Albanians, and the consequent need for an independent national state. Actually, their main object was to prevent the whole Balkans falling to the existing States; they hoped that Albania might remain a "sphere of influence" especially for Italy, which had been harbouring Balkan ambitions for some time.

The story of the development of Nationalism in the Balkans is thus far from cheerful. It is true that Turkey was gradually almost driven out, and the Mohammedan dominion of the Balkans therefore ceased. But the nations which emerged were at once backward and ambitious, and the combination made the Balkan problem worse. There seemed little likelihood of these States settling down to friendly development; good

MIDDLE AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

neighbourliness was almost unknown. The worst features of Nationalism, its narrow loyalty, its readiness to hate, its ambition for dominion, were all illustrated with distressing clarity. Even anti-Semitism was marked in Roumania. Such was the position immediately prior to the Great War ; and it was fitting that the quarrel which precipitated the European War was one between Austria and Serbia, the excuse for which was the political murder of the Archduke by discontented Serbs who were Austrian subjects. The Balkan quarrels were not the sole cause of the war ; they were an important element, since almost all the Great Powers had, or imagined they had, interests in the Balkans. The policies followed by all had been almost uniformly selfish ; and the Balkan States themselves remained fiercely nationalistic, while harbouring dreams of wide empire. Thus the Balkans formed a fitting theatre for a quarrel which was to develop into the first great war of Nation-States.

CHAPTER VI

NORTHERN NATIONS

I. Norway

Norway attached to Sweden, 1814 The Constitution of Eidsvold The growth of Norwegian Nationalism Constitutional questions The difficulty of foreign affairs The consular question and the final separation Carlstad, 1905

BECAUSE it was accomplished without outside help, and therefore did not threaten to produce a European war, the Norwegian national movement has generally received little notice outside Scandinavia. Actually, it was the finest example in the nineteenth century of a national movement, being from every point of view a better example of the working of a purely Nationalist movement than either Italy or Germany. The three Scandinavian kingdoms—Sweden, Denmark, and Norway—had always been closely associated; and for centuries Norway had been a minor partner. It was therefore intelligible that the Powers should have thought it possible to alter their grouping in 1814 without real difficulty. As Sweden had eventually sided with the allies against Napoleon, while Denmark had remained faithful to him, the transference of Norway from Denmark to Sweden seemed the easiest and most natural way of dealing out reward and punishment; and as Russia had seized Finland from Sweden after Tilsit, and kept it

NORTHERN NATIONS

in 1814, there was additional reason for some compensation to Sweden. So in 1814 Norway was allotted to Sweden, whose Crown Prince was the French ex-Marshall Bernadotte. But though the Norwegians numbered fewer than a million, they resented this high-handed method of dealing with them. At Eidsvold, in May, they framed a constitution of a democratic kind, on the models of America, the France of 1791, and the inevitable Spanish constitution of 1812. Its main features were a single-chamber Assembly, and very limited rights for the King. They then elected a Danish prince as King. The Swedes, under Bernadotte, promptly invaded Norway; but finding that they would have to deal with a really united national resistance, came to terms very quickly. The Norwegians had realized that the great Powers might insist; so in November 1814 Norway became a free, independent, and indivisible kingdom, united with Sweden under one King, whom the Norwegians, giving up their Dane, had elected. Thus a dual monarchy was set up, the only bonds of union being the monarchy and the ministries of war and foreign affairs. The two countries were very different in social pattern and in outlook. Sweden had a powerful aristocracy and a Parliament with separate houses for the nobility, the clergy, the cities, and the peasants. Compared with Norway, it was wealthy; and the Swedes persisted in thinking of Norway as a conquered country. Norway, thoroughly democratic, a community mainly of fishers and seafarers, had its single house, and the unusual rule that any bill passed by three successive Assemblies (the Assembly being triennial) became law, despite the royal veto. The constitution of Eidsvold had been made the basic law of the union.

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

This rule was almost immediately put to the test. The Norwegians passed, in 1815, a bill abolishing the nobility ; when the King rejected it, it was again passed in 1818 and in 1821. Despite the efforts of Bernadotte (now King) it became law. The most thoroughly democratic State in Europe had declared itself. Friction between the Assembly and the King continued persistently. It was inevitable, since the King always lived in Sweden, and desired to extend the Swedish system to Norway. It was advantageous to him, since he could generally count on disagreements among the four houses ; facing a single Norwegian Assembly was different, and allowed no scope for finesse, and little for bargaining. As the ministries were responsible to the King, and could not be dismissed by the Assembly, difficulties between the government and the Assembly became normal. All Bernadotte's efforts to alter the constitution were steadily resisted, and finally were given up in 1830.

This national resistance to the monarch tended to develop into a full national movement. This showed itself in the question of language. All three Scandinavian languages were similar, but there were marked differences of dialect, especially in Norway. For official or literary purposes, Danish had been used ; during the nineteenth century this was replaced by Norwego-Danish, the language of the educated classes. By the middle of the century a fully national language, Landsmaal, based on old Norse, had been developed, and gradually invaded even literature. The excitement about Landsmaal, which even became a political issue as late as 1912, was a symptom of the determination of the Norwegians to insist on their equal status in the union with the Swedes.

NORTHERN NATIONS

So, too, they objected to the office of Viceroy, and finally secured its abolition in 1873. But as they had a large measure of self-government, the national movement did not occupy the whole field, and the Assembly was divided into parties roughly corresponding to the British Conservatives and Liberals of the period. The Conservatives, on the whole, upheld the existing arrangements, and generally supported the Ministry; the Liberals wished to develop more democratic tendencies, and normally opposed the ministry.

As all efforts to get the Norwegians to surrender the constitution of Eidsvold failed, and the Swedes still wished to dominate, they suggested, in 1860, the setting up of a Union Parliament. As Sweden had twice the population of Norway, this would have given them two members to each Norwegian one; the Norwegians therefore refused. That refusal made the eventual dissolution of the existing union almost certain. It was in this struggle that the Norwegian Liberal Party, in defence of the constitution of 1814, was created. It engaged in a prolonged struggle with the King about the admission of ministers to the Assembly, which eventually led, in 1883, to the impeachment of the whole ministry. The ministers were found guilty of advising the King contrary to the interests of the country; and as every one knew that their measures were really the King's, there was a general fear of a *coup d'état*. But Oscar II. did not desire a war; and it was clear that the Norwegians meant business. He therefore accepted the judgment, though he showed his feelings by asking one of the ministers who had been fined to form a ministry. He was finally compelled to call in a Liberal ministry in 1884, and a further step in the development of Norwegian democracy had

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

been taken. Future ministries were in fact dependent on a majority in the Assembly.

The final breach with Sweden came on the question of foreign relations. From the beginning this had caused difficulty. The Norwegians had set up their national flag in the constitution of Eidsvold ; and by 1838 had succeeded in having this flag flown by Norwegian ships everywhere. They had never been satisfied with the arrangement by which diplomatic and consular affairs were run from Stockholm, and their dissatisfaction grew as their trade and mercantile marine flourished. It did so especially after the abolition by England, in 1850, of her Navigation Acts. Norwegian commercial interests were more important and widespread than Swedish, and by 1892 the Assembly demanded the establishment of a separate consular service. The King vetoed this, and the ministry resigned. The issue became the chief one in the elections of 1894, and a large majority was returned for insistence. A joint committee of Norwegians and Swedes was set up to consider the question, but could reach no agreement. A further committee, in 1902, produced results satisfactory to the Norwegians, and it seemed by 1903 that the matter was settled ; but the Swedes now insisted that the Norwegian consuls were to be controlled and removable by the Swedish foreign minister. In May 1905 the Norwegian Assembly passed unanimously a bill establishing a Norwegian consular service independent of Sweden. When the King refused his assent to this bill, the Norwegians declared the union dissolved.

A strong party in Sweden was prepared for war ; but the government decided against this. They asked for a plebiscite, to make certain that the Assembly

NORTHERN NATIONS

correctly represented the people. The voting in August 1905 showed over 368,000 against 184. So overwhelming a free vote convinced both the King and the Swedish government that the Norwegians were fully united as a nation, and the separation of the two kingdoms was agreed upon. The Treaty of Carlstad settled the details of the severance ; the most interesting of the terms were the neutralizing of the frontier, on which no military fortifications were to be erected, and the agreement to submit future disputes which could not be settled by normal diplomatic methods to the Hague International Arbitration Tribunal. Prince Charles of Denmark ascended the Norwegian throne as Haakon VII. A truly national movement had been fully successful. The national movement in Norway is especially interesting because the field was comparatively limited, and partly because there was no question of making a nation. The Norwegians were a nation in 1814, and the union with Sweden was almost solely the personal union of the crowns. It was therefore in the nature of the case that the dispute which finally caused severance should have been on a question of foreign affairs. On neither side was there any working up of hatred of the other party. The Norwegians simply insisted on their right to manage their own affairs. The Swedes wished for a certain preponderance in the union ; but they wisely hesitated to insist against a really united people. Though tempers were rather frayed in 1905, the two countries soon became friendly ; and the Great War compelled all three Scandinavian countries to draw together, even though their sympathies in the war might differ. There seems every reason to suppose that Norwegian independence is a permanent settlement, and that the three

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

countries will be able to work harmoniously together while each preserves complete independence. So peaceful and orderly a result of a force which during the nineteenth century generally led to war is an encouragement for the future. It proves that Nationalism, though it raises the emotional temper, need not necessarily result in war. Given favourable conditions, there is nothing inherently impossible in a peaceful and friendly settlement.

2. Ireland

Ireland and the Union of 1801. The question of Catholic Emancipation. O'Connell's success, 1829 : its basis. The "Tithe War," agrarian grievances, and Repeal. The Potato Famine and its effects. Ireland quiet in 1848. The Irish-Americans and the Fenians. Gladstone's attempts at pacification ; the Irish Church question, and Land Reform. Parnell and "Home Rule." Political murder. Gladstone and Home Rule. The Liberal split. Balfour and Ireland. The Liberals, 1906, and Home Rule. The arming of Ulster. Sinn Féin and Separation. The Home Rule Act. Ireland in the Great War. The Rebellion of 1916. "The Troubles" after 1918. The Irish Free State. Relations with Britain.

The demand for national self-government in Ireland is the most familiar example to English people of the nineteenth-century national movements. They have at no time felt particularly happy about it, and realize because of it that national movements are not of necessity easily settled. The real basis of the difficulties in this case is, of course, that the Union was not one of equal partners, but of a dominant and a subordinate ; that, in fact, there had been a partial conquest of Ireland. As that partial conquest had been accompanied by settlement on a considerable scale as well as political

NORTHERN NATIONS

rule, the national unity of Ireland had been upset, unless the settlers could be absorbed. Many of them were ; the Cromwellian settlements have disappeared ; but the difference in religion helped to keep the mainly Scottish settlement in Ulster a separate community which did not fuse with its Irish neighbours. Not that Ulster necessarily stood for union with England ; at the end of the eighteenth century Ulster was as unwilling as the rest of Ireland to see the separate Irish Parliament vanish from Dublin, and Ireland be swallowed in a so-called Union. In 1798 discontent was as active in Ulster as in any part. When Union came, in 1801, it was largely by Catholic support, in expectation of emancipation, that it was carried. Pitt's failure to compel George III. to agree to emancipation assured the permanent unpopularity of the Union. For the rest of the century there was a persistent movement for what came to be called Home Rule.

The English refusal to grant self-government was uncomfortably based mainly on practical considerations. To dissolve the Union would be to create in England's rear a government which might, in time of war, be unfriendly. It would certainly be dominated by Catholics ; and fear of Catholicism was still very strong in nineteenth-century England. It is one of the minor ironies of Irish history that Irish Catholicism dates from the attempt to impose the Anglican Church on Ireland in Tudor days. Further, the Protestants in Ireland would infallibly be oppressed by the Catholic majority. Since religious feeling in Ireland was notoriously bitter, there was some reason for this fear. So the English were unwilling to concede self-government. Unwilling to oppose a "national" movement, they tried to convince themselves that the

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

Irish were not in any real sense a nation. Interminable discussions on this point settled nothing ; the only real test, as has been said, is that people should believe that they are a nation. Even on this ground, there was an increasing doubt during the course of the century as to whether Ulster wanted to be Irish. In one sense, certainly ; Ulstermen, like Protestants of English descent in Dublin, insisted on their differentiation from mere Englishmen. They were Irish ; but politically they were doubtful of their desire to be associated with the rest of their nation. The real difficulties of the situation gave England an excuse, perhaps a reason, for refusing to grant self-government.

After the almost abortive attempts at open rebellion which immediately followed the Union, agitation in Ireland concentrated chiefly on the religious question. Catholic emancipation became the dominant feature of Irish affairs until, under the influence of O'Connell's success in the Clare Election of 1828, the Tory English government agreed, in 1829, to emancipation as a less evil than the civil war which they had been forced to believe was the alternative. Had the mass of the English people been politically effective, emancipation would not have been granted. Anti-Catholic feeling was still very strong among the uneducated majority. As it was, it was accompanied by a measure disfranchising a large number of Irish voters ; but some retreat from a democracy that meant very little was not regarded as a high price to pay for the removal of Catholic disabilities. The exclusion of O'Connell, since he had been elected before emancipation, from the House of Commons created far more excitement in Ireland. He promptly began an agitation for Repeal which occupied him for

NORTHERN NATIONS

the rest of his life, and periodically caused difficulty to the English government. The "Tithe War" of 1831-32, which interrupted the Repeal movement, was a further illustration of the complications introduced into Irish questions by religious differences. The tithes objected to were those due to the Anglican Church of Ireland, which were felt in both pocket and conscience by the Catholic peasants. The "War" had all the worst features of a peasant revolt, and served to make existing bitterness grow even harsher; but it eventually compelled the government to give way. Wellington's open admission of his motive for agreeing to Catholic emancipation had been well noted in Ireland; and the threat of civil war became a regular feature of Irish agitation.

This readiness to appeal to force naturally caused the government also to resort to force; and coercion became a frequent feature in Irish affairs. Under such conditions no satisfactory solution of any important question was likely. In periods of less excitement—for not even the Irish were capable of keeping up a fever heat of agitation continuously—conciliation was sometimes tried, generally by Liberal ministries. The effect was commonly to give the Irish some new platform from which to proclaim their wrongs and their desire for Repeal. Even well-meant efforts might be unfortunate. Thus the Irish Poor Law of 1838, giving official poor relief on a scale not previously attempted in Ireland, was most unpopular in that country because it introduced the work-house test, to which the Irish objected at least as strongly as the English poor of the same period. The basis of all Irish agitations was the poverty of the peasantry. Attempting to support an increasing population on land which was ill-farmed through lack of capital, and rack-

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

rented because of the combination of over-population and absentee landlords, Ireland provided an insoluble problem to the English governments. Afraid to undo the Union, they gradually began to realize the basic nature of the question of the land, and various efforts were made to mitigate the apparently hopeless poverty of the mass of Irish peasants. In the "forties" it was the potato famine rather than the "Young Ireland" Party founded in imitation of Mazzini's "Young Italy" which had the greatest effect in England. In fact, "Young Ireland" was dealt with for the time in 1843-44 by a dose of coercion, while the Maynooth Grant nearly wrecked Peel's government. This grant to a Catholic college from public funds aroused the anti-Papal feeling in England to extravagant heights, and the measure was passed only with the help of Liberal votes, as many of Peel's Tory followers voted against it. The possible effects of the Union in England's internal politics had been illustrated, as well as some of the prejudices most warmly cherished in the country.

The disastrous results of the potato famine hastened the introduction of Free Trade in England. In Ireland the disorders which inevitably followed starvation produced first the usual coercion, and then, both from Peel's ministry and from the Whigs who followed him, measures for relief; though eventually private charity had to supply the deficiencies in the official schemes. The famine and its accompaniments reduced the over-population; but the standard of living had even declined, and poverty and discontent remained normal. But even the excitements of 1848 could not produce a rebellion in a country so devastated. Ireland was temporarily comparatively quiet, even if the "Young Ireland" enthusiasts

NORTHERN NATIONS

were not. So the year of revolutions chanced to see neither an Irish nor a Polish movement of importance. Nor did Ireland become prominent again in English politics for some time. The loss of about two millions in population effectively quietened Ireland temporarily. But during this period bitterness actually increased. The whole of Ireland's woes were put down in the account against England, and the emigrants to America remained as anti-English as those at home. It was in America, in the late fifties, that the Fenians were born, a secret society which aimed at setting up an Irish Republic. The influence of the Irish-Americans had begun, and was to continue until the present day. The influence of the national feeling of these Irish-Americans has been enormous. It made them difficult of absorption by the United States of America, anxious to create its own national spirit; it kept alive and increased the anti-British feeling in that country: even in the post-war world the egregious Mayor Thompson of Chicago appeared to confuse George V. with George III.; and it supplied the finance for every Nationalist effort in Ireland. Thus a national question once again became of importance in international relations, especially since England was very slow in appreciating the real importance of the bitterness of the Irish-Americans.

The first Fenian plots were comparatively easily dealt with in 1865 and 1866; though the attempted invasion of Canada by Fenians in May was a symptom which deserved more attention than it received. Certainly the government of the United States promptly made it clear that no infraction of neutrality would be permitted; but the existence of a bitter anti-British feeling in America, especially since the Irish-Americans were very

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

active in politics, was of real importance. When Gladstone took office in 1868 his first words were "My mission is to pacify Ireland." Fenian troubles had broken out again in 1867, not only in Ireland, but, in accordance with the policy decided upon in America, in England too. It was war, and it was to be carried into the enemy's country. The attempt at Chester did not materialize; but the will was there; and the attempt to blow up Clerkenwell Prison, which resulted in much damage and some loss of life, infuriated English public opinion. Gladstone, aware of the extreme difficulty of carrying through Repeal, attempted the pacification of Ireland by tackling the questions of Church and land tenure. If these two obvious sources of discontent could be removed, he hoped that the Irish might remain contented in the Union. The national basis of the Irish movement had not yet been accepted in this country. Despite difficulties with the House of Lords, Gladstone succeeded, in 1869, in separating the Irish Church from the Church of England, and in disestablishing and disendowing it. The irritating spectacle of a "foreign" nominally national Church had been got rid of. His Land Act, necessarily a compromise, did not effectively tackle the real problems, though it did mitigate the worst evils of rack-renting. Even had it been more thoroughgoing, it would not, as Gladstone hoped, have "pacified" Ireland. Amid the taunts of Disraeli, he had to pass further coercive measures immediately after his Irish reforms.

The discomforts of the English were greatly increased when the cautious Butt was replaced as leader of the Irish Party in the Commons by Parnell. Parnell is a standard example of the extremism of a convertite; his

NORTHERN NATIONS

descent was English and American, and he was a Protestant and a landowner. But his policy was always that declared at Cincinnati in 1880, when he was raising money for his campaign : "None of us, whether we are in America or Ireland, or wherever we may be, will be satisfied until we have destroyed the last link which keeps Ireland bound to England." The Irish movement, always fundamentally Nationalist, was now definitely and consciously aiming at national independence.

The first stages of the new movement appeared very little different from the old ; a land league appeared, aiming at expropriating the owners within a limited period. But the league was more effective than earlier bodies had been, and introduced "Boycott" into the English language ; it was the penalty for one who took a farm from which the tenant had been evicted for non-payment of rent. When the government tried to deal with this by having Parnell and others tried in the ordinary courts, the jury returned the very Irish verdict : "We are unanimous that we cannot agree." In the House of Commons the Irish began that campaign of obstruction which gradually forced the House to alter its easy-going ways, and make more and more stringent rules. Even so, the Irish members remained a nuisance, and seriously delayed parliamentary business. As parliamentary methods are in any case deliberate, these delays increasingly irritated English opinion, always ready to be inflamed against the Irish because its own conscience was uneasy. By 1886 Gladstone had passed a further Land Act, which was no more successful in settling even the immediate issue, much less pacifying Parnell and the Irish. Strong measures were once again tried, and Parnell was imprisoned at Kilmainham. The reply to

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

this was a further outburst of violence, which culminated, even while Gladstone was bargaining with Parnell, and thereby causing his Irish Secretary to resign, in the murder of his successor, Lord Frederick Cavendish. Political murder of this type was regarded as Continental, and England was horrified. Even Parnell thought of a temporary retirement. Coercion was continued, though there was a further stage of land reform.

Parnell's reiterated demands for national independence, together with the results of the election of 1885, which gave the eighty-six Irish nationalists the balancing power in the House, made the Irish question of first importance; and after characteristic hesitations, Gladstone decided on Home Rule. Even the Liberals were divided about this; and Randolph Churchill, with his "Ulster will fight; and Ulster will be right," represented the vast majority of the Conservatives. The Home Rule Bill split the Liberal Party, Gladstone risked an election, and was decisively defeated. The English electorate still objected to any dissolution of the Union. In the Conservative government the unpleasant Irish position soon fell to Balfour, who managed remarkably to combine firmness and continued coercion with unexpected success. He was materially helped, in 1890, by the dissension in the Irish Party over the O'Shea divorce case, in which Parnell was cited as co-respondent. This introduction of a "moral" issue not only split the Irish Party, but shook the English Nonconformists, Gladstone's strongest supporters. Whatever chance there had been for Home Rule in the immediate future disappeared. Balfour meanwhile got through a Land Purchase Act, and instituted relief works in the most distressed parts. His combination of unbending Unionism with practical

NORTHERN NATIONS

sympathy won him the permanent regard of the Irish.

Winning the election in 1892, Gladstone again introduced a Home Rule Bill; he had a majority only with the help of the Irish Nationalists. The House of Lords promptly threw out the Bill, and Gladstone accepted the defeat. In 1894 he retired. The Unionists and Conservatives won the election in 1895, and remained in office for a decade. During that period open discontent became rarer in Ireland; the breach between Parnellites and anti-Parnellites took long to heal, and the agrarian population was less distressed, especially since the Conservatives took over and developed the Land Purchase Scheme. But the belief in England that the Irish question had disappeared was without foundation. The Nationalist movement persisted, and the Irish members remained a permanent reminder in Parliament of Ireland's demand for self-government.

When, in 1906, the Liberals gained an overwhelming majority, it was certain that the question of Home Rule would be revived. The Liberals had shed their objectors to Home Rule to the Conservatives; the party was therefore committed in principle to Home Rule. Unfortunately, they did not introduce a Home Rule Bill until 1910, when the election had greatly reduced their majority, and they were once again dependent on Nationalist support. Opposition in the Lords, always predominantly Conservative, was to be expected; but it would be eventually overcome. Actually, the Liberal quarrels with the Lords were not only on Ireland; and they produced the Parliament Act of 1910, which reduced the Lords, in cases of dispute, to a suspensory veto. This seemed to make Home Rule certain in time, but the

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

Unionists, concentrating on the question of Ulster, showed that they were, like the Irish, prepared for unconstitutional means. The arming of Ulster, and the apparent determination of Carson and the Unionists to resist Home Rule by force made the English realize that Nationalism is a passion which it is extremely difficult to confine in a constitution. But the threat of actual war produced a strong feeling that this was not our method of settling questions which the repeated asseverations of loyalty on the part of the Ulster leaders did nothing to placate. When the Home Rule Bill, held up by the Lords' veto, was due to come into operation despite them, the attempt to use force was generally condemned by English opinion, though firmly proclaimed by the Conservatives.

On the Irish side the movement for independence had been developed by the revival of the Irish language, a work in which Dr. Hyde was a pioneer. Language revival came rather late in Ireland ; but it was an unmistakable pointer. In 1904, too, the Sinn Fein organization was founded. It aimed at the overthrow of British domination ; and its title demonstrates the dangers as well as the virtues of national movements. "Ourselves alone" may be a fine rallying-cry for a people who think they are oppressed, or denied the self-government they desire ; but it proclaims almost too openly the essential selfishness and narrowness which is normal in national movements. Sinn Fein almost justified the fears of Ulster ; and, as has been shown, nineteenth-century experience of triumphant national movements gave no reason to suppose that they would have any Liberalism in their policy. The Home Rule measure eventually produced by the Asquith government in 1911

NORTHERN NATIONS

was not a very satisfactory attempt at a solution. The Parliament it would have set up at Dublin was to be for all Ireland ; but its powers were very limited.

The fierceness of the rival parties in Ireland was almost unintelligible to the English. The passions aroused by national feeling were far hotter than anything English politics produced. The Ulster fear of Catholic domination from Dublin seemed exaggerated ; but the Sinn Fein programme showed that, extreme as it was, it was not unreasonable. The absurd distortions of history which were currently accepted in Ireland, proving the continued and nefarious intent of England to destroy Ireland economically, were proof of a temper more Nationalist than reasonable. The bitterness of anti-English feeling was intense ; and the Protestant north feared that a good deal of that bitterness might be vented upon them if Home Rule were granted. The Liberal Party in England, attempting to be reasonable and fair, found itself lost in a tempest of passion in which reason seemed entirely to have vanished. Their Irish secretary, Birrell, did not understand the temper with which he had to deal, and did not believe in the fury which circled round him. He assumed that he was dealing with civilized and modern people, prepared, at bottom, for civilized and modern methods. He did not realize that nationalism is a passion which strips off the veneer of civilization, and that both sides really meant the extreme things they said. As the time for Home Rule came nearer, and attempts to find a compromise acceptable to both parties entirely failed, it seemed that civil war was certain. That was the common opinion in Ireland ; unfortunately, English opinion simply could not believe in civil war. The very idea was absurd, and most English

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

people felt that somehow or other things would turn out all right.

The outbreak of the Great War temporarily eased the situation. Home Rule was put into cold storage for the period of the war, with the promise of an Amending Bill to deal with Ulster ; English opinion felt that then it would be faced very differently. In Ireland neither side was pleased by the delay ; and though the official Nationalists rallied to the Empire, and did their best to encourage recruiting, the more extreme members of the party and the Sinn Feiners definitely took up the attitude that England's difficulty was Ireland's opportunity. They declared that England was responsible for the war, and that Irishmen should fight only for their own freedom. They had sufficient effect seriously to retard recruiting ; and as the normal emigration of about 30,000 per annum was stopped, a dangerous class of youths whom the country could not support grew rapidly.

In Easter, 1916, came the rebellion. It was a failure, being suppressed with comparatively little difficulty. The execution of the leaders, and the indecision of the government, who were afraid fully to trust the Irish, and unwilling really to repress them, turned the failure into the making of Sinn Fein. An attempt to introduce Home Rule immediately, with the exclusion of Ulster, broke down ; and " partition " became another wrong against which the Sinn Feiners inveighed. In the elections of December 1918 they won easily, and proceeded to elect Mr. De Valera " President of the Irish Republic." The long-drawn-out civil war and terror which this produced is only too well remembered. Sinn Fein terror was answered by the " Black and Tans " ; neither side could claim much moral superiority in a guerrilla

NORTHERN NATIONS

warfare fought with the savagery common to that type of struggle, especially when Nationalism is added. English opinion, tired of war after 1914-18, became thoroughly disgusted. It was unwilling to continue the policy of war or coercion that would be necessary to preserve the semblance of Union, and the government, after setting up a separate Parliament for the six counties of Ulster, gave way almost completely. The Free State that was set up in Southern Ireland as a self-governing Dominion was not a satisfactory solution, but it was probably the best possible in the circumstances. Irish Nationalism was not yet content; and a series of disputes with Britain occurred as soon as De Valera became head of the Free State government. Fortunately, tempers cooled down somewhat with the passage of time, and practical considerations made it clear even to the most recalcitrant of Irish Nationalists that permanent enmity to England was inadequate as the chief basis for a healthy Irish State. Though partition remained a source of trouble, a friendly settlement of the outstanding questions has been made in 1938. As to partition, the British government had made it clear that Ulster will be included in Eire only at her own request. Nationalists should surely ask no more; but the extremists will.

The long struggle for national independence has therefore in the main been won. Eire has had to learn that government must be carried on even in a "National" State, and that the repression of groups who seek to alter the existing government by force is the first duty of that government. The ordinary Irishman, for so long automatically "agin the government," is finding it a little difficult to alter his old habits. But it seems clear

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

that the abandonment of the Union is final, and that Ireland will learn to live harmoniously with England. How long the partition will continue it is impossible to predict. An interesting and characteristically Irish feature of the position is that for such purposes as Rugby football it does not now exist ; Irish international teams are recruited from both areas. Perhaps this is a sign that in course of time an Ireland politically unified may be possible ; but it is no guarantee of that possibility.

The Irish question has demonstrated very clearly to the ordinary Englishman certain of the chief features of nineteenth-century Nationalism. Its enthusiasm and its single-mindedness are patent. So also are its complete unscrupulousness—Sinn Fein propaganda, whether in Ireland or in the United States, never worried in the least about truth ; the bitterness of its hatreds ; its intolerance ; its readiness to appeal to force ; and its essential unreasonableness. When men's feelings are really roused, reason is used only to find justifications for what they intend doing. So the Liberal appeal to reason is completely ineffective in a "national" question. So, too, the Nationalist has an assumption of moral superiority ; there is a general tendency to accept this ; but it is completely unreasonable. Sinn Fein terror had no more moral justification than the reply terror of the Black and Tans. The necessarily satisfactory result of a successful outcome to a Nationalist movement was also assumed in the nineteenth century ; but experience has shown that it does not inevitably follow. Continued domination of a group that demands national self-government is possible only by force ; and such long-continued application of force is generally felt undesirable. But the grant of self-government does not solve

NORTHERN NATIONS

the real economic and political problems that may exist ; nor is there any proof, so far, that a " National " government is necessarily wiser in its approach to these problems. The Irish instance also brings up the interesting point as to whether democratic political institutions are compatible with Roman Catholicism. The acceptance of authoritarianism in religion clearly makes it difficult to accept the contrary system in politics. It may reasonably be doubted whether such a disharmony can long be maintained. Logic is certainly not dominant in politics ; but to run two sides of the same life on contrary principles is a strain on more than logic.

The Irish question is also the standard illustration to the English that Nationalism is not a political question at all. The Irish Nationalists in the British House of Commons were not a political party ; they were prepared to support any political party which would grant them their national claims. This is the most important point about Nationalism ; it is not a political doctrine, though Mill made it appear so. His dictum " It is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of nationalities," which represents the usual nineteenth-century view, makes Nationalism appear to be a political doctrine. Actually, it is merely one way, though perhaps the simplest and most usual way, of ensuring that community which is the necessary basis not only for " free institutions " but for any political life. But in itself it is not political ; there is clearly no reason why all Englishmen, or Irishmen, or Poles, should have similar political views and sympathies. They may believe that their common nationality supplies the best basis for that real spirit of community which is the

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

basis of all social life. Unfortunately, a conscious national movement becomes narrow and intolerant ; and toleration is the real essential for " free institutions," or for any satisfactory social organization. The need for toleration is a lesson man learns unwillingly and slowly ; but it is the beginning of political wisdom. In the school of a Nationalist movement he unfortunately learns only intolerance. The dangers of this are obvious, and need no stressing.

CHAPTER VII

THE NEW STATES

1. Italy after 1860

Nation-States and peace. *Italia Irredenta*. The Italian Parliamentary experiment. The question of Rome. Venetia gained, 1866. Rome, 1870. Catholics and the Italian kingdom. The failure to secure unity. Crispi and foreign adventure. Violence in politics. The Socialist Party. The effects of localism and of illiteracy.

By 1870, as has been seen, Nationalism had succeeded in changing the map of Europe. The new Nation-States, Italy and Germany, had been created; and in the Balkans, Nationalism was steadily dissolving the Turkish Empire. Those who had worked most enthusiastically for Nationalism had assumed that, once their ends were gained, a better and a happier Europe would result, in which the peoples would live harmoniously together. The other great movement of the century, the Industrial Revolution, had transformed economic activity and everyday life, and was increasingly making the world one. Liberalism, as expressed in Democracy, was increasingly making the various States approximate more closely in political organization. Continued progress on these lines would gradually produce a world in which the Parliament of Man foreseen by the poet would be a reality. War, the outcome of the rivalries of govern-

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

ments, would disappear when governments were national and really represented the various peoples. As has been shown, in practice Nationalism generally overshadowed Liberalism, which disappeared in the excitement and the strife of creating the Nation-States. It seems to have been believed that this eclipse was only temporary, and that once national desires for self-government had been satisfied, Liberalism would automatically follow in time.

In fact neither Italy nor Germany really became a Nation-State ; but it is extremely doubtful whether subsequent international history would have been any more peaceful had they done so. Nation-States, in fact, are not necessarily more peace-loving than any other form of State. It has also been shown that Nationalism is fundamentally opposed to Liberalism ; its emphasis on the group makes it intolerant of the individual rights which are the very basis of Liberalism. It is essentially unreasonable, being based on feeling. This makes it far more powerful than Liberalism, and accounts for the invariable tendency of the masses to choose Nationalism when the two forces for any reason seem to be in conflict. In the nineteenth century some of the Nation-States were generally unaggressive ; but this was due to other causes than their Nationalism. Some, like the Belgians, the Dutch, and the Scandinavians, were incapable of aggression. They were not sufficiently large to make successful aggression possible. Britain was unaggressive in Europe because she had no reason to be otherwise. Busily engaged in building up a World Empire, and in being the workshop of the world, she had no desire to conquer territory in Europe, though she showed no tendency to surrender such key-points as Gibraltar and Malta, which she already possessed. She desired peace in Europe

THE NEW STATES

not because she was a Nation-State, but because she was an island State with extra-European interests. The idea that Nation-States as such would be peaceful has no foundation in fact. So, too, it had been made clear that Nation-States would not necessarily look with favour on other national movements ; they were quite as ready as other forms of States to dominate other peoples if they had the opportunity. There was therefore no good reason for anticipating international peace after 1870. The partial triumph of Nationalism had not made this any more probable.

Since the Nation-States had been set up as a result of war there was inevitably the fear of a war of revenge. It would have been difficult for Italy to be really friendly with Austria, considering how the Italian kingdom had been created. As, in addition, there was still an *Italia Irridenta*, antagonism between the two Powers was inevitable. Had the new Italy been sufficiently powerful, there can be no doubt that she would have fought Austria for the Trentino. Had she succeeded, it is difficult to imagine the two Powers settling down in real friendship. As it was, the Trentino remained one of the dominant factors in Italian foreign relations. Unsatisfied Nationalist ambitions made her a possible disturbing element in Europe. It was lack of power, not lack of will, that kept her at peace. It might have been argued that once she had become really united—become a nation, in fact, and gained the Trentino—she would be quite satisfied and peaceful. But even in the nineteenth century there was no valid reason for such an assumption. Certainly, the main task of the new Italy was to make herself really as well as nominally a Nation-State ; and that task proved more difficult than Mazzini and his

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

enthusiasts had imagined. The excitements of 1848 and 1859 had obscured for the moment the lack of any real unity of feeling between north and south ; they did little to create such a unity. The history of Italy from 1860 to 1914 is mainly the story of an attempt to unify the country.

Defeat, by compelling people to stand together, has generally been more effective than victory in encouraging Nationalism. A threat from outside is the strongest motive for sinking domestic differences. The expulsion of the Austrians from Italy, since it was accomplished by French help, probably came too soon. A continuance of the Austrian domination for a period would probably have united the Italians more thoroughly than anything else. As it was, fear of Austria was not strong enough entirely to banish jealousy of Piedmont. Probably, too, a dictatorial government would have helped Nationalism to become real. The tragedy of Italy is that she tried the parliamentary system too soon. That system takes for granted the existence of a homogeneous society ; without that basis, parliamentary democracy cannot be an effective form of government. Cavour hoped that by treating the Italians as a united people one would induce union ; but the experiment was clearly hazardous. If sufficient homogeneity does not exist, parliamentary democracy is much more likely to accentuate than to obliterate differences. Freedom, as all political theorists now agree, is possible only in society ; and that society must be beyond question before democracy can safely be attempted. To offer political and other freedoms to individuals who have not yet learned to live together in reasonable harmony is likely to postpone the accomplishment of that harmony. The necessity for a really

THE NEW STATES

homogeneous group as the basis for political democracy had not been realized in the nineteenth century. Italian history was to illustrate the truth. So the one instance in which Nationalism and Liberalism were really allied, and an attempt made to work both out together proved the impossibility of the task. Had the Italians really been a nation in 1859, their parliamentary experiment might have succeeded ; as they were not, the necessary basis for successful democracy was wanting. The result was likely to make them dissatisfied with parliamentary government ; and this is precisely what occurred.

The first practical problem facing the government in 1860 was the question of the capital. Turin was out of the question, both because of its northern position and of its Piedmontese associations. Rome was beyond doubt the most suitable capital ; unfortunately, it was the Pope's ; and he was still busy anathematizing his despoilers. To have seized Rome meant to risk almost certain war with France, with clerical opinion everywhere hostile to Italy. Cavour had declared in 1860 that Rome should be the capital ; but he hoped to arrange this by negotiation and not by the simple Garibaldian means of force. The Papacy would not treat with the robber kingdom, which it refused to recognize ; and in 1865 Florence became the capital. This was obviously only a temporary arrangement ; but it helped to keep alive local ill-feeling between Turin and the new capital. Even the war of 1866, which gained Venetia by Prussian efforts, did not enable Italy to take over Rome. Impatient Nationalists again decided to use force, and an insurrection occurred in 1867. Garibaldi escaped from his practical captivity to lead the attack, but though his

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

volunteers scattered the Papal troops, they were themselves defeated at Mentana by the French, whom the Emperor had reinforced. France still barred the way to Rome, and so lost almost all the gratitude her freeing of Lombardy had gained for her. It was not until after Sedan that Italy was able to take Rome ; even then, the Pope refused to negotiate, and would yield only to the show of force. Victor Emmanuel might boast to the Parliament at Florence : " Italy is free and united ; it only depends on us to make her great and happy " ; but even Rome as capital failed to work miracles, and lack of unity remained Italy's chief trouble. The Law of Guarantees recognized the complete independence of the Papacy, and assigned the Pope an income which he refused to touch. It did prevent international difficulties arising over the seizure of Rome. But the stubborn refusal of the Papacy to have any dealings with the Italian kingdom was a serious blow to national unity. When, in 1895, Catholics were expressly forbidden to vote in Italian elections, the acuteness of the difficulty for sincere Catholics may be realized. By far the greater number did in fact vote, and a Confessional Party was built up in the Italian Parliament ; but the position was clearly unsatisfactory.

Though the government tackled the question of brigandage, which was endemic in the south, with energy and without delay, it was some time before they succeeded in putting it down ; and it was felt by the south as almost a conquest by the northern army. The difficulty in extirpating it showed that it had popular roots. The old habit of making life tolerable by ignoring the government as far as possible was not easily got rid of. The country, too, was poor ; and the effort to

THE NEW STATES

appear as a Power strained her resources, and made taxation a constant source of complaint. Far more serious was the failure to produce real political parties. Without political parties, parliamentary democracy is impossible ; and in Italy local interests and personalities counted for far more than political views. The corruption in politics became a byword, and the management of Parliament a question of bribery of various kinds. Deputies were sent not to support any political views, but to see that the district got a railway, or a bridge, or some share of government contracts ; such deputies would naturally support any ministry which would promise what was desired. Even so, a deputy's life was made a misery by the constant demands for personal help ; all his supporters appeared to have relations who needed jobs, and expected the deputy to compel the government to find them ; even the success of examination candidates was regarded as within his competence. With such a basis, real politics were impossible in the Italian Parliament. The atmosphere of graft and bribery from below poisoned the relations between members, and governments lived mainly by their skill in management. The wonder is that Parliament managed to do as much as it did ; the accusation by the people that all politicians were corrupt and the whole system useless, was primarily a reflection on themselves ; but the system of *trasformismo* by which members of Right groups became ministers in Left cabinets proved how unreal political divisions had become ; and it was stabilized in 1883.

Unfortunately, some ministers tried to overcome their perpetual difficulties by engaging in external adventures. Though Italy was clearly not ready for such attempts,

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

there was the excuse that there was a steady Italian emigration. The temptation to try to gain some territory to which that emigration could be directed was considerable ; and success in such a policy might well make the minister secure for years. The pleasing prospect dazzled Crispi, who tried to expand the Italian possession on the Red Sea to include Abyssinia. The disaster at Adowa, in 1894, caused Crispi's fall, and checked any further colonial ambitions until just before the war. The tide of emigration, which reached 250,000 per annum at the end of the century, and rose further, reaching nearly half a million in 1905, continued to flow mainly to the United States of America and to South America. In addition, there was a regular temporary emigration both to neighbouring countries and to South America. These folk brought back most of their wages, and helped to maintain a slightly better standard of living than could otherwise have been possible. But this recurrent annual tide helped to unsettle Italian affairs and prevent political and social development. It is not really surprising, therefore, that Italian unity should have been far from complete even in 1914.

The sense of the unreality of politics, and the chasm between the government and the country, were maintained by the hopeless parochialism of Italian politics. Since the influence of secret societies was added, the political picture was very dark. Only the Socialists among the Italian parties had any real cohesion, or any political views ; and, unfortunately, they were greatly influenced by a quite irrelevant Marxism. Italian Socialism was a late development, the party coming into existence only in 1891 ; but it grew rapidly because it had a message and a programme, and it soon became

THE NEW STATES

important as a unifying influence. It was the first party to be nation-wide ; that is, it was the first real political party in Italy. And though it developed more slowly in the agricultural south than in the industrial north, it was a force making for real Italian unity. In fact, this very success became a danger. A good many Italians joined the party because it was the only party worth the name ; but their Socialism was a very uncertain quantity. All who desired even the most moderate reforms, and especially the purification of public life, were almost bound to become nominally Socialist. So, as early as 1891, Socialist *fasci* grew with mushroom rapidity in Sicily ; these *fasci* were land leagues rather than real Socialist organizations ; but their effect was to frighten the landlords, who feared that their power might be challenged. In 1893 they persuaded the Giolitti government to use force, and every effort was made to suppress the *fasci* ; and when Crispi succeeded to Giolitti, the "strong man" put the island under martial law, and a period which would almost have disgraced the Neapolitan Bourbons followed. The final effect was rather disgust with the government than any destruction of such Socialism as existed.

The lack of real political parties inevitably kept alive the tradition of violence. Any sense of grievance was likely to lead to riots, as peaceful agitation had no result. Violence makes real unity or stable politics impossible ; and so the vicious circle persisted. This tradition of violence was to become of great importance in post-war days ; it is vital to remember that it was a tradition, and not a product of those days. The failure to produce real political parties between 1860 and 1914 punctuated that period with outbreaks of riot, and the discontented

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

normally proceeded to use whatever force they were able to command. As has been mentioned, the government was unfortunately ready to show them the way. It was too ready to back up the fears of the economically fortunate by forcible suppression of anything to which they objected. It had some excuse in 1898, when the riots in the south were food riots, and there were no politics in the movement ; but the movement in Milan gave no real provocation for the massacre that occurred. It was essentially a protest against miserable poverty and partiality in the local government ; its drowning in blood made the government, to justify itself, magnify it into a Socialist attempt against the State. They thoroughly frightened the well-to-do, and made the idea of class war current in Italy. They also forced all those disgusted by military brutality into the Socialist Party, or at least into alliance with it. The attempt to perpetuate coercion led even in Parliament to a move to the Left.

When Giolitti, in 1901, made it clear that the government would no longer be the automatic ally of the propertied classes, and suppress all working-class movements as subversive, the discontent of the Italian masses with their conditions produced an immediate outburst of strikes ; even in agriculture strikes became common. Because of the tradition of forcible intervention by the government, many of these strikes were far from peaceful in atmosphere and method. Even a conciliatory government was bound to take action, especially when essential services like the railways were involved. So railwaymen were called to the colours in 1902 ; and in 1903 the government had to suppress a general strike in Rome and open disorder in the south.

THE NEW STATES

The policy of violence could not easily be abandoned. In 1904 strikes became definitely political ; they aimed at compelling the resignation of the existing Right ministry. In the northern cities especially these general political strikes were accompanied by a good deal of violence. Giolitti, the premier, wisely refused to incite riot into revolution ; the minimum of force was used to maintain order. The result was seen in the elections of that year. For the first time the Church withdrew its absolute ban against participation by Catholics, and the moderate parties won a resounding success. But the resort to violence in politics did not cease ; it remained a characteristic of Italy right up to 1914.

A further reason for the failure to accomplish national unity in this period was the widespread illiteracy among the people. In 1871, 69 per cent. of the population over the age of six were illiterate ; in 1901, the percentage was still 48. Even as late as 1930 it was over 20. In the south the position was even worse ; in 1871, 80 per cent., and even in 1935, over 40 per cent. Literacy does not produce intelligence ; but a population unable to read is clearly unable to obtain the information necessary for real political views. It is also terribly at the mercy of its emotions ; the orator has an unhealthy share of influence. Above all, illiteracy makes the parish pump all important ; the only really effective forces are those that obviously and directly impinge on the individual. So the failure to spread even the elements of education made it almost impossible to get the masses of the Italian people to realize the need for national unity. Their horizon was the narrow localism in which they had always lived ; and so the separatist tendencies remained. The only effective widening of ideas which they got

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

came from returned emigrants ; and as they came from countries which differed very greatly in essentials from Italy, most of these ideas were garbled or misunderstood ; and they naturally did not help towards a national unity. Unfortunately, they generally tended to confirm the feeling that Italy was a poor country, poor not only economically but in every way, with no future to speak of. Such an atmosphere is clearly not conducive to a healthy national spirit.

2. Germany after 1871

A Federal State ; the difficulties of creating unity. The religious question. Papal Infallibility, 1870, and the *Kulturkampf*. The Centre, a confessional party. Bismarck's defeat. The growth of the Social Democratic Party. Social Democracy and Nationalism. The German Colonial Empire. Militarism and unity.

The German Empire had been created by Prussia ; that was at once its strength and its weakness. It was a Federal Empire of twenty-five States, and not a unified State, much less a Nation-State. To turn the Empire into a Nation-State was a task even harder than to unite Italy. Even Bismarck did not think that for this purpose force was the best method. He had already proclaimed to the North German Confederation that he was working "so to constitute her unification that it may be preserved enduringly and with the goodwill of all concerned in it." He had tried to ensure this by exerting no pressure on the south German States ; but Bismarck was characteristically thinking not of people but of governments when he spoke. It was unification with the goodwill of the governments that he secured ; he was not concerned

THE NEW STATES

about the feelings of the ordinary man. A rooted dislike of Democracy, based on distrust of the masses, was the basis of his system. So the new Germany was not only Federal, but the chief partner in the Federation was anti-democratic. The completion of German unity was not to be gained by calling in the people to help ; like the existing Federation, it was to come from above. Unfortunately, the feelings aroused by Prussian ideas and methods were not always favourable ; and it was the feeling of Nationalism that it was necessary to develop and to harness. Under the most skilful guidance the task would have been difficult ; Federalism inevitably perpetuated the ancient localisms. Under Prussian guidance, with its underlying belief in force and its psychological clumsiness, the job became almost impossible.

The first serious difficulty the new Empire had to face was the inevitable religious question. The Reformation had helped more than almost anything else to perpetuate German disunity. Some States were Lutheran, others Catholic. The doctrine of Papal Infallibility, promulgated in 1870, was certain to cause trouble. The "Old Catholics," especially strong in Bavaria, refused to accept the new dogma, and the hierarchy deprived recalcitrants of their posts. Since this affected the universities and schools, the government was drawn into the quarrel, and the *Kulturkampf* began. The struggle produced the bitterness that is usual in religious quarrels, and caused endless complications in politics ; the ramifications of a religious struggle are many and varied. Bismarck, who disapproved of civil marriage, had to pass a Civil Marriage Act, and lost Conservative support by so doing. The Liberals were the chief anti-clericals, and

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

Bismarck, to his discomfort, found himself relying on Liberal support. Government prosecution made martyrs of its opponents ; and the spectacle of clumsy Prussian police chasing slippery priests amused those whose religious feelings it did not outrage. Worst of all, it made permanent a confessional party, the Centre. Bismarck's dislike of the Centre was based on its solidity and opposition ; the real tragedy was that it introduced into politics a party which was not really political at all. As Germany was not a parliamentary country, this was not so disastrous as it might have been ; confessional parties are an impossibility in a parliamentary system, which depends for its life on political differentiation ; but even in the German Reichstag they introduced an element which checked the growth of real political parties. Bismarck, having begun the *Kulturkampf*, carried it on with characteristic vigour ; and tempers rose so that his assassination was attempted in 1874. The death of Pius IX. in 1878 did not interrupt the fight, since Leo XIII., though less bitter, was equally determined not to give way. As Bismarck, on other grounds, needed the support of the Centre, it was he who gave way in 1880, though peace, which made the Pope the victor in the main, was not finally made until 1887. By emphasizing the question of religion, the *Kulturkampf* materially helped to check the tendency towards any real union among the German people ; a point of difference had been heavily underlined. By emphasizing the distinction between Church and State, and denying the moral claims of the latter, the *Kulturkampf* presented many Germans with a problem of divided loyalty. As the question was clearly of first importance, it is hardly surprising that the new loyalty which hardly yet existed

THE NEW STATES

yielded to the old. In any case, Bavarian Catholics were not likely to decide in favour of a Prussian and a Protestant. The old localism was thus heavily reinforced in the important early years of the Empire.

Bismarck's chief effort to promote national unity was the abandonment of Free Trade for Protection in 1879 ; and even in this national unity was possibly a secondary consideration. The belief that a high tariff wall would develop German industries might be well founded ; they certainly progressed mightily after 1880 ; but the idea that economic factors will greatly assist a feeling like Nationalism is mistaken. Nationalism, like all passions, can be completely oblivious of economic advantage ; when it is really roused, economic considerations simply cease to count. A further real step towards unity was taken in the administration of law and justice. Especially in civil law there was still great diversity among the various parts of the Empire. The difficulties of securing unification even in this limited field demonstrated the magnitude of the wider task. A Supreme Court of Appeal was not finally set up, and then at Leipzig, until 1879 ; and the Imperial civil code did not come into operation until 1900. Even legal uniformity had therefore a very brief existence in the German Empire before 1914. So, too, the social legislation by which Bismarck hoped to secure popularity for his system failed entirely in this object. His insurance against sickness, accident, and old age was an early move in State control and organization of social services ; and those services were appreciated by the working class. But as an effort to check the rise of Socialism among the workers, Bismarck's State Socialism entirely failed. The Socialist Party steadily continued to gain adherents

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

until it was by far the largest among the German parties. The tendency among Socialists to Republicanism, at least in theory, was alarming to a State so monarchical as the German Empire. Actually, the rise of Socialist parties unquestionably helped towards German unity. They were really political parties, and so united the working classes in all parts. Probably the growth of Socialism was the greatest factor making for German unity during the period 1871-1914. Superficially this did not seem to be so ; for since the German system was not a parliamentary one—the Reichstag was essentially a consultative body, and could not control or dismiss ministers—Socialists remained permanently in opposition. The impossibility of securing office makes for a certain unreality in politics ; it also makes for extremism, which is much more readily embraced when its adherents know that there is no danger of their being given the job of carrying out their theories. So German Socialists remained Marxian ; and their insistence on the class war and the international nature of the working-class movement made them appear anti-national. But such developments of talk and of theory were unimportant beside the creation of a nation-wide party, which did more than anything else to weaken particularism among the masses. At the same time there was substance in Buelow's statement : " The Social-Democratic Party is the antithesis of the Prussian State. . . . It will have nothing to do with German patriotic memories which bear a monarchical and military character." That monarchical and military character which had been emphasized by Bismarck's success prevented the Socialists from actively helping German Nationalism. So the party best able to help towards German unity was

THE NEW STATES

unwilling to do so ; by their very existence they were uniting the various German peoples ; but their prejudice against the existing State made them slur over this fact. This failure to ally themselves with Nationalism was the chief cause of their ultimate failure. But how could good Socialists look with favour on a Nationalism so markedly military in character ? Not that Socialists are, like Liberals, fundamentally opposed to the doctrine of force ; their belief in the need for force, for revolution, made them only partial opponents of the Bismarckian creed and State. There was therefore no really powerful party in Germany which whole-heartedly condemned the use of force.

The organization of the Empire internally brought out its federal nature. Its chief Imperial organs were the Bundesrat, in which the various governments were represented with varying voting power, and the popularly elected Reichstag. The Prussian King was *ipso facto* German Emperor, and the Imperial Chancellor and the ministers were responsible to and appointed by him. As a combination of Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg could effectively hold up business in the Bundesrat, the reality of State power is clear. This organization was bound to hinder the effective growth of real national unity, for the various States were naturally unwilling to surrender their privileges, and the special position of Bavaria remained as a standing reminder that the States were historic entities, with traditions and loyalties far older than the Empire. The inclusion of various submerged nationalities—the Poles in Posen, the French in Lorraine, and the Danes in Schleswig—also hampered the growth of real national unity. Conscious of their failure to produce real unity, and terribly worried by the

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

rapid and steady growth of Social Democracy, the government, after Bismarck's fall, tried to stimulate enthusiasm for the Empire by a flamboyant and adventurous foreign policy. This is the oldest of tricks ; but its invariable eventual failure never prevents governments from trying it. It had, perhaps, more hope of success in Germany, with its worship of force and of success, than elsewhere. It certainly could be argued that it was likely to appeal to German Nationalism.

Bismarck himself had laid the foundations for the new policy when, somewhat unwillingly, he entered into the scramble for colonies. He was never vitally interested, and thought it much better that France should busy herself in colonial adventures, and so forget her European quarrel ; and Germany was late in the field. Still, Bismarck in the eighties acquired for Germany most of her Colonial Empire, though he himself remained essentially European in policy and outlook. As the pilot was dropped by the young Emperor William II. in 1890, new men were to develop the new feature of Imperial Germany. Even if the underlying reason for the new orientation was the effort to stimulate patriotic unity by success in foreign affairs, there was the excuse that the New Germany was really new ; she was rapidly becoming the chief industrial country in Europe. The Industrial Revolution in Germany is a movement of the period since 1870, when she was still a corn-exporting country with a population of just over forty millions. By 1910 she was a great industrial country with sixty-five millions, despite emigration (chiefly to the United States), and an increasing need for markets. So Germany began to think of colonies more seriously ; to seek economic penetration to the south-east, over the

THE NEW STATES

shoulder of Austria to Anatolia and Bagdad ; and to try to get a foothold in China. The effort to make the German people realize what its government was doing was couched in terms which irritated and alarmed other Powers ; and it is doubtful whether much real support was gained.

Though the German Empire dominated Europe in the years before 1914, and her military strength was tremendous and rather blatantly advertised, she had therefore not yet gone far in her primary task of unifying the Germans. Aware of all the difficulties, the government seemed to leave this to the slow processes of time. In one way they were right. Conscious efforts to create unity are not likely to succeed. Real unity is normally the by-product of other forces. Like happiness, it comes best unsought ; it is discovered, possibly with surprise, to have become a fact. But that process is slow ; and by 1914 it had not proceeded far. Incidents such as the Koeppenick affair, when a shoemaker amused Europe by successfully impersonating a Prussian officer, the uniform being sufficient to ensure obedience to all his commands, and the Zabern "flogging" in 1912, illustrated a certain element of popular feeling even against militarism.

CHAPTER VIII

INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES 1870-1914

The Balance of Power. Italy and the Triple Alliance. France and Russia. The position of Britain. Effect of the South African War. The Franco-British Entente, 1904. The agreement with Russia, 1907. The drift towards war. The Moroccan crises, 1905-1911. Nationalism and war. The influence of Socialism. International Socialism unreal; national varieties. 1914, a War of Nation-States.

THE two new States were not able to attempt their task of unification in an untroubled atmosphere. They were two new States who might disturb the existing balance in Europe; and, as has been seen, Nationalism is no guarantee of peacefulness. In the period up to 1914 Italy was a junior partner among the Powers. France might be somewhat disturbed by the appearance of a Power on her south-eastern border; but Italy was too poor and too troubled internally seriously to hamper France. When, in 1881, France, egged on by Bismarck, suddenly seized Tunis, the Italians were greatly upset. There had been a steady emigration from Italy to Tunis, and Italy had hoped eventually to take it over herself. French action, which was contrary to her definite promises, made the Italians bitterly anti-French. So high was feeling that Italy, despite her standing quarrel with Austria over the Trentino, sought the alliance of Germany, the centre of the anti-French group. Bismarck,

sure of his ground as usual, told the Italians that the road to Berlin lay through Vienna ; and Italy actually joined Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance in 1882, and renewed the alliance in 1887, 1891, 1896, 1902, 1907, and 1912 ; and the alliance was nominally in being in 1914. But Italy, a mere junior partner, was never really comfortable in the German camp ; the Trentino made that impossible. She remained a nominal member largely in order to try to maintain her Mediterranean interests against the pressure of France.

But the appearance of Germany in 1871 was clearly a different matter. Here was the sudden appearance of a State which might well be considered the chief in Europe. A new balance was clearly necessary. As German population continued to grow rapidly, she soon definitely ousted France from her old leadership. Bismarck's chief anxiety was to prevent the possibility of a war of revenge. He therefore aimed at keeping France diplomatically isolated. The keystone of his policy was friendship with Russia ; and his diplomatic skill is shown by his success in maintaining that *entente* even when he entered into close alliance with Russia's Balkan rival Austria, and made that alliance, which became the Triple Alliance in 1882, the second basis of his policy. That kept France isolated, as it left her no possible ally ; Britain notoriously refused to enter into European commitments. Nothing angered the Iron Chancellor more than the failure of his successors to maintain his line to St. Petersburg. William II. abandoned the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890, and Bismarck had dark forebodings. They were justified by the announcement of the Tsar in 1893 of "bonds which unite the two countries"—France and Russia. The ground had been prepared for a

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

Franco-Russian alliance for some time. When, in 1875, it appeared possible that Bismarck might renew the war against France, and really finish the business this time, Russia as well as Britain stood by the threatened country. And France, intent on breaking out of the isolation in which Bismarck kept her, realized that Russia was her only possible ally. The savings of the careful French people not only made it possible to pay off the huge indemnity to Germany with unexpected ease, but also served to grease the wheels of diplomacy with Russia. French capital began to flow thither in quantity as early as 1888.

Thus in the nineties Europe was divided into the Triple Alliance, with Germany at its head, and the Dual Entente, in which France was the paymaster. So long as force was the accepted final arbiter in international disputes, such an arrangement would avoid war only because each side feared the other. No one objected to victory ; it was only the possibility of defeat or of a very expensive victory which prevented war from breaking out. Though Germany, unquestionably the most considerable single Power, was not a Nation-State, she was a conscript one. Her army was not only the most effective in Europe, it was a national army. Prussia had not been able to secure unification in Germany, but she did secure uniformity in the German army. In this she was helped by the spirit of Nationalism. Prejudiced in favour of militarism by the events of 1848 and 1863 to 1870, German Nationalism found in the army its most natural expression. It was possibly as tenacious of its monarchical memories as Buelow thought ; it was certainly as definitely militarist. Probably Bismarck and his successors really depended on this

more than on any other factor eventually to produce national unity. To them the army was all-important. So the army became at once the symbol and the means of German unity. The worst of such a policy is that it becomes necessary to use the army. Militarism cannot be satisfied for ever by manoeuvres. The nature of the German Empire made it practically inevitable that she should fight. Nationalism, had it been accomplished, would not have made this less likely ; the Nationalist spirit of which the army was the chief expression made it more likely. What the new Nation-States ensured was that any future war would be an affair of whole peoples and not a matter for a few professionals. Such a national war had not been known in Europe ; even the Franco-German War had been, by comparison, a small affair.

The prospect of such a war of nations terrified intelligent people in all countries ; but since they were unwilling to alter the existing system, or unable to do so, their alarm did nothing to reduce the danger. The only important Power not drawn into the maelstrom was Britain ; but her isolation was apparent rather than real. Her policy had always been to avoid alliances, but to be prepared to take part in any European war which threatened either the Low Countries or the balance in Europe. In such case she would enter the war to keep the Low Countries out of the hands of any major Power, or to prevent any one Power dominating Europe. There were those, generally wise after the event, who thought she ought to have interfered on the latter grounds in the Franco-Prussian War. When the South African War demonstrated the extent and the depth of the dislike felt for her on the Continent, Britain decided that isolation

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

was no longer splendid, and determined to seek allies. As her existing quarrels were with Russia, whom she feared because of India, and France, with whom she had long-standing difficulties in various parts of the world, it was natural that she should think first of alliance with Germany. There were no outstanding difficulties in the way here, and relations had generally been friendly. In fact we had, in 1887, helped Italy to renew the Triple Alliance by the offer of naval support against France, though we refused Bismarck's invitation fully to become a partner. Germany's colonial empire produced amusement rather than alarm ; and the anger at the Kaiser's Jameson Raid telegram died down quickly. That gesture of friendship with the Boers was felt to be one of the Kaiser's little extravagances rather than a sober expression of policy. So to Germany we went, Chamberlain, the active Colonial Secretary, being one of the driving forces. Germany haggled about terms. The motives of her policy are still obscure. Possibly she disliked our alliance with Japan in 1902 ; though the Kaiser's worry about the Yellow Peril is of rather later date. More probably Holstein, the power behind the scenes in German foreign policy, thought because of our existing quarrels we were bound to join the German group, and should therefore be made to pay for the privilege. When things did not go easily, Chamberlain lost patience, and told the Germans that if they did not make an alliance we should go to France. The threat was treated as bluff, and did not help the negotiations, which were finally broken off. Possibly, too, the anti-British feeling expressed by von Tirpitz and his group represented the view of a considerable section of the German governing group. That " blue

water " school naturally hated Britain as the effective bar to any world empire for Germany.

Failure to secure an alliance of itself immediately altered relations between the two countries. To be turned down was both irritating and humiliating to Britain ; and Germany soon regretted the lost opportunity. Inevitably she tried to blame Britain rather than herself. We promptly approached France ; and an agreement was made in 1904. The basis of this agreement was simple : in return for a free hand in Egypt, Britain gave France a free hand in Morocco. Egyptian affairs, always complicated, had been a perpetual source of squabbling between the two countries ever since the making of the Suez Canal ; the gradual tightening of the British hold on Egypt had been specially irritating to France since she was the original sponsor of the canal scheme, and had also, as a Mediterranean Power, always felt herself peculiarly interested in the affairs of Egypt and the Levant. To add to her annoyance, Britain at each step had proclaimed her intention of not taking control, but of withdrawing completely from Egypt as soon as possible. To have made an agreement with France about Egypt certainly reduced Britain's difficulties materially. To recognize France's special interests in Morocco, apart from the Spanish zone, was no great price to pay, as we had no real desire to compete with France here. Unfortunately, it rather suggested that the free hand given to France was complete ; but clearly all Britain could really do was to withdraw any possible claims of her own, and promise diplomatic support in future to France. Other countries which might have Moroccan ambitions might well feel that this bargain rather ignored them ; alternatively, it suggested that

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

Britain would back France in any trouble that might occur over Morocco.

The agreement with France was an *entente*, and not a treaty ; that is, there was no definite written agreement of alliance. Our old tradition of isolation probably was effective here ; we did not wish to bind ourselves in an alliance, but to preserve as much freedom of action as was possible. The disadvantage was that it made it very easy for some sections, at least, of French opinion to feel that we were a very uncertain friend, unwilling to be bound because we had no intention of doing anything unless we were compelled by circumstances. But even the Entente with France was sufficient to make us come to terms with France's ally. With Russia our disagreements were in Asia, since we hoped the dream of Constantinople had been finally abandoned. It was our Indian Empire which made us nervous and suspicious of Russia ; and it was these feelings which produced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. The Entente with France helped to keep down the temperature during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 ; otherwise the Dogger Bank incident, when destroyers of the Russian Baltic fleet fired on British fishing vessels, might easily have led to war. The accession of the Liberals to power in 1906 made no essential difference in our foreign policy ; Sir Edward Grey took over and continued on the lines laid down by Lord Lansdowne. So, in 1907, a Convention was signed with Russia, the chief feature of which was the partition of Persia into "spheres of influence." Undoubtedly, the German Bagdad railway, with its threat to both Powers, materially helped Britain and Russia to sink their differences.

The Entente also helped to detach Italy from the

Triple Alliance; and at Algeciras, in 1906, she proclaimed her support of Britain and France in the Moroccan question against Germany. The division of Europe into two armed camps was practically complete; and it was fairly clear to which camp Italy really belonged. Such a division, it has been held, inevitably meant war sooner or later; and peace-loving Liberals in Britain were very worried, and inclined to be critical of a foreign policy which produced such a result. In fact, the root of the danger of war was not the two camps, but the universal recognition of complete State sovereignty. So long as States insisted on complete sovereignty, there was finally no way of dealing with disagreements among them except by force. Relations between States, as between individuals, must be governed either by law or by force. Since no State was prepared for the surrender of sovereignty entailed in the recognition of real international law, force remained the only arbiter. That this was recognized was proved by the steady increase of armaments. No State dare be left behind in the race, or it would be unable to maintain its interests and its "honour." International anarchy remained, as it had always been, the European custom; and that meant war. The alignments we have been following did not create the war; they were themselves the result of the anarchy, which made every State anxious to have as many and as powerful allies as possible, to ensure victory in any conflict that might occur. "International rivalry" is the customary term to cover this period; "inter-State rivalry" would be more accurate. Not all the States concerned, as has been seen, were Nation-States; but had all been, the rivalry would not have been decreased, and so the customary phrase is not essentially

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

inaccurate. What was slowly being realized in this period was that any major conflict would be more far-reaching than the wars of the past. The creation of Nation-States, and of States trying to be Nation-States, meant that future quarrels would involve the peoples far more than the conflicts of an earlier day. Conscript armies, armed peoples, were becoming the rule in Europe; war between such States would be a very different matter from wars between the old dynastic States, fought out by comparatively small armies, essentially professional.

The war that ended the period is often called the first War of Great Imperialisms. This phrase is definitely misleading. Were it true, it is unquestionable that the leading combatants on the opposing sides must have been Britain and Germany: the existing great Imperial Power, and its most dangerous challenger. But when war actually came in 1914, neither Germany nor Britain was immediately involved. The war broke out over a Balkan quarrel, and the Powers immediately concerned were Austria and Russia; Germany came in as Austria's ally, France as Russia's; and Britain eventually as France's. But it is generally agreed that one of the causes of the war was the belief in Germany, to some extent shared in France, that Britain might not come in. Actually there was a brief delay before Britain did decide to fight; to see the war, therefore, as primarily a struggle between Britain and Germany is to ignore the facts. And if Britain and Germany are not the primary combatants, then to speak of a War of Great Imperialisms is misleading. It was the first War of Nation-States; a thoroughly nineteenth-century product. Nationalism, with its final claim to sovereignty, was the real per-

petuator of international anarchy, with its inevitable war. It was the realization of this which led, after the war, to the effort to create a League of Nations, to get rid of international anarchy.

After the creation of the Franco-British Entente in 1904, the drift to war in Europe became more marked ; but this was not a direct result of the Entente. To some extent the Moroccan crises may have been efforts by Germany to break the Entente, or at least to test its reality. But, as has been mentioned, Germany could plead that the agreement blandly ignored her possible interests in Morocco, as well as other peoples'. Such a plea is rather put out of court by the German Chancellor's definite statements in the Reichstag in 1904, when the Entente was published, that Germany's interests in Morocco were purely commercial, and were not endangered by the Entente. The Kaiser's visit to Tangier in 1905, and the sudden creation of a Moroccan crisis meant, therefore, either that Germany had changed her view, or, more probably, that the secret Franco-Spanish partition of Morocco had angered her. That partition was obviously envisaged in the Entente ; Germany's sudden change of tone suggested a desire to break the Entente rather than any special interest in Morocco. The crisis procured the resignation of Delcassé, the French foreign minister, which was undisguisedly hailed in Berlin as a humiliation for France ; but at the Conference at Algeciras, France was the real victor ; the attitude of Italy was proof of that. It probably helped forward, too, the negotiations between Britain and Russia. These excitements were part of the old Franco-German rivalry. The field might now be Morocco ; the real quarrel was on the Rhine. Again,

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

it will be noticed, Britain is a secondary figure ; she comes in as an ally and not as a principal. It was in no way surprising, therefore, that the crisis of 1905 should have been followed by the Agadir incidents of 1911, when again it seemed possible that a European war might be precipitated. It is noticeable that in each incident Germany was the Power that produced the crisis ; but this did not mean that she was uniquely to blame. Perhaps, with her militarist tradition and her belief in force, she was readier to accept international anarchy as normal and right, and to try to get her own way by throwing her armed force into the scales with something of a clatter. But crises of one sort or another are a necessary product of the disagreements of sovereign States. So the sending of a cruiser by Germany to Agadir was merely a symptom of the kind of difficulty bound to arise if any power imagined, rightly or wrongly, that its interests were being endangered, or even that some other Power was being unexpectedly strengthened. It was a sign, too, of her continued dissatisfaction over her virtual defeat on the Moroccan question at Algeciras ; she revived the Moroccan issue because she hoped to counteract that failure.

That the dangers inherent in the anarchy persisting in international relations were realized is shown by the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and the setting up of the Hague Tribunal for international disputes. Tsarist Russia, a "backward" Power, has the honour of having initiated this movement. Unfortunately, she herself proceeded forthwith to blunder into war with Japan. The abortive nature of these efforts to ensure peace lay not in faulty machinery, but in the stubborn refusal of all the Powers alike to surrender sovereignty.

Filled with nineteenth-century nationalistic ideas, they made the Nation-State the final product of history. Any derogation of the power of the Nation-State was impossible. That refusal to substitute law for force is the essential feature of the period. The refusal was a conscious one ; the proposals for limiting the freedom of States to be judges in their own case were made. It is sometimes argued that the refusal was essentially a governmental one ; it was the governments who were unwilling to surrender any of their power ; the peoples would have been more reasonable. Events in 1914 and subsequently show quite definitely that the governments in this matter accurately represented the masses of the peoples. Nationalism, the triumphant doctrine of the nineteenth century, triumphant because it is an idea based on a fact, on the reality of the desire of certain groups of people to live under one government, made the peoples quite unable really to desire anything beyond it. That so often it was developed during the nineteenth century by preaching hatred of the foreign oppressor emphasized its essential narrowness, and made it an exclusive and militant doctrine. Often, too, it taught an arrogant superiority ; the attitude that there were lesser breeds without the law. Such a doctrine could not tolerate any infringement in national rights ; and the right to be judge in its own cause is one which Nationalism has always made most emphatically. To suggest the surrender of this right, this sovereignty, by the State which was the outward form of Nationalism was the worst kind of treason. Emphasis on Nationalism made the failure of the Hague Conference certain. Governments claiming to represent Nationalism dared not suggest any surrender of sovereignty. That this

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

requires emphasis is proved by the statement by Professor Ramsay Muir, in a book published in 1916, that "if the whole of Europe could once be completely and satisfactorily divided on national lines, there might be good hope of the cessation of strife." Even if such a division were possible, the results would be almost certainly to increase the possibility of war. The Nation-State regards itself as the admirable and final product of history, and regards anything that trenches upon its prized "sovereignty" as an intolerable evil. It is not only evil in practice; it is morally wrong. Such an attitude cannot give "good hope of the cessation of strife."

Another possible safeguard of international peace had appeared, it was thought, in Socialism. Emphasizing the struggle between classes in existing States, it saw international struggles as efforts to fasten the existing control more securely on the lower classes, or to distract their attention from the position in their own country. It proclaimed the essential unity of the "working class" everywhere, and the need for them to unite against their oppressors, the ruling class. Wars between States, whether Nation-States or not, were to it irrelevancies; the real struggle was internal. Increasingly, it was suggested by Socialist leaders in the different European countries that the working class should refuse to fight in such wars. Part of the alarm produced in Germany by the growth of Social Democracy was the feeling that it would weaken the State in war; the masses might refuse to fight the foreigner, and prefer to attack their own government. Buelow's feeling that the Socialists were antagonistic to the German tradition of militarism was widely shared. There is no doubt that Socialist parties throughout Europe attacked militarism in the

period between 1871 and 1914; and they preached fervently and unceasingly the unity of workers in all countries against their despoilers and oppressors. They had, too, the confidence which comes from fervent belief, and makes men specially effective. Marxism had convinced them that the future lay with them. The triumph of the proletariat was inevitable, though it might be delayed. Such a doctrine makes its adherents peculiarly militant, optimistic, and difficult to suppress. Socialism, despite every effort on the part of all existing governments, grew rapidly during the period; that growth encouraged its votaries the more. Their triumph seemed to be approaching. Should international anarchy result in war, it was widely held that Socialists throughout Europe would be able to stop that war, even if they began a series of civil wars. There were even some who believed that Socialism was essentially pacifist. Such a view could not possibly be held about Marxian Socialism, with its emphasis on revolution and on violence. Marx had nothing but scorn for pacifists, and contempt for pacifism. Marxian Socialists, with their belief in the necessity for violence, did nothing to induce international or any other peace. They believed that the possessing classes would never willingly surrender their privileges and power; only force could unseat them, and force used ruthlessly and unsparingly. Lenin was a true Marxist. Their naïve belief that this use of force would be final, and that perfect peace would ensue, is interesting as an illustration of self-deception. Force cannot, as a matter of logic, produce peace; it may produce the quiet of death. The real basis of the Marxian belief in force is impatience. Its adherents want their heaven now, and are quite prepared, therefore, to fight for it. But

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

as Socialist parties grew, an increasing number of their members realized that the doctrine of revolutionary violence had little real attraction for them. They preferred the slower but peaceful method of gradual change. Fierce disputes arose as to whether gradual change could ever, in fact, produce revolutionary results ; the disagreements on this engaged Continental Socialism so fully that it had very little energy left for attack on the existing system.

Inevitably, too, despite the insistence on the international nature of its doctrines, Socialism in fact differed from country to country according to the special circumstances in each country. Thus in England, with its reformist tradition, its powerful social homogeneity, and its long parliamentary experience, Socialism in the nineteenth century was never Marxist. It was a national variety, characterized by Fabian gradualness and middle-class sympathy. Though internationalist in theory, it never was really comfortable with the Marxians of the Continent, especially since it became numerically important only when it became practically the political side of the Trade Union movement ; that movement had long ceased to be revolutionary. In France, with its individualist tradition, Socialism tended towards Syndicalism. It maintained closer associations with Marxism than did England ; but its Syndicalist developments were generally regarded with some suspicion. It was also divided, as Hervé made clear, on the very issue of the part Socialists should play in any war between existing capitalist governments. The most Marxian Socialism was the Russian, because most of the Socialists were exiles. In Switzerland and their other refuges they had plenty of time to work out their theories. Their disputes

resounded throughout European Socialism, except in England ; but their exile and apparent helplessness as a real political force confined their influence to theory ; and even in that there was a strong feeling that Russian Socialists were extremists largely because there was little danger of their ever having the opportunity to put their theories into practice. They were certainly internationalist in theory ; but it was perfectly clear that their real interest lay in the movement in Russia. German Socialism was specially interesting. Since the Reichstag was not a Parliament, Socialists in that body were in no danger of having to form an executive government. There was therefore always a certain taint of futility about Socialism in Germany. Only a political change that amounted to revolution could give Socialists real power ; they were therefore committed to revolution. But there was acute difference of opinion as to whether that revolution should be primarily political, or thoroughgoing. All claimed to be Marxist ; but the great majority favoured gradualist methods, and the attempt at political change. The minority pointed out with bitterness, backed up by the Russians, that this programme simply was not Marxian. Their disputes enlivened Socialist congresses, but had practically no effect on policy. The Social Democratic Party remained essentially parliamentary, and not revolutionary, in outlook. In southern Europe there was a strong tendency, especially in Spain, to move towards a Bakuninist anarchism, which suited the habitual individualism of the people. In fact, despite half-hearted attempts by various leaders, Socialism took on a local colour in almost every country in Europe. Its internationalism, therefore, as a safeguard for peace was of no real value ; lip-service

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

was paid to it, but on practical issues it was almost always quietly ignored.

“Power politics,” the view that every State is a final judge in any dispute, and that the only arbiter is force, was therefore bound sooner or later to lead to war. The development during the century of Nationalism merely increased this certainty, and ensured that the masses would be prepared to fight. National animosities, normally latent, but always easily able to be worked up, added to the European powder magazine. That no government really desired war did not ease the situation ; it merely made it probable that the war, when it came, would be blundered into rather than planned. And that is what actually occurred in 1914.

CHAPTER IX

NATIONALISM AND THE GREAT WAR

The appeal to Nationalism in 1914 ; its success. The position of Italy. Socialists and the War. The attitude of Mussolini. Italy's entry into the War, 1915, and its effects. The question of Poland. Nationalism and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Wilson War Aims. Nationalism and the League of Nations. The War and German unity. The collapse of Tsarist Russia. Marxist Russia and Nationalism.

WHEN Europe, hardly aware of what was happening, blundered into war in 1914, the really dominant forces of the period were tested. The test might be brutal ; it was certainly thorough. Would Liberalism, with its basic objection to force, and its belief that force was irrelevant to most political questions of importance, be able to check the war ? Would Socialism, with its belief in working-class identity of interest in all industrial countries, and its growing adherents, be able to prevent this clash of predatory States ? Liberalism was clearly helpless once war had actually broken out. It is useless to condemn war philosophically when fighting has begun. The only thing to do is to win the war, and then try to prevent its repetition. In any case, it has been seen that Liberalism was in decline throughout Europe in the early part of the twentieth century. It was far too weak to make any real effort. It was also not generally organ-

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

ized. Especially in continental countries, Liberal opinion was seldom concentrated in a single political party ; it tended to be vaguely and uncertainly held by a number of parties, and to be really dominant in none. Before a crisis like the war this vague Liberalism disappeared.

To Socialism the challenge was fundamental and direct. Would French and German Socialists fight each other ? The issue was not burked ; the Marxian Socialists saw to that. Promptly they condemned the war, and proclaimed that no real Socialist should fight in such a conflict. But when the war credits came before the Reichstag, the minority who supported this line were a mere handful. The same thing occurred in France ; and in Britain the Labour Party joined in a Coalition government. The minority in every case was tiny, and quite unable to affect the situation. And there can be no doubt that the leaders and spokesmen of the majority correctly represented the vast mass of their constituents. Faced with the definite choice between Socialism and Nationalism, the masses practically unanimously decided for Nationalism. Their country came first ; that was their deepest and most abiding loyalty. The war must be won before they could return to discuss Socialism. The extreme Marxians became a small group of leaders, with practically no followers. The picture is the same in every country which was plunged into war in 1914. The governments could not miss the lesson ; national solidarity, the need for national unity, the abandonment of party strife, the all-importance of patriotism, these became the constant themes of every warring government. The war was to be a war of nations ; the deification of Nationalism became the chief means of producing and maintaining the necessary fighting spirit.

NATIONALISM AND THE GREAT WAR

The test had shown conclusively that Nationalism was by far the greatest force in Europe ; the dominant factor of the nineteenth century was still dominant. The situation in Italy, which was not plunged into war in 1914, was especially interesting. There, as has been seen, Nationalism was still engaged on its primary task of creating a nation ; and the process was slow and apparently unsatisfactory. Not anxious to enter into a European struggle which would clearly strain her slender resources, Italy decided officially that the war on the part of Austria and Germany was not defensive, and that therefore she was not committed to help them. She had, in 1902, secretly pledged her neutrality to France in case of war. As a neutral, and the most important neutral, her alliance was eagerly bargained for by each of the two camps. The question of entry or continued neutrality was bound to be discussed by every party and group in Italy. The question showed how deep were the divisions in Italy, and how little homogeneity had yet been achieved. Even the Nationalist Party, which was steadily increasing in numbers in Italy before the war, was divided between admiration of the really united " strong State " of Germany, which made some want to enter on the German side, and purely Nationalist designs on territory, which made others favour intervention on the side of the Allies. Giolitti and what may perhaps be called the parliamentary group were for neutrality, with diplomatic pressure on Austria to satisfy national claims ; these would thus be obtained much more cheaply. The Catholics were also for neutrality, because Austria was Catholic, and they disliked anti-clerical France. Some Conservatives were pro-German ; most favoured neutrality, with extortion from Austria. The Republicans

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

favoured France and intervention, as did the Radicals. The Socialists, fresh from their condemnation of capitalist war in the Italian invasion of Libya, were for neutrality in any national capitalistic conflict ; but a small group of dissidents, headed by Bissolati, were for intervention on the side of the Entente. Most important of all, the great majority of Italians were simply not interested ; they did not want war, and were not vitally concerned in any of the issues raised.

But the war itself became an important factor in the situation. Here was the future of Europe being settled on the battlefield, and Italy, officially, was hoping to garner profit, like a vulture, from the dead. Increasingly, Nationalists became insistent that Italy must share in settling the destiny of herself and of Europe. And this feeling was not confined to the Nationalist Party ; it affected some even among the Socialists , and among them, Mussolini. Up to the end of September 1914 he took the orthodox party view, and was opposed to any intervention in a war of capitalist States. But the feeling that great events were afoot, and that Italy, if she were to have any future worth the name, must be concerned in those events, drove him towards intervention. To him that meant joining the Allies ; his sympathies were with France, the great Latin Power. It is interesting to notice that he justified this choice by opposition to Germany as the country of absolutism, regimentation, and over-organization, which killed life ; while France was the land of Revolution, the home of liberty and equality. These are clearly rationalizations ; what really influenced Mussolini was Nationalism, the feeling that Italy was playing an unworthy part, and that she must be roused to unite and decide her own destiny.

NATIONALISM AND THE GREAT WAR

He wanted intervention partly because he wanted action, and even more because he believed that war would cement Italian unity, which peace had failed to do. Since he failed to convince the Socialist Party, which stuck to the orthodox position, he was expelled from the party towards the end of November. He had chosen Nationalism rather than Socialism ; and though the Italian Socialist Party did not generally do so, it was Mussolini and his few supporters who represented the vast majority of Socialists in Europe. They too had chosen Nationalism. In consequence, Mussolini felt that he was right, and the majority of Italian Socialists wrong ; he felt rather than reasoned this. This dependence on feeling, on emotion, on what comes to be rationalized as intuition, is the characteristic of the ordinary human reaction to any great issue. Because man is primarily an emotional being, an emotion like Nationalism becomes dominant in such a crisis as occurred in 1914. Socialism, with its emotional appeal to a class loyalty that is comparatively recent, was thus powerless to prevent the war. Because Italian society was not homogeneous, because she had not yet become fully a nation, this newer loyalty was more effective in Italy than in the older Nation-States ; but even there it produced no revolution when Italy eventually entered the war in the spring of 1915. The Socialists were never whole-hearted about the war ; but they would not rebel against it. Their half-heartedness inevitably produced their ruin ; they lost their grip on Italian popular sentiment. Their failure to ally themselves with Nationalism meant that they would not dominate the future ; no party which opposed so strong a current could hope for real success. Mussolini realized this ; the failure of

the Italian Socialist Party to do so meant that he became their bitter enemy.

Italy entered the war eventually almost under protest, so far as her government was concerned. She was partly bullied and partly bribed into alliance with the Entente ; and the price offered was considerable. Not only was she to obtain the Trentino, and so at last complete Garibaldi's work, but she was to have considerable gains on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, which she would completely dominate. It is of interest that Masaryk, the later Czech president, noted in 1914 that the Italians were discussing Trieste rather than Trent, and were already thinking of African colonies, and of Asia. Her entry into the war did not produce the outburst of national enthusiasm for which Mussolini, like the Nationalists, had hoped. There was certainly less popular enthusiasm for the war than in the western countries. But her participation in the war undoubtedly did very greatly help forward national unity. The failure of the parliamentary government to show real enthusiasm made all those anxious to create national unity the more disgusted with that system. They had been none too fond of it in peace ; in war they came bitterly to condemn it. In any case, war is a fertile breeder of dictators. The special Italian circumstances made it very probable that there would be at least an attempt after the war to get rid of parliamentary government in favour of some sort of dictatorship.

The outbreak of the war, with the fervent Nationalism it produced, inevitably brought up the question of Poland. Poles would fight in three armies, possibly against other Poles. Hastening to seize the opportunity, Russia promptly issued a proclamation by which she

NATIONALISM AND THE GREAT WAR

tried to secure the support of Polish national feeling. "The hour has struck in which the sacred dream of your fathers and forefathers may find fulfilment. A century and a half ago the living flesh of Poland was torn asunder, but her soul did not die. . . . May the boundaries be annihilated which cut the Polish nation into parts. May that nation reunite into one body under the sceptre of the Russian Emperor ! Under this sceptre Poland shall be reborn, free in faith, in language, in self-government. One thing only Russia expects of you : equal consideration for the rights of the nationalities to which history has linked you." As Germany naturally made precisely similar promises, the Poles could take their choice. Their most effective leader, Pilsudski, fought on the German side, and his Polish forces materially assisted in Germany's success in that theatre of the war until 1917. When both Russia and Germany collapsed in turn, the prospects for an independent Poland became really bright ; and Pilsudski was diplomatic enough to send Paderewski, internationally famous as a Pole and a pianist, to Versailles to plead the Polish cause. As an ex-German officer, he himself might have been rather less welcome. An ardent patriot, he became the practical dictator of the new State ; and he promptly tried to gain further, and non-Polish, territory out of the disorder to the east which had resulted from the Russian revolution. Polish Nationalism, unexpectedly and almost miraculously triumphant after so long a period of oppression, immediately tried to revive as much as possible of the old Polish Empire. It seems almost incredible that so extreme and sincere a Nationalist as Pilsudski should be so quick to try to dominate other nationalities ; it only proved once again that Nationalism is an entirely selfish

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

creed ; though it might be thought that even selfishness would have suggested to so hardened a patriotic agitator and plotter as Pilsudski that to make new Polands of minorities inside the State he had done so much to create was hardly the best way of ensuring either its happiness or its permanence.

As the war dragged interminably on, and the fear grew greater that the masses might eventually refuse to fight any longer, the need to utilize every means of preserving staying-power, if not enthusiasm, made every Power emphasize and re-emphasize Nationalism. It seemed as though it was not merely a war of nations, but a war for Nationalism. While this was absurd, it was true that the national existence of certain peoples, at least, might be endangered, according to which side eventually proved victorious. As the strain grew greater Nationalism grew increasingly hysterical ; each side preached vigorously that the other was practically sub-human. This stupid vilification, which certainly seemed to be popular, was regarded as necessary to win the war. It was bound to have disastrous effects on the peace. Its worst feature was that it emphasized the bad side of Nationalism, which is normally quite sufficiently in evidence.

Meanwhile the Allies had naturally done their best to foment national movements in Austria-Hungary, as they would put one enemy out of the war. On the whole they had little success. The Dual Monarchy was not as united and whole-hearted in the war as was Germany ; but it stood the strain unexpectedly well, even though the Czechs from the first decided that alliance with the Entente was the best means of ensuring their own independence, on which they were determined. Masaryk's

NATIONALISM AND THE GREAT WAR

creation of the Czech State during the war is one of the few really romantic stories of that period of blood and iron. As it was impossible to create a hostile State inside Austria, a Czech army was created out of the prisoners of war taken by the Russians ; that army would serve on the side of the Entente ; and the defeat of the Central Powers would thus ensure the creation of a Czech State in Bohemia. Some of the other " submerged " nationalities carried on rather similar activities, though none was so well organized and maintained as the Czech. The Roumanians in Transylvania, where they formed a majority, naturally desired to be united with the Roumanian kingdom. When Austria-Hungary collapsed, it was clear that a series of national States would be the outcome. Only success in the war would save the Habsburg dominions ; and even that would almost certainly have been temporary, unless the Magyar policy was altered. Alone among these excited and hopeful Nationalists, Masaryk was considering a State which would include minorities, and was trying to ensure that in the new State, when it came into being, the national rights of minorities should be considered from the first.

As the conflict became more strenuous and exhausting, the need for declared aims was felt. Actually the governments involved were concerned merely and necessarily with the effort to win. But a declaration of aims might be some help in this. It was not until America came into the war that any intelligible general aims were produced ; and it is very noticeable that Nationalism appeared very prominently among them. Among President Wilson's Four Principles was : " All well-defined national elements shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded without introducing

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

new, or perpetuating old, elements of discord and antagonism." This principle can be regarded only as a pious hope ; it had little relevance to the actual situation in warring Europe. But at least it made Nationalism one of the major ideas on which the settlement was to be based. Among the Fourteen Points, the peoples of Austria-Hungary were to be accorded the freest opportunity for autonomous development, and the subject nationalities of the Turkish Empire were to be given absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development. Nationalism and Democracy were, in fact, the main basis of the Wilsonian war aims. The nineteenth-century idea that Nation-States would be peaceful neighbours was the real basis of these suggestions. Allow the dominant nineteenth-century force of Nationalism full scope, and the creation of Nation-States throughout Europe would produce permanent peace, or at least conduce greatly to that so desirable end. It is true that Wilson envisaged a League of Nations, which would introduce order and recognized procedure and law into the inter-relations of the Nation-States. That was a programme that offered a real alternative to the anarchy and power politics that had produced the war. But it is equally true that the creation of Nation-States was the least happy basis for such a League. Nationalism was not likely suddenly to change ; and unless it changed fundamentally, it could not work the League which Wilson desired.

And Nationalism had inevitably been exacerbated by the war. It was more self-centred, more passionate, more full of hatred than ever. The spiritual Balkanization of Europe was produced during the war ; its echo on the map in the treaties was inescapable. The war,

NATIONALISM AND THE GREAT WAR

by its very bitterness and strain, emphasized "old elements of discord and antagonism," and created new. An inflamed and chauvinistic Nationalism was bound to result ; mere exhaustion might disguise it for a moment ; but it would be the major result of the first Great War of Nation-States.

In Germany the war went far to produce real national unity. The German love of discipline, their genius for organization, and their military pride combined to produce a solidarity that was complete. Socialists forgot their Marxism ; even more remarkable, Hanoverians forgot the Guelphs. As increasingly Germany seemed to be fighting almost alone against the embattled world, German Nationalism, always military in tone, became increasingly triumphant over all the difficulties which had so delayed its development. As the pressure of the war grew greater, the Germans were cemented into a unity more real than they had ever known. At last particularism really lost its hold, and the national unity which had appeared almost impossible of fulfilment became a reality. When Germany finally went down in defeat, and the terms of the Treaty of Versailles reduced them to something very like a subject people, that national unity became a first necessity. Their defeat of 1918 did far more for German Nationalism than the victory of 1870. It also ensured an embittered Nationalism, fed by a sense of wrong and injustice.

Only in Russia was Nationalism not a major feature of the war. The Tsarist Empire, far more ramshackle in reality than the Austrian, was quite incapable of withstanding so great a strain. Its utter collapse in 1917 left a vacuum which was filled by Marxian Socialists. As Trotsky himself says, they did not begin the revolution.

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

It happened because the entire fabric of the State was in dissolution. "The whole truth," he says, "is that the fabric of the régime had completely decayed ; there was not a live thread left." The past history of Russia had given her a Socialist Party of a really Marxian kind ; and that party, as the only one in Russia with any internal cohesion or any real policy, eventually seized control. This revolution filled the western democracies with horror, chiefly because it took Russia out of the war, but also because, amid blood and strife, it really tried to introduce Socialism. This the governments naturally hated ; the sanctity of private property was the only sanctity for which they had a real regard ; and the people also disliked it. They, too, regarded private property as sacrosanct, in the main. There was a general terror lest this Revolution should be exported ; its doctrines proclaimed the possibility, and its early leaders all believed fervently in international revolution, and that their Russian success was merely the precursor of a much wider movement. But a major reason for the possibility of the Russian November Revolution was that Russia was not a nation. There was no sense of common interest or feeling between the small governing class and the great mass of the people. The normal use of French among the aristocracy, so that it was almost bad form to speak really good Russian, was a symptom of a separation that was far greater than anything to be found in western Europe. In the Baltic provinces the German barons had remained Germans ; but the lack of any homogeneity with the common people was almost as marked throughout Russia. A revolution that swept away the existing ruling and possessing classes was therefore easier to organize than it would be in a real

NATIONALISM AND THE GREAT WAR

Nation-State, where the feeling of common nationality tells against this sort of extremism. When, as soon as they were able, the victorious Allies replaced the Germans as the attackers of the Bolshevik system they so feared, they materially helped to establish it. The War of Intervention compelled the Russians to support the new régime, because it was the only Russian government. None of the so-called White Russian governments had any real existence; they were most obviously not Russian. So the great force of Nationalism came to be on the side of the Bolsheviks. Their leaders, committed to international revolution, were uncomfortable in this compulsory position of national leaders against foreign aggressors; but they could not avoid the fact. Naturally, they were glad to find increasing support for their government; but they gravely suspected its source. The subsequent development of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is, on one side, the story of the conquest of Marxian international revolution (to which Trotsky remained faithful) by the Russian Nationalism which found its exponent, ironically, in the Georgian Stalin. Though the Bolshevik Revolution has undoubtedly produced a society on a new economic basis, it has also done the nineteenth-century job of making Russia a Nation-State. That may prove eventually to be the greater part of its work.

CHAPTER X

NATIONALISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR

The "Balkanization" of Europe. The new Nation-States. Italy and the Treaties. The rise of Fascism. The danger to peace. Nationalism in post-war Germany. Versailles and Weimar. The rise of Nazism. Militarist Nationalism. Nationalism and Economic trends. The move towards Autarchy. The League of Nations and its failure. Extra-European Nationalisms—Turkey. The work of Mustapha Kemal. The new Turkish National State. Japan and China. The creation of Chinese Nationalism. Summary. Nationalism in the nineteenth century. Its dominance. Nationalism still developing. The dangers. The Totalitarian State and its claims.

THE most striking features of post-war Europe have been the almost universal collapse of democracy in the new national States and the rise of Fascism and Nazism. These appear, at first sight, curious results of a war to end war, and to make the world safe for Democracy, or even for a war of Imperialisms. They are not so unexpected as the result of the first war of Nation-States. Fascism and Nazism have appeared in the two countries which, as has been seen, failed to gain national unity in the nineteenth century, though they became States. This is no coincidence ; it is because Italy and Germany failed to attain to Nationalism in the nineteenth century that they have become Fascist in the twentieth. There is no breach with the past ; in each case the basis for the new form of State is Nationalism. So, too, the

NATIONALISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR

collapse of democratic methods in the new States need not be surprising. Democracy is a difficult form of government, and its prime necessity, as has been pointed out, is a homogeneous society. That essential has generally been wanting in the new States. Bryce, in a famous epigram, remarked of the reorganization of the Holy Roman Empire that in the Golden Bull Charles IV. "legalized anarchy and called it a constitution." To try parliamentary democracy in a State whose people have no homogeneity and no political experience is to do much the same thing. The attempt was almost certain to hamper rather than assist the unity which was the first necessity of all these new States.

In their redrawing of the map of Europe the statesmen after the war were unable even to attempt merely to set up Nation-States; various promises and agreements made during the war had to be taken into account. Even had they been entirely free, they would have found the tasks insuperably difficult; for national groups in many parts of Europe are intermingled in the most exasperating way. State boundaries must pay some attention to natural features; and so the new States must either include minorities or some of the group for whom the State was being created must be left outside. As a general rule the Allies included minorities in those States which they regarded as being on their side, and left outside some of those whom they regarded as enemies. So Roumania in its expansion included Magyars, Italy Austrians, and the newly formed Czechoslovakia Germans, while the new Hungary failed to include something like a third of all the Magyars. To some extent this was unavoidable, as the Magyars are geographically dispersed. Poland as set up by the treaties

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

included national minorities ; and she promptly added to these by forcibly seizing Vilna from Lithuania and also attempting the conquest of Ukraine, of which eventually she gained a considerable slice. In fact, the setting up of Nation-States was largely a pretence, like the legitimism of 1815 ; the real object of the victorious Allies was to strengthen themselves, and weaken their late enemies, among whom Russia was now included, because of her Bolshevism. But the setting up of the Succession States, which divided among them the territory of Austria-Hungary, and the creating of the Baltic States did make the new Europe more markedly national than the old. Naturally, most of the new States were comparatively small ; only Poland could pretend, in size and population, to rank as a Great Power. Large national groups had generally created their own States before 1918. This Balkanization of Europe, as it has been called, by creating a number of lesser States was apparently expected to help the maintenance of peace. Small States are generally unaggressive of necessity. But it is equally true that they can be a temptation to larger and more powerful neighbours. The small States of the nineteenth century had depended for survival chiefly on the jealousies of the greater. It was only too probable that this would remain the chief factor in the survival of the new small States.

Once again the position of Italy was peculiar. She was one of the victorious group, and might therefore expect to benefit largely ; and she had large ambitions. Further, she had the definite promises made in the Treaty of London of 1915, by which she had been bribed to come into the war. To her dismay and anger her claims were largely ignored. She certainly obtained the

NATIONALISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR

Trentino and Trieste, but only a small portion of the Dalmatian coast ; the promised Protectorate of Albania was denied her ; and she obtained practically nothing in the share-out of German Africa. She was treated, in fact, as a defeated nation. The refusal of Fiume rankled especially, and D'Annunzio, the poet turned airman, led a raid which captured the town. That he had eventually to be expelled by the Italian government itself, under pressure from the Allies, merely exasperated the Italians the more. Psychologically, Italy joined her lately defeated enemies ; she objected to the treaties almost as strongly as they did. This frustration and exasperation did more even than the war to further Italian national unity. The spectacle of the aged Giolitti, once more Premier, driving D'Annunzio from Fiume completed their disgust with the parliamentary system. With their traditions it was inevitable that they should turn to violence, and when in 1920 Mussolini stole the thunder of the Nationalists for his Fascist Party, which preached a combination of Nationalism and force, he began to make headway. On the Socialist side, too, the Communists, as the party of violence, gained ground. But they lacked leadership and organization, and their efforts, which culminated in the seizure of a large number of factories in September 1920, had collapsed by the beginning of 1921, when all the factories had been returned to their owners. Their failure left the field clear for the Fascists ; and the Communist attempt gave Mussolini the effective slogan of saving Italy from the Reds. Since the Italian propertied classes had always been nervous, the unreality of this slogan in no way diminished its usefulness. The need for unity was clear ; and by persistently sounding the national note, in which he

was justified by his actions since 1914, Mussolini was gradually able to gain a considerable measure of support. As his party was the declared enemy of parliamentarism, and believed in force as the essential means of settling all questions, his calling in by the King as Premier, in October 1922, meant the setting up of a Dictatorship. That Dictatorship was based on Nationalism ; all Mussolini's appeals and proclamations reiterate the same note. To preserve the Dictatorship and popularize it national sentiment has been worked up to a pitch of hysteria, and at the same time the nation has been thoroughly militarized. The Prussian system of militarist Nationalism has been adopted and developed. It is noticeable that Mussolini has repeatedly pointed to Liberalism as the real enemy ; not the Liberalism of the Italian parliamentary parties but the nineteenth-century doctrine. In that he rightly sees the antithesis of the Fascist deification of the national group and its worship of force.

The success of Fascism in Italy is therefore based primarily on its attraction for the Italian national spirit. Because it does this, and so satisfies the deepest desires of the Italians, it has been accepted. Its dependence on force is not startling to them ; force has always been normal in Italian politics. It is, of course, on one side the successful effort on the part of the propertied classes to preserve their control, and even tighten it. But that attempt has been successful because it has been able to keep on its side the immense emotional power of the desire for national unity. The spirit of Nationalism, frustrated in the nineteenth century, is still the strongest factor in Italy in the twentieth. Since it is allied now not to Liberalism but to the openly declared belief in

NATIONALISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR

force, it is clear that Fascist Italy is not only a possible but a probable disturber of the peace of Europe. The perfervid preaching of Nationalism with all the facilities offered by modern science is obviously successful. But it is not the modern facilities which cause this success ; it is their use for purposes to which people are already predisposed. Preaching to the already converted is the easiest sort of preaching ; and if the preacher is concerned chiefly with emotional response it can be the most effective sort. The flamboyance and megalomania which amuse the majority of English people suit the more temperamental and emotional Italians. That Fascism as a system can prove permanent is incredible ; but it has already done what is probably its chief historic task. It has at last completed Italian national unity. From the point of view of Europe in general this is fundamentally good. Nation-States promise a reasonable degree of permanence. But since Nationalism has been whipped into hysteria to accomplish this end, there are obviously dangers to the rest of Europe ; and as militarism of a noticeably flamboyant and aggressive type marks the new united Italy, the potential dangers inherent in all national movements are terribly accentuated. All the narrowness, the egotism, the tendency to look down on others, the aggressiveness which have been noticed in nineteenth-century Nationalism are exaggerated almost to caricature in post-war Italy. The attack on Abyssinia and the creation of a new Roman Empire are not merely attempts by Mussolini to distract the attention of the Italians from home affairs ; to satisfy them with glory for the loss of liberty. They are expressions of the aggressive Nationalism in which Italy has come to glory. Italians in 1803 and 1848 would not fight for Liberalism,

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

but only, if at all, for Nationalism ; Italians in 1938 do not want to fight for liberty, but only for Italy. The long delay in making Italy, and the means used finally to create it, have made her a State whose danger to Europe is controlled only by her comparative lack of force. The will for World Empire is there ; fortunately, the material basis is lacking. But Mussolini's success in breaking up the League of Nations and in forcing Britain to come to terms has delighted the national spirit of the Italians. At last they are a Great Power ; and they intend the world to know it, and recognize it in the most obvious way. The simple doctrine of force, intelligible even to the most backward, has been accepted because no other doctrine has ever really gained support in the country. Naturally, a triumphant Nationalism disliked the attempt to temper sovereignty represented by the League. This insistence on the complete sovereignty of Nation-States is unquestionably popular ; it accurately expresses the feeling of the ordinary man in all countries. That it inevitably means war does not prevent his obstinate adherence to "national rights." Italy is only a little more "popular" in this than are the older Nation-States.

The importance of Nationalism in post-war Germany needs no emphasis. The war, as has been pointed out, greatly furthered national unity ; it also maintained its historic militarist tone. The peace, with its ruthless suppression of Germany by the victorious Powers, completed the work of unification. At the same time it almost drove Germany to force. When the tiny Austria left after the Succession States had been carved out was set up in 1919, the Allies insisted that on no account must it join Germany. Austria "will abstain from any act

NATIONALISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR

which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence." Since the old Austrian Empire was gone there was no future for Austria, and especially for Vienna, except in conjunction with Germany. But to carve off bits of Germany and then let her have German Austria struck the Allies as very inadequate punishment of the vanquished. The new Germany, as a Nation-State, was bound to desire to include Austria. That desire could be attained only by force. The moral was obvious, especially to a people with the recent history and training of the Germans. The failure of the Allies to treat the German Republic at all reasonably made the Germans more and more associate that system with the humiliations of Versailles and the Ruhr. The Weimar Republic, proudly extolled as the most democratic in Europe, became indelibly marked as a subject State. It is not therefore surprising that German Nationalism turned once again to its older tradition, and saw in dictatorship and militarism its future as well as its past. The success of Hitler, considering his beginnings and the frequency with which he made mistakes, is in itself an amazing instance of how the support of a spirit like Nationalism will lead to triumph. His programme, with its borrowings from the Socialists and its obvious attempts to please all interests, was clearly unreal and insincere except in one particular. It was that one element of sincerity that finally led to success rather than the medley of conflicting promises. There could be no doubt about the Nationalism of National Socialism. That, and the appeal to force, were the two things which carried Hitler eventually to power.

German Nationalism in the post-war period was almost bound to become militarist ; the treatment of

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

Germany at Versailles and subsequently made that only too clear. Hitler added a peculiarly hysterical tone to this militarism, and also a most unpleasant anti-Semitism. This fungus of Nationalism is by no means new or confined to Germany. Prejudice is one of the marked features of Nationalism, and that prejudice has very frequently shown itself in anti-Semitism. It was developed to extravagant lengths in post-war Germany partly because German Nationalism was for years unable even verbally to attack its real opponents. Allied troops were in occupation until 1925, and for some years later there was real reason to fear French or Allied action against any German movement which might seem to threaten the dominant Powers. So German Nationalists could not openly proclaim their dislike of France or of the Allies generally. They transferred all their stored hatreds on to the unfortunate Jews. When Hitler also declaimed that Jews and Marxists were responsible for the loss of the war by stabbing Germany in the back, they gladly accepted this legend in spite of its obvious lack of truth. Returning militarism was unwilling to believe that militarism could really have failed in the war. To blame the Jews and Marxists made it possible to embrace once again the simple and beloved doctrine of force. In any case, when Nationalism becomes the sole basis for a State, it is clear that it cannot admit to full citizenship groups who are not members of the dominant nation.

It was a tragedy that the Weimar Republic had not unified Germany; the Republicans accepted far too much of the old régime, including almost the whole of its civil service. They also accepted the States; Prussia, Bavaria, and the rest all became Republics; they were not really and finally united in a single Ger-

NATIONALISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR

many. This too ready acceptance of the past was one of the greatest mistakes of the Germany of the immediate post-war period. Had the Social Democrats, who then ruled, really allied themselves with Nationalism they would have made themselves secure against any movement like the Hitler one. Again, economic forces and influences have been very powerful in the creation of Nazi Germany ; but the dominant forces have been political, and the greatest of these has been Nationalism. If Fascism is called hysterical, words fail to describe the extravagances of Nationalism as it has developed in Nazi Germany. A stupid and unhistoric Racism, with a whole series of myths in its train, has apparently been accepted. Painstaking German scholarship is being used to back up this fantastic edifice. All the dangerous and unpleasant aspects of Nationalism have been heightened to a degree that defies caricature. And in support of this essentially barbarous view the whole nation is organized as an army. The dangers to Europe as well as Germany are only too clear. Unfortunately, too, the Nazi régime has been able to offer success after success to the people. Even Bismarck was not so quickly and so dramatically able to prove himself right and the Liberals wrong. Hitler has been able to rearm, to denounce clause after clause of the hated treaty, to gain Austria—and is busy squeezing Czechoslovakia.¹ The days of humiliation are over, as he promised, and Germany once more dominates Europe. Even those Germans who cannot swallow the whole of the amazing Nazi creed must agree that National unity on an unexpected scale has

¹ The complete success of this policy in September 1938 has greatly increased popular support for the existing system in Germany, and the only democratic state in eastern Europe has practically disappeared.

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

been accomplished, and that the Third Reich is even more powerful than the First, and more dominant in Europe. Germany has at last completed the nineteenth century ; it is unfortunate that in consequence she is likely to disturb the twentieth.

The fact that Hitler is by birth an Austrian actually helped him in Germany. He was the better symbol of national unity since he was not a Bavarian or a Prussian or a Hanoverian ; he was a German, with no particularist attachment to any State in the Reich. It is therefore really natural, though it seems a little ironical, that German unity should be produced at last by an Austrian. His humble origin again was an advantage, just as it was to Mussolini ; a leader of a popular movement is the better for being drawn from the people. That kind of obvious, though quite unreal, " democracy " is much more readily appreciated by the masses than the real article, with its heavy demands on them. In any case, as has been pointed out, Nationalism is necessarily intolerant of Liberalism and Democracy. It aims at sinking the individual in the mass. That aim has always seemed desirable to Germans ; in the Nazi State they are doing it with German thoroughness. The spectacle of seventy journalists in a special uniform accompanying Hitler to Rome, in 1938, is a characteristic symptom of the most alarming of all the tendencies of Nazism.

These extreme Nationalisms of the post-war period—and the Italian and German instances are only instances of a general tendency—have grown up in a world which for many practical purposes had already gone far in the nineteenth century to become a unity. Above all, it was rapidly becoming economically one, with world trade developing to an extent undreamed of by earlier genera-

NATIONALISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR

tions. The reaction of extreme and conscious Nationalisms to this unquestionable fact has been most interesting. In effect, all have said with greater or less emphasis that if economic factors are denying or undermining national separatism and independence, then it is economics which must change. All recognize, when the issue is really raised, that there is nothing more inevitable about economic movements than about any other aspect of human activity. Economic developments are human, made by men for men, and if they clash with other activities of men they can at desire be altered. Faced with the choice between the economic betterment and the rising standard of living undoubtedly offered by increasing world trade, and a narrow and parochial Nationalism, the choice has almost universally been for Nationalism. Better a lower standard of living if it makes us less dependent on the foreigner. The choice has been particularly emphasized in Germany, where the frantic efforts at economic self-sufficiency are the inevitable result of a Nationalism which is at once extreme and militarist. If one expects to fight, one naturally desires as complete independence in every way as is possible. So science, instead of developing the general resources of mankind, is directed to producing substitutes for all commodities regarded as essential which Nature has unkindly denied to the country. That this obviously is wasteful economy does not prevent its happening. The desire for a closed economy is the answer of Nationalism to the economic unification of the world towards which Britain led in the nineteenth century. Economic Nationalism has become a marked and characteristic feature of the post-war world. It is the result of a definite preference for Nationalism as

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

against economic betterment. It is not confined to one State, or even to one group of States. To some extent, once begun it has forced other States into the same path. Britain abandoned Free Trade in this period because she was compelled to. In a world of increasing economic Nationalism, in which world trade was steadily being reduced, and tariff barriers and other restrictions reaching unparalleled heights, it was quite impossible for Britain to remain Free Trade. Unwilling to face the economic retrogression spelt by pure economic Nationalism, since it would have meant a far more serious reduction in the general standard of living to her than to any other country, she hastened to create an economic Nationalism within the British Empire. The enthusiasm with which this choice of the lesser evil has been hailed in many quarters in Britain is a further illustration of the astonishing strength of Nationalism. There is a school that definitely prefers the new and narrower field to the world economic unity which seemed to be growing.

Since even in this question, in which immediate and tangible interests might be expected to be all-powerful, the response of the twentieth century to the tendency to world unity is to smash it, the fate of the League of Nations need cause no surprise. In this economic question, too, the governments, even if dictatorial, correctly represent the feelings and desires of the ordinary man. He certainly wants a higher standard of living ; but if that standard can be attained only by the recognition of world unity, with its consequent limitation of the sovereignty of the Nation-States, then he will not pay the price. He supports the ideal of national self-sufficiency even if it be a low and somewhat precarious sufficiency. It is ironical that this attitude should clearly

NATIONALISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR

be dominating the world at the very time when Marxism, with its basic doctrine of the prime importance of economic facts, is gaining ground. In this field the twentieth century has turned its back on the nineteenth century, and is doing its best to destroy its works. The view, therefore, that Nationalism was the dominant factor in that century is being proved in practical life to-day ; and when the economic development of the century proves to run counter to its Nationalism, it is the economic life which is being changed.

Possibly the most important of all the developments in the post-war world has been the creation of Nationalisms outside Europe. Curiously, the internationalist Socialism of Marx has helped this materially. Simplified Marxism, with its doctrine of hope for the under-dog, has been widely accepted among "colonial" peoples. As the ruling group is of different race and nationality, it has led to what is essentially a Nationalist rather than a Socialist series of movements. So in Mexico the struggle against the American and British Oil Companies has become a national struggle, with far brighter prospects of success in consequence ; and the troubles in Jamaica are a symptom not only of economic distress, though that is certainly real, but of the stirrings of national consciousness. Even more important, for the immediate future at least, is the development of Turkish Nationalism. The apparently impossible has been done, and in a minimum of time. The story of the creation of Kemalist Turkey is almost incredible ; it moves from the improbable to the impossible with a serene and apparently effortless ease. The "Young Turk" movement of the beginning of the twentieth century was a Nationalist movement ; but it seemed likely to make little headway

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

in a theocratic State of which the Sultan claimed to be head of all the Moslems. The Caliphate was a denial of Nationalism, and seemed an integral part of Turkey ; to abandon that was practically to abandon the Koran, and that was unthinkable. Then the " Young Turk " revolution helped to bring on the Balkan Wars, the first of which was so disastrous to Turkey. The prospects for a Nationalist Party seemed bleak. In the Great War, despite her victories at Kut and Gallipoli, Turkey eventually collapsed in utter confusion. Her Empire disappeared, and it seemed certain that Greece would obtain Smyrna and the *Ægean* coast of Asia Minor, studded with colonies of Greeks for generations. But the very completeness of the disaster produced Turkish Nationalism. The Empire was gone beyond recall, but to submit in turn to become Helots was intolerable. In Mustapha Kemal the Nationalist movement found the leader it needed : a soldier and a fervent Nationalist. Despite his amusing attempt to create a parliamentary opposition in 1930, an attempt naturally quickly abandoned, Kemal was essentially the soldier and dictator. He succeeded almost miraculously in rallying the despairing Turks in a really national resistance. Unexpectedly they swept the Greeks from Asia Minor in 1922 and reconquered Smyrna ; at Chanak a fresh war against Britain hung in the balance. Eventually, at Lausanne in 1923, the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, which Kemal and the Nationalists had refused to accept, was abandoned, and a treaty negotiated on the usual pre-war terms of equality and discussion was agreed to. It is worthy of note that this old-fashioned treaty is the only one of the group which ended the war which has really been kept. But Lausanne, while it recognized the expulsion

NATIONALISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR

of the Greeks from Asia Minor, and the new Turkish State centred in Anatolia, did not solve all problems for a Nationalist Turkey. The abolition of the Sultanate, in 1922, and still more of the Caliphate, in 1924, were far more important and more difficult steps. Kemal had really set about making Turkey a nation ; and in this task the introduction of the Western alphabet and the abandonment of the fez are real milestones. Only a successful general could have attempted such reforms, and even then only one with the drive, the certainty, and the single-mindedness of Kemal. The creation of a Turkish nation is one of the major results of the Great War. Its final effects are incalculable ; but the spread of Nationalism to Asia may well be one of the dominant factors of the twentieth century. Fortunately, Nationalist Turkey seems really to have abandoned Imperial dreams ; she does not want back her old Empire, but prefers to be a real Nation-State. If that state of mind continues she will make for peace rather than for the disturbance of the Near East. The prospect is some consolation for the state of Europe.

In the Far East, too, Nationalism has become the dominant factor. The ancient and non-national civilization of China, a civilization with the longest and proudest tradition in the world, is being forced into Nationalism by the attacks of Japan. What the Western countries, despite economic penetration and occasional warlike episodes, failed to do in the nineteenth century, Japan is doing in the twentieth century. Making a Nation-State of China will produce results which will dwarf even the most glorious triumph of Nationalism in Europe in the nineteenth century. The possible repercussions on India are only the most obvious results of a movement which

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

must affect world history enormously. Nationalism has definitely become a world doctrine ; it is no longer confined to Europe. That will be the basis for the remainder of the twentieth century.

This sketch of Europe in the nineteenth century has been confined to a single issue ; it makes no claims to completeness. The history of France and of Britain has been practically ignored. The thread of Nationalism has been followed, to the exclusion of other factors, however influential. But it has made clear the thesis with which it began—that Nationalism was the dominant factor of nineteenth-century Europe, the most persistent of all the urges which characterize the period. Nationalism has remained dominant because it expresses the emotions and the desires of the great majority of mankind. They care more about their grouping than about the nature of the government of that group ; or at least they put the making of the group as the first task. Even logically they are right in this. No stable or satisfactory system of government is possible until a real community has been achieved. A community means a group conscious of common interests and feelings. So far, the most stable and satisfactory groups produced in Europe have generally been national ; the sense of common nationality is sufficiently strong to overcome differences not only of economic interest but of religion and language. That Nationalism is impossible of scientific definition is unimportant ; it is a reality easily perceived.

The modern tendency, especially of those with strong "left" sympathies, to see in Nationalism merely a disguise for the economic domination of particular groups or classes, and to regard it almost as something unreal, worked up by these groups for selfish interests, simply

NATIONALISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR

ignores the facts of recent history. Nationalism, as has been shown, has been utilized for ulterior motives ; but it has been utilized, not created. It is because particular interests have realized the existence and the strength of Nationalist feeling that they have been anxious to associate their own claims as indissolubly as possible with it. It can be used as a cloak by selfish or sectional interests precisely because it has substance ; a transparent cloak would be of little value. Because it is essentially emotional, it can readily be stimulated, and because it represents the widest stretch of which his natural selfishness is capable, the ordinary man keeps it inherently selfish and exclusive. " My country, right or wrong," is to him perfectly intelligible and natural ; any other attitude is really treasonable. That such an attitude must lead to war does not fundamentally disturb him. It may be unfortunate, but it is unavoidable. And it is unavoidable so long as the sovereignty of Nation-States is insisted upon ; and that is the very basis of all Nationalism during this period. How far this spirit can penetrate and become part and parcel of the mental atmosphere is illustrated by the completely uncritical acceptance by English people of the Anglican Church. The spectacle of a national Christian Church arouses no feelings of amazement, though clearly nothing could be more inconsistent with Christian doctrines. So, too, the Church of Scotland is calmly accepted by the usually more logical Scots. Nationalism is so deep-rooted and all-pervading that the flagrant inconsistency of a national Church claiming to be Christian is simply not observed. It is taken for granted, as a natural phenomenon. The recent attempt to create a German Christian Church, even, seems hardly to have made English people realize their

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

own peculiar position. Sentiment is far stronger than mere rationalism.

That Nationalism is not a declining force is clear. It merely began its work in Europe in the nineteenth century, and the task is being continued in the twentieth. As nascent Nationalism, if a term may be borrowed from the chemist for an element newly released, is peculiarly energetic, single-minded, and selfish, the prospects are not encouraging. Nations seem usually to find themselves in disaster and defeat, and the first result of the realization of unity is a tendency to obliterate these memories by expansive aggression. This may be an infantile disease of Nationalism, but that does not make it any the less dangerous when the infant attacked is a Great Power. It is quite possible, as many fear, that the quarrels of various Nationalisms may cause the collapse of the European civilization we know. Realization of the real root of the danger is no guarantee that it will be avoided, not even if that realization were spread universally. Just as men have refused the economic unification of the world rather than surrender Nationalism, so they might be prepared to smash the civilization we know rather than give up their national separatism. In fact, there are clearly tendencies in this direction visible to-day of which Hitler's statement, that if his policy meant injury to scientific development in Germany then science must suffer, is only an illustration.

Older established Nationalisms, having learnt something from prolonged experience, are less aggressive. No one really believes that either France or Britain will precipitate a European conflict. It is that very certainty which helps to keep the new Nationalisms strident and aggressive. Given time, these gawky and clumsy youths

NATIONALISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR

will doubtless develop into decent members of society ; the danger is that they will not give themselves time. The combination of Nationalism with militarism which is so marked in the post-war period is the most disturbing thing possible. Every one knows that the piling up of armaments cannot assist the cause of peace ; but even the most peaceful of peoples are all being forced in twentieth-century Europe to arm to the teeth. The economic strain of this is tremendous, but its psychological effect is even more serious. Callously, cynically, despairingly, or enthusiastically, according to circumstances and temperament, the European peoples are taking war for granted. As it can be avoided only if Nationalism is curtailed, they are probably right. That the present position in Europe is chiefly the result of Nationalism seems beyond doubt. As long ago as 1862 Acton, in his essay on "Nationality," pointed out the dangers inherent in the doctrine. His words are worth quoting :

"By making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, this principle reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the boundary. It cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the State, because the State would then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of the principle of its existence. According, therefore, to the degree of humanity and civilization in that dominant body which claims all the rights of the community, the inferior races are exterminated, or reduced to servitude, or outlawed, or put in a condition of dependence." Acton might have been foreseeing in detail Nazi Germany. He goes on, "Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

over the works of God and the interests of mankind. There is no principle of change, no phase of political speculation conceivable, more comprehensive, more subversive, or more arbitrary than this. It is a confutation of democracy, because it sets limits to the exercise of the popular will, and substitutes for it a higher principle. It prevents not only the division but the extension of the State, and forbids to terminate war by conquest, and to obtain a security for peace." Surely few long-range prophecies can have been so fully justified by events.

What Acton foresaw has happened because Nationalism really expressed the popular will. The hope for the future is that national groupings, wherever they are geographically possible, will produce stable communities, which may then develop politically towards freedom and civilization. To make it the sole basis for a community means, as he foretold, extermination or outlawry for considerable groups. This process, on the scale on which it is proceeding in modern Europe, is intolerable ; and when militarism is added, the horrors and tragedies of Europe to-day are explicable. They are none the less horrors and intolerable. The need for a recognition that Nationalism is not everything is urgent, but so long as the ordinary man remains Nationalist, as he is, the possibility of that recognition is small. Man's emotions, his strongest incentives and his most powerful driving forces, are carrying him with increasing speed towards a disaster that may well be fatal to the civilization he has laboriously built up in Europe.

The recognition of Nationalism as a fact of nature, and as therefore a valuable means of creating a stable community, was the greatest work of the nineteenth century. But to make an end of Nationalism for itself,

NATIONALISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR

to regard it as not only a basis for a community but as the sole basis possible for a community is both foolish and criminal. Unfortunately, a spirit, an idea, like Nationalism, when once aroused, is difficult to control. Its narrowness and intolerance are only too readily accepted by the ordinary man, who finds tolerance difficult and so is easily persuaded that it is unnatural. The modern Totalitarian States are the inevitable outcome of too great emphasis on the national basis of a Nation-State. They are self-condemned as backward by their denial of all real political life. But in the reaction from nineteenth-century individualism, especially in its economic results, the modern world overemphasizes the need for social organization, and is mistaking uniformity for unity. The Totalitarian State, with its claim to utter loyalty, is transforming Nationalism into a religion. It therefore denies not only all political life but all real life. Man can find himself only in a community ; only as a social being can he become free and develop his personality. But when Nationalism is elevated into a religion not only are national minorities reduced to servitude, but even the members of the ruling national group are denied all the benefits for which a community is created. To worship the group, and deny the value of the individual except as a mere unit in the group, is to return to the earliest stages of man's development. The Totalitarian State must be a passing phenomenon ; from its very nature it cannot last. It is an absurd over-emphasis of one side of man's dual nature—his need for social grouping, and his individualism. That so absurd a perversion should appear and be accepted in this twentieth century might have appeared impossible. Its development from the over-emphasis given to Nationalism has proved only

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

too easy. Man is still governed by his emotions ; and one so deep-rooted, so essential, so part of his whole life and make-up as Nationalism has proved overpowering. It has carried away reason, judgment, humanitarianism, and toleration in an apparently resistless flood. It is infecting the less intelligent, the more impatient, and the misfits even in older and stabler communities like the French and English. The cry for national unity, which generally means uniformity, is growing stronger. The warning of Acton was unheeded in his own day. Now that the dangers he foresaw in Nationalism if it became the sole basis of States have been realized before our eyes, that warning needs re-emphasis. Nationalism, intruding into the field of politics, has produced the Totalitarian State. The barbarism and stupidity of that creation should warn those States which have real unity, and need not worry about their roots, of the vital necessity for political differentiation, and of the essential nature of toleration. That doctrine, condemned utterly in advance by the Totalitarian State, is the sole hope for the future development of mankind. Readiness to tolerate differences within the group is the mark of a group which is real and has vitality. The group that dare not permit variations not only restricts its future ; it stands condemned as a group maintained by force or by fear. Nationalism is only healthy when it is normally forgotten ; the reiteration of national unity which arises so continuously and so tiresomely from Germany and Italy is the best proof that that unity is but newly established, and not yet very firmly. Allied to militarism, to the simple and therefore easily accepted doctrine of force, Nationalism has become the chief menace of the twentieth century. Beside this, the bogey of Communism is a

NATIONALISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR

harmless phantom. Economic reorganization can and will be undertaken by any community that really desires it. But militant Nationalism, if unchecked, means never-ending war, and a return to barbarism. The indefeasible sovereignty of the Nation-State is the real heresy which threatens Europe. Until that heresy is abandoned there can be no hope of real peace, but at the best a continuance of our present armed nervousness. The danger is the greater because this heresy, unlike Communism, is really popular ; it is firmly held by the majority of the masses in Europe. Popular reaction even in this country to any proposal for a real system of Collective Security is the proof—the only too clear proof—of that. Erected into a religion in the Totalitarian States, where only one view may be expressed, it has swept Europe into a hysteria which would be incredible were it not daily exemplified before our eyes.

The development in Britain of vocal and enthusiastic Welsh and Scots Nationalist groups is an unwelcome illustration of the continued strength and growth of Nationalism. No one wishes to deny to the Scots or the Welsh their national pride and their national peculiarities. But to break up the unity of a community which has learned through centuries of struggle and difficulty to become a real community on the basis of toleration of differences would be a retrograde step of the most serious nature. Britain is an example of the possibility of another basis than Nationalism for a healthy and civilized State ; to break it into fragments by Home Rule movements for its various constituent parts would not only be foolish ; it would be criminal. There is no real parallel with the Irish movement ; no one thinks of claiming that Scotland has ever been conquered ; and the "conquest" of

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

Wales was a feudal affair which affected the real life of the Welsh very little. All these movements for fragmentation are based on the delusion that only a national group is suitable for a stable State. The terrible results of that doctrine in Europe should surely be sufficient to ensure that in this country we continue to demonstrate that other bases are possible, and are often preferable. The German view of Czechoslovakia is that it is not really a State at all, because it is not, and cannot be, a Nation-State. Masaryk's attempt to create a real State based not on Nationalism but on toleration was the first and most promising effort of construction in post-war Europe. It is not perfect ; the Czechs generally found it difficult to rise to the heights of Masaryk, and really make equal citizenship the basis for their State ; but they have increasingly been moving towards that ideal. The irruption into such a community of Nazism is deplorable. By its very nature Nazism denies the basis of Czechoslovak citizenship. Its intolerance makes it an impossible partner in a democratic community. The struggle in Czechoslovakia is therefore the really vital struggle of the present day. If that State, with its non-national basis, can survive, there is hope that in time Europe may recognize that the Nation-State is not the end of history. Should it be destroyed by Nazism, or torn into fragments in a war, Nationalism will be further strengthened, and further enabled to destroy the future of Europe.¹

In the long run the lesson of the need for toleration must be learned ; but as toleration is fatal to the very basis of the Totalitarian States they will not hasten to learn the lesson. Only too probably they will try to maintain their own intolerant basis with the greater

¹ See footnote on p. 177.

NATIONALISM AFTER THE GREAT WAR

vigour; and that effort is likely to secure popular support. Unfortunately, the likeliest way to secure support for their exclusiveness, to ensure at least a temporary increase of uniformity, is to lead the nation in uniform to war. It is not accidental that Mussolini sees in war the real test of a State or nation: "War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it. All other trials are substitutes . . ." He accepts, as do all the Totalitarians, the essentially stupid doctrine of Nietzsche because he realizes that war is the best producer both of uniformity and of dictatorship. Already he has been allowed to give Italy that test in Abyssinia and in Spain. The experiments of Nazi Germany will almost certainly be on a more ambitious scale.

That Nationalism fits in with the psychological make-up of the average man makes it the more dangerous because the more popular. The greatest problem for the twentieth century is likely to be not the economic problem of the distribution of the wealth man can create but the basis of the society which is to produce that wealth. If the nineteenth century doctrine of Nationalism persists, especially in its modern form of Totalitarianism, the future is dark. Communities based on Nationalism alone are, in fact, impracticable in Europe. The effort to create them is likely to plunge the Continent into stupid and endless war. But unless the ordinary man is prepared to surrender his worship of the ideal of the Nation-State, his view that there should be no interference with *his* State, that prospect cannot be averted. Faced with the real difficulties of a complicated world, man tends to seek simple solutions; the most

A CENTURY OF NATIONALISM

general, Nationalism and force ; the less popular, Marxism. That they are not real solutions is irrelevant ; they appear to the masses to be simple and intelligible answers to the most pressing problems. That the only real answers are more complicated, and make greater demands on the ordinary man, makes it only too probable that he will insist on trying his simple short-cuts at whatever cost. That such attempted solutions are really popular, the ordinary view of Nationalism and of the value and the "naturalness" of force are abundant proof. This makes it very probable that the forces that built the Europe of the nineteenth century will be allowed to do their best to destroy it in the twentieth.

A NOTE ON BOOKS

EVEN for the reader confined to English, books on nineteenth-century history are embarrassingly numerous, and a considerable proportion have value. The best beginning is probably the relevant volumes (X.-XII.) of the *Cambridge Modern History*. These also have excellent bibliographies. For the earlier part of the century C. A. FYFFE, *History of Modern Europe* (to 1878), has not yet been superseded. He tells the story well. For the later period G. P. GOOCH, *A History of Modern Europe, 1878-1914*, is excellent.

Of the briefer histories HAZEN, *Europe since 1815*, is sound. By an American, it avoids partisanship. MARRIOTT, *A History of Europe, 1815-1920*, is slight, but a good introduction. GRANT and TEMPERLEY, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, is an excellent "Liberal" statement, scholarly and interesting.

M. KENNEDY, *A Century of Revolution*, is a sketch on much the scale of this book, but from a different angle.

Excellent books dealing with particular periods or countries are numerous. G. M. TREVELYAN, *Garibaldi and the Thousand* (one of a trilogy dealing with the making of Italy), is vivid as well as accurate. FRIEDJUNG, *The Struggle for Supremacy in Germany, 1859-66*, gives a German view of Bismarck. T. G. MASARYK, *The Making of a State*, is a statement of Liberalism as well as an account of the creation of republican Czechoslovakia.

A NOTE ON BOOKS

MAZZINI, *The Duties of Man*, is still the best nineteenth-century defence of Nationalism. LORD ACTON, *Essay on Nationality*, is published in his *History of Freedom, and other Essays*. H. J. LASKI, *History of European Liberalism*, is a useful survey from the point of view of a political theorist.

For the post-war period S. KING-HALL, *Our Own Times*, is a valiant attempt to give an orderly account, with a "Liberal" bias. J. HAMPDEN JACKSON, *The Post-War World*, is the best of the shorter books. E. H. CARR, *International Relations since the Peace Treaties*, gives an excellent brief account of recent international affairs. L. VILLARI, *Italy*, gives a Fascist view of recent Italian history.

Further and more detailed study is indicated in the various bibliographies which most of the above books contain.

INDEX

- Absolutism, 19, 20, 32, 43, 76.
 Abyssinia, 126, 173, 193.
 Adrianople, 86, 94.
 — Treaty of, 24.
 Albania, 83, 87, 93, 94, 171.
 Alexander I, Tsar, 23, 25, 28.
 Algeciras, Conference of, 145,
 147, 148.
 Alsace-Lorraine, 16, 70.
 America, 19, 97, 107, 109.
 Austria, 15, 17, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33,
 34, 35, 36, 37, 42, 44, 48, 50, 51,
 52, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61,
 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 76,
 78-82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90,
 92, 93, 94, 95, 121, 137, 138,
 139, 146, 157, 163, 174, 175,
 177.
 Austria-Hungary, 82, 162, 163,
 164, 170.
 Austrian Empire, 17, 30, 35, 36,
 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 48, 58, 78,
 90, 175.
 Austrians, 38, 40, 41, 42, 67, 68,
 122, 169, 178.
 Bagdad railway, 91, 144.
 Balfour, Arthur, 102, 110.
 Balkans, 17, 21, 22, 23, 28, 83-95.
 Bavaria, 24, 43, 58, 70, 131, 135,
 176.
 Belgians, 14, 24, 25, 120.
 Belgium, 18, 28.
 Berlin, Treaty of, 83, 88, 92.
 Bismarck, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65,
 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 76,
 86, 130, 131, 132, 133, 136, 138,
 139, 140, 177.
 Bohemia, 38, 40, 68, 163.
 Bosnia, 83, 85, 86, 87, 92.
 Bourbons, 15, 18, 19, 50, 55, 127.
 Britain, 14, 15, 17, 40, 52, 59, 62,
 65, 74, 76, 83, 85, 86, 87, 92,
 102, 115, 120, 139, 140, 141,
 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148,
 156, 174, 179, 180, 182, 184,
 186, 191.
 Bulgaria, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92,
 93, 94.
 Carbonari, 20, 52.
 Carlstad, Treaty of, 96, 101.
 Catholicism, 103, 117.
 Catholics, 103, 124, 129, 131, 133,
 157.
 Cavour, Camillo, 34, 49, 51, 52,
 53, 54, 55, 56, 72, 74, 122,
 123.
 Charles Albert of Piedmont, 40,
 41, 47.
 China, 168, 183.
 Communism, 190, 191.
 Communists, 171.
 Confederation, the German, 58,
 59, 61, 78.
 Congress of Vienna, 13, 16, 22.
 Conservatives, 99, 110, 111.
 Constantinople, 22, 84, 85, 144.
 Crete, 83, 90, 91.
 Crimean War, 52, 83, 84.
 Crispi, Francesco, 119, 126, 127.
 Croatia, 38, 41, 79.
 Croat(ian)s, 40, 41, 42.
 Custozza, Battle of, 40, 67, 68.
 Czechoslovakia, 169, 177, 192.
 Czechs, 40, 41, 80, 82, 162, 192.

INDEX

- Danes, 12, 59, 60, 64, 65, 135.
 Deák, 37, 38, 42, 80.
 Denmark, 17, 59, 64, 65, 71, 96.
 Disraeli, Benjamin, 85, 86, 88.
 Dual Monarchy, 80, 81, 82, 162.
 Dutch, the, 24, 25, 120.
 Egypt, 24, 31, 143.
 Eidsvold, Constitution of, 96, 99, 100.
 England, 17, 19, 20, 23, 25, 28, 31, 35, 47, 54, 58, 100, 103, 107, 108, 109, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 152, 153.
 Entente, the Franco-British, 138, 140, 144, 147, 158, 160, 162, 163.
 Europe, 9, 10, 16, 31, 38, 47, 49, 78, 83, 119, 120, 140, 155, 164, 168, 170, 177, 181, 184, 187, 188, 191, 192, 193, 194.
 Fascism, 168, 172, 177.
 Fenians, 102, 107.
 Ferdinand II, Emperor of Austria, 39, 40, 42, 79.
 Ferdinand VII, King of Spain, 18, 19, 20.
 France, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 35, 40, 45, 47, 51, 52, 53, 55, 58, 60, 62, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 76, 78, 83, 97, 123, 136, 138, 140, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 152, 156, 157, 176, 184, 186.
 Francis Joseph, 39, 53, 68, 79, 80.
 Franco-Prussian War, 57, 69, 141.
 Frankfort, 44, 58, 59.
 — Treaty of, 70.
 Frederick William IV., 44, 58, 60.
 French, the, 12, 20, 24, 50, 55, 69, 124, 135, 190.
 — Revolution, (1789) 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16, 21, 36, (1830) 18, 24, (1848) 35.
 Galicia, 38, 45, 76.
 Garibaldi, 33, 34, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 73, 123, 160.
 German Empire, 57, 70, 71, 130, 133, 134, 137, 141.
 Germans, 43, 44, 59, 60, 62, 69, 70, 71, 75, 78, 81, 137, 142, 166, 167, 169, 178.
 Germany, 14, 15, 17, 28, 30, 31, 32, 43, 44, 47, 49, 62, 66, 68, 70, 72, 91, 96, 119, 120, 130-137, 138, 140, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 153, 157, 161, 165, 168, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 187, 190, 193.
 Giolitti, 127, 128, 129, 157, 171.
 Gladstone, W. E., 13, 102, 108, 109, 110, 111.
 Great War, 27, 78, 82, 95, 101, 102, 114, 155-67, 182.
 Greece, 18, 23, 28, 87, 90, 91, 93, 94.
 Greeks, 21, 22, 23, 24, 31, 84, 85, 88, 90, 91, 183.
 Habsburgs, 36, 44, 82, 163.
 Hanover, 58, 59, 64, 68.
 Herzegovina, 83, 85, 86, 87, 92.
 Hitler, 175, 176, 177, 178, 186.
 Holstein, 59, 64, 65, 66, 67, 142.
 Home Rule, 102, 103, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 191.
 Hungary, 17, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 79, 80, 81, 87, 169.
 Industrial Revolution, 8, 9, 60, 119, 136.
 Ireland, 12, 102-18.
 Irish Free State, 102, 115.
 Italians, 32, 57, 68, 138, 139, 158, 172, 173, 174.
 Italy, 14, 17, 18, 23, 27, 30, 32, 33, 34, 40, 41, 49, 52, 54, 55, 65, 68, 69, 72, 74, 79, 96, 119-30, 138, 139, 144, 155, 157, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 190, 193.

INDEX

Japan, 148, 168, 183.

Jews, 11, 176

Kemal, Mustapha, 168, 182, 183

Koniggratz, Battle of, 68, 69, 80

Kossuth, Louis, 37, 38, 39, 42, 73, 80

League of Nations, 147, 155, 164, 168, 174, 180

Liberalism, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 27, 28, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 56, 57, 63, 72, 73, 74, 112, 119, 120, 123, 155, 156, 172, 173, 178

Liberals, 18, 30, 39, 41, 44, 45, 48, 49, 62, 63, 66, 67, 69, 70, 99, 102, 110, 111, 135, 145, 177

Libya, 93, 158

Lombardy, 20, 35, 40, 50, 51, 53, 124

Louis Napoleon, 45, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 61, 66, 68, 69

— Philippe, 24, 27, 31, 35

Macedonia, 83, 87, 91, 93

Magyars, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 78, 79, 80, 81, 88, 90, 169

Marx, Karl, 47, 151, 181

Marxism, 126, 151, 165, 181, 194

Masaryk, President, 160, 162, 163, 192

Mazzini, 30, 32, 33, 34, 46, 50, 52, 53, 54, 106, 121

Mehemet Ali, 24, 30, 31

Metternich, 14, 15, 20, 23, 27, 30, 32, 34, 36, 37, 39, 43

Montenegro, 84, 85, 86, 87, 92, 93

Mussolini, 155, 158, 159, 160, 171, 172, 174, 178, 193

Naples, 18, 19, 40, 49, 54, 55

Napoleon I, 14, 16, 18, 60, 96

National Socialism, 175

Nazism, 178, 192

Nicholas I, Tsar, 24, 26, 58, 75, 76, 77

North German Confederation, 57, 68, 69, 70, 130

Norway, 12, 17, 96-102

Norwegians, 12, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101

Novara, Battle of, 47, 50

O'Connell, Daniel, 102, 104

Olmütz, 58, 59, 61, 69

Papacy, 32, 78, 123, 124

Papal States, 27, 50, 51, 53, 55

Paris, Treaty of, 84

Parnell, C E, 102, 108, 109

Piedmont, 14, 40, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 57, 72, 83

Pilsudski, Marshal, 161, 162

Pius IX, 32, 40, 50, 132

Poland, 14, 16, 17, 18, 26, 62, 75-78, 160, 161, 169, 170

Poles, 25, 26, 62, 63, 75, 76, 135, 160, 161

Portugal, 17, 18, 20, 21, 30

Posen, 62, 75, 76, 135

Prague, Treaty of, 68

Protestants, 103, 104, 109, 133

Prussia, 14, 15, 17, 26, 32, 44, 45, 48, 52, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72, 75, 80, 130, 140, 176

Prussians, 59, 69, 70, 133

Radetsky, Joseph, 40, 41, 47

Rome, 50, 51, 55, 56, 119, 123, 124, 128, 178

Roumania, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, 91, 94, 95, 169

Roumanians, 42, 82, 85, 163

Russia, 14, 17, 22, 23, 25, 26, 38, 42, 45, 52, 59, 62, 63, 65, 77, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 94, 96, 138, 139, 140, 142, 144, 146, 147, 148, 155, 160, 161, 165, 166, 170

Russians, 75, 86, 153, 163

INDEX

- San Stefano, Treaty of, 83, 86, 87, 88
- Saxony, 58, 64, 68, 80, 135
- Schleswig, 59, 64, 65, 66, 67, 135
- Schleswig-Holstein, 59, 60, 64
- Schwarzenberg, Prince of, 39, 42, 43, 48, 58, 61, 78, 79
- Serbia, 84, 85, 86, 87, 92, 93, 94, 95.
- Serbs, 82, 85, 88, 91
- Sinn Fein, 102, 112, 113, 116
- Slavs, 42, 78, 82
- Social Democratic Party, 130, 134, 153, 177
- Socialism, 47, 74, 126, 127, 133, 138, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 159, 166, 181
- Socialists, 126, 128, 134, 135, 151, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 165, 166
- Spain, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 30, 153, 193
- Sweden, 12, 17, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101
- Swedes, 12, 97, 99, 100, 101.
- Transylvania, 42, 79, 80, 163
- Trentino, 121, 138, 139, 160, 171
- Triple Alliance, 138, 139, 140, 142, 145
- Turkey, 22, 24, 30, 31, 52, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 90, 93, 94, 168, 181, 182, 183
- Turkish Empire, 17, 22, 23, 31, 119, 164.
- Turks, 21, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 92, 93, 182
- Ulster, 102, 103, 104, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115
- United States of America, 107, 116, 126, 136
- Venetia, 53, 54, 55, 56, 66, 68, 119, 123
- Versailles, 13, 70, 161, 165, 168, 175, 176
- Victor Emmanuel II, 47, 51, 53, 55, 124
- Vienna, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 78, 79, 80, 81, 139, 175
- Vienna Settlement (1815), 7-17, 24.
- Weimar Republic, 15, 168, 175, 176
- William I, Kaiser, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 70
- William II, Kaiser, 136, 139, 142, 147
- Wilson, President, 155, 163
- Wurtemberg, 43, 58, 135
- "Young Italy" movement, 54, 106
- "Young Turk" movement, 83, 92, 93, 181, 182
- Zollverein, 57, 60
- Zurich, Treaty of, 53.

